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FOREWORD 
This module constitutes an integral part of the Main Comparative Report of the 
Science and Technology Policy Instruments (STPI) project, a large research effort that 
examines the design and implementation of science and technology policies in 10 develop-
ing countries (Appendixes l and 2). 
The STPI project generated a large number of reports, essays, and monographs 
covering a great variety of themes in science and technology for development. More than 
250 documents were produced by the country teams and the Field Coordinator's Office, 
and this proliferation posed rather difficult problems during the comparative phase of 
the project. It was decided that a Main Comparative Report, covering the substantive 
aspects of the research work of the country teams would be published, and that several 
monographs treating specific subjects would complement it. 
The Main Comparative Report is organized in three parts. The first consists 
of a short essay covering the main policy and research issues identified through the 
research, and the second contains the most relevant results of a comparative nature that 
were obtained in the project. These first two parts have been published by the Inter-
national Development Research Centre in a single volume in English, Spanish, and French 
(109e, 109s, and 109f). 
The third part of the Main Comparative Report consists of 12 modules containing 
material selected from the many reports produced during the STPI project. They provide 
the supporting material for the findings described and the assertions made in the first 
two parts of the Main Comparative Report. 
The modules were prepared by several consultants, and given the diversity of 
topics covered, the IDRC staff did not consider it desirable nor possible to impose a 
single format or structure for their preparation. The reader will find a diversity of 
styles and structures in the modules and will find that the selection of texts reflects 
the views of the consultant who compiled the module. However, the modules were prepared 
in close collaboration with the Field Coordinator and were also submitted to a STPI 
editorial committee who ensured that they provided a representative sample of STPI 
material. They should be read in conjunction with the first two parts of the Main 
Comparative Report. 
Francisco R. Sagasti* 
Field Coordinator 
Science and Technology Policy 
Instruments (STPI) Project 
*Present address: Grupo Analisis para el Desarrollo (GRADE), Apartado L. 18-5008, 
Miraflores, Lima 18, Peru. 
7 
INTRODUCTION 
The policy instruments described in this module comprise all those measures put 
into effect by governments that affect the structure and growth of industry and the be-
haviour of industrial firms, thus defining the pattern of demand for technology. These 
instruments constitute in fact an implicit policy in the field of scientific and tech-
nological development, and together with the instruments of explicit policies form the 
centre of attention of the STPI research effort. It must be underlined that the ex-
amination of these implicit policy instruments unquestionably demonstrates that tech-
nological decisions are in essence a dependent variable, affected and molded by the 
primary decisions of an industrial enterprise (i.e., selection of output mix and related 
decisions). 
The instruments in this category affect the industrial fields in which technology 
is demanded, the sources to which this demand is addressed, the conditions under which 
this demand is satisfied, and in general the growth and develoJlllent of indigenous 
scientific and technological capabilities. In general, these instruments do not act in 
a direct way to exert a demand pressure on the local research and development infra-
structure. An important exception is the possibility of using directly the purchasing 
power of the state to create a demand for local scientific and technological inputs. But 
by and large, these policy instruments affect the pattern of demand for technology through 
their impact on a wide variety of decisions at the industrial enterprise level, which in 
turn have implications for the demand of technology. 
As will be seen, these instruments can affect the type of technology incorporated 
into production by an industrial enterprise in terms of factor proportions, use of 
natural resources, and raw materials. They can affect a decision to import a given tech-
nology or to carry out technological research and development activities at the firm 
level. Furthermore, these instruments can be said to have a general impact on all tech-
nological decisions of firms (whether they are classified as major or minor) through 
their effects on the decisions on the output mix of industrial firms as well as their 
impact on industrial market structures. 
It is interesting that in spite of the diversity in (a) the types of instruments 
analyzed in the different countries participating in the STPI project and (b) the 
heterogeneity of the industrial branches surveyed (limited to five branches with very 
different characteristics), there is a striking uniformity in the resultant implicit 
policies for scientific and technological development. As will be seen, lack of selec-
tivity (i.e., a general across-the-board type of orientation) may account partly for this 
uniformity. 
A very important group of instruments that have an implicit science and tech-
nology policy is not included in this module. These are the instruments of protection1sm 
(tariffs and quantitative controls), which have been a major component in the strategy 
of industrial development of many countries participating in the STPI project. Because 
of their impact on the imports of embodied and disembodied technology they are examined 
in Module 6 on the instruments that affect the imports of technology. (Their impact on 
imports of disembodied technology is felt through the way they affect imports and import 
substitution of goods that require different disembodied technologies for their 
production.) The instruments included in this module are the following: 
Industrial Programing and Mechanisms for Setting Priorities for Industry: These 
policy instruments consist of legislation, incentives, prohibitions, and other inter-
ventionist measures aimed at setting up and developing a country's industrial structure. 
These instruments are inserted into the framework of import substitution or export pro-
motion industrialization strategies and are redesigned when the strategy changes as in 
the case of the recent emphasis given by several STPI countries to the development of 
basic and capital goods industries. 
Industrial Financing Mechanisms: The main role of industrial financing instru-
ments relates to their impact on the pattern of industrial growth and hence to the 
demand for technological inputs. They may be considered as the most powerful instruments 
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when the state controls their operations, in particular when dealing with large projects 
that go beyond the financial possibilities of a given enterprise or group of firms. Their 
role can also be decisive in reorienting demand for engineering services and industrial 
R&D toward local suppliers. 
State Purchasing Power: Next to industrial programing and financing, the use of 
state purchasing power can be considered among the instruments with a key role to play in 
defining the patterns of demand for technology. In most of the countries studied, the 
state budgets represent a very large proportion of total consumption and of total invest-
ments, and in many STPI countries the state has become a direct producer, particularly in 
the basic industries sector. 
Fiscal Measures: Measures related to the fiscal treatment given to enterprises 
(sometimes associated with subsidies, price control mechanisms, and credits) aim at 
modifying the environment that determines business decisions, with the expectation of 
achieving an effective change in business behaviour. 
Price Controls: The effects of price controls on the demand for technological 
inputs cannot be clearly defined. They can increase profitability in a given industrial 
branch if it is a question of a guaranteed minimum price, or vice versa they can increase 
profitability if it is a question of a maximum price. The only case examined in the STPI 
project was the Colombian price control mechanism. 
Export Promotion Measures: Most of the developing countries that have achieved a 
certain degree of import substitution industrialization have attempted to break their 
growth bottlenecks both by encouraging exports and by increasing import substitution. 
This may result in important reorientations in the demand for technological inputs. 
INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMING AND MECHANISMS FOR 
SETTING PRIORITIES FOR INDUSTRY 
This section describes the legal and institutional devices used by the state to 
shape the industrial structure. These policy instruments consist of legislation, in-
centives, prohibitions, and other interventionist measures aimed at establishing and 
developing the country's industrial structure. These instruments are inserted into the 
framework of import substitution or export promotion industrialization strategies and are 
redesigned when the strategy changes, as in the case of the recent emphasis given by 
several STPI countries to the development of basic and capital goods industries. 
In most STPI countries these programing instruments were found to be not very 
effective, for they were mostly indicative, had little selectivity, and their effect 
tended to be considerably weakened by other contextual factors, such as the country's 
general economic situation and upheavals in the international economy. However, indirect 
instruments for technological policies, the different forms of industrial programing 
and the means used for defining industrial priorities could be of great importance 
because, by influencing the structure of industry, they also condition its technological 
requirements. 
This section discusses briefly the most important findings concerning instruments 
for industrial programing, and includes the following cases: 
Mexico - Manufacturing programs. 
The law for the promotion of new and necessary industries. 
The decree concerning industrial decentralization and development. 
Peru - The general law of industries. 
Korea Instruments for export promotion. 
The machinery industry promotion law. 
Argentina - The law on the reconversion of the automobile industry. 
- Regional industrial promotion instruments. 
India - The fifth five-year plan for the telecommunications and 
electronics industry. 
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These are, of course, not the only instruments used in each country, but they 
are the ones that were selected for study by the respective STPI teams. 
The instruments for industrial programing examined can be classified in four 
broad categories, described below; the categories reflect a particular industrialization 
strategy that defines their consistency, although the set of instruments for a given 
country seldom falls completely 1n one category or another. 
(a) The first category consists of a broad system of incentives with few or no 
obligations on the part of the enterprises that are supposed to benefit from them. These 
are intended to modify the economic environment for the enterprise so as to orient its 
behaviour in a desired direction, particularly in terms of investments. These in-
centives modify the structure of rewards for intervening in a particular field or area 
of industrial activity. The approach followed by Korea fits roughly into this pattern. 
(b) A second category consists of a system of incentives closely linked to a set 
of state controls, but limited to an agreement whereby if the private firm complies with 
certain requirements affecting its business conduct (which refer mostly to the orienta-
tion of new investments or reinvestments), the state grants the enterprise a set of 
benefits and incentives. The approach followed by Mexico conforms to this pattern. 
(c) Another category covers a system of compulsory constraints which limit the 
scope of action for the enterprise. In this case the entrepreneurs, even at the 
expense of their profits, have to modify their behaviour to satisfy a given industrial 
policy defined by the state. Through this mechanism the state attempts to reshape the 
industrial structure without getting directly involved in productive activities. The 
Argentinian case fits roughly into this pattern. 
(d) Finally, the state can also intervene actively and directly in shaping the 
industrial structure through the establishment of public enterprises, or through joint 
ventures with private enterprises where the financial or equity position of the state 
is generally decisive. This kind of instrument has usually been resorted to in the basic 
industry sector where investments and risks are high and profit expectations low, but 
it can also extend to many other areas of industrial activity, as in Peru. 
In view of the above typology, the instruments for industrial programing 
examined tend to fall mostly into the first two categories and to have a rather weak 
influence on the process of determining the industrial structure. Furthermore, when 
the instruments acquire greater compulsory power, problems emerge related to the dif-
ficulties for the state to regulate industrial growth strictly and to run vast industrial 
programs. Most STPI countries, therefore, have let market forces shape their industrial 
structures, with the state assuming a passive role. This has led to the concentration 
of capital in the hands of large enterprises (where foreign capital predominates) and 
to regressive patterns of income distribution. 
A further issue that confounds the impact of state intervention in shaping 
industry is the fact that industrial programing mechanisms usually have been based on 
rather general economic considerations responding to immediate balance of payments, 
shortage of inputs, or similar problems, rather than to rationally conceived industri-
alization plans. This implied the indiscriminate support of all types of industries, 
which for the most part focused primarily on the internal market, although Korea is an 
exception in the sense that indiscriminate support was given mainly to export-oriented 
industries. With few and recent exceptions, this also meant that little attention was 
paid to the demands for technical inputs that industry would require. 
Nevertheless, industrial programing and the mechanisms for defining priorities 
could become key instruments because they are supposed to define the structure of 
industry, which in turn shapes the pattern of demand for technology. This can be seen, 
for example, in the fact that a specialized, well-articulated (in terms of backward and 
forward linkages) industrial system can provide a solid basis for continuity in tech-
nology purchases, both at home and abroad, for the absorption of technology and for the 
negotiation of technology imports. This would improve the possibility of developing 
an indigenous capacity in selected industries, manufacturing enterprises, engineering 
firms, and research laboratories. Also, the promotion of capital goods industries, 
which develop and change in constant interaction with the industries that use these 
capital goods, could also have important positive effects on technological development, 
provided a certain degree of specialization is allowed. Several STPI countries have 
realized this (particularly Brazil, Korea, and Mexico) and have taken measures to 
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ensure the rapid and steady growth of their capital goods industries. 
Manufacturing Programs 
In 1965 manufacturing programs, designed as an instrument to increase the degree 
of national integration of industry and to deepen the process of substitution industri-
alization, were established. The immediate background of this instrument is characterized 
by the efforts to "Mexicanize" and to integrate the automotive industry. These efforts 
were placed under the control of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (SIC). The aim 
was to induce producers and importers to substitute foreign purchases, vertically inte-
grating their production processes (if they commit themselves to produce the inputs that 
are usually acquired abroad), or finishing imported articles. 
The interested enterprises submit their manufacturing program to the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce, and the conditions of quantity, quality, price, and length of 
time involved are taken into account before approving the programs. The manufacturing 
program agreements are usually divided into 6-month stages, specifying for each one the 
substitution of imports that should be attained, or the progress that should be made 
regarding the utilization of raw materials, inputs, and parts of components of national 
origin. The benefits received by the enterprises whose manufacturing programs have been 
approved are the following: 
(a) The product manufactured by the enterprise is submitted for approval under 
the licence requirement regulation, and the enterprise receives import licences for that 
product (or for those that are necessary for its activities). 
(b) The enterprise may receive tax incentives under the Decree Concerning De-
centralization (and previously under the New and Necessary Industries Law and Regulation 
14). (The incentives offered by these instruments are considerable, as is seen in the 
following section.) 
(c) Furthermore, the enterprises are given authorization to sell their products 
at prices higher than those set in the international market (with the differential 
approved by the Ministry of Industry). 
The submission for approval of a product manufactured by an enterprise (and 
previously imported) under the licence requirement regulation guarantees that enterprise 
an exclusive market (often even before beginning to produce). 
The discretionary power behind this instrument is enormous and its potential 
is promising because it allows for a great degree of selectivity. Nevertheless, the 
criteria that govern its use have not been explicitly described or made known: priority 
industrial branches have not been defined, nor the types of projects that should be given 
preference, nor which types of enterprise make up each branch, etc. 
The requirements that must be met to receive approval of a manufacturing program 
are the following: the authorized price differential must not exceed 25% of the FOB 
price of imported products (however, in some industries greater differentials may be 
authorized); the degree of national integration must reach 60% of the direct cost of 
manufacture; 51% of the enterprise's social capital must be held by Mexican citizens; the 
products must be of the same quality as the imported products; and, before the creation 
of the National Registry of the Transfer of Technology (RNTT), it was required that the 
payments for technology must not pass the limit of 3% of annual net sales (at present, 
proof of registration is the only requirement). Furthermore, an attempt to promote exports 
has been made by making fulfillment of export programs a condition for receiving approval. 
According to a study done by CEPAL-NAFINSA, the principal branches that benefited 
from 1965 to 1970 were the automotive industry, internal combustion engines, parts and 
replacements for automotive vehicles, tractors, bicycles and motorcycles, construction 
equipment, tools, pumps and compressors, pipes, radio and communications equipment, 
agricultural implements, chains for industrial uses, the chemical and petrochemical 
industry, electrical equipment and accessories, and office equipment (1). According to 
the same study, "in most of the cases joint investments involving foreign and Mexican 
capital are involved." 
The initiative to present manufacturing programs rests with the entrepreneurs, 
and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce limits itself to studying the applications and 
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dictating its decisions about them. With regard to capital goods, the manufacturing 
programs do not function like Nacional Financiera's project ONUDI (concerning capital 
goods), in which the aim is to identify, negotiate,. and launch specific industrial 
projects. By waiting for the initiative of entrepreneurs, the instrument loses selec-
tivity and may be utilized to promote projects that are of little interest or relevance. 
Furthermore, criteria concerning the selection of technology, the links with the 
scientific and technological system, the performance of technical or R&D activities, etc., 
are not applied in the management of this instrument. Its link with the Decree Con-
cerning Industrial Decentralization and Development is positive, but the application 
criteria mentioned in that instrument have not been precisely defined. 
The lack of such application criteria is also reflected in the fact that the 
levels of national integration, the plant value added, and the composition of social 
capital required are invariable, even though enterprises from different branches of 
industry are dealt with. Thus, 6D% of industrial integration is required of an enter-
prise in the metal mechanics or petrochemical industries, in which the level of indus-
trial integration may be low. The plant value added (a minimum of 1D% of the direct 
cost of manufacture) also may be very low in some industries. Finally, the requirement 
that 51% of the capital must be of national origin is a formal requirement, which does 
not accurately reflect the position of the decision-making power of an enterprise: it 
is important to examine this element in relation to the origin of the technology, the 
negotiating capacity of the nationally owned part, etc. These criteria have not been 
defined, and therefore the instrument is open to abuse. 
The manufacturing programs have been recognized as an instrument of great 
potential because of its flexibility. Nevertheless, as long as it continues to respond 
to objectives of such limited scope, its utility will also be limited. If, however, 
it is difficult under the protectionist system to perform modifications to pursue an 
objective of autonomous technological development without introducing other types of 
distortions, the situation is radically different with manufacturing programs. The 
possibilities of examining each draft program individually allow diverse criteria to be 
incorporated. These possibilities are presently annulled because the instrument is 
linked to the protectionist system, and its pursued end is limited to the promotion of 
the substitution of imports. 
Moreover, the instrument is voluntary (since it is not obligatory to have a 
manufacturing program approved to fulfill any legal requirement), and the initiative 
lies with the entrepreneurs, who are allowed to apply for incentives, whether within 
the scope of this mechanism or outside it. The negotiating position of the responsible 
authority in relation to the entrepreneurs is limited by this fact. Thus, the 
selective application is even more limited. If it is added that there are no sectoral 
priorities of any kind and that the application criteria have not been explicitly 
defined, it is logical to conclude that this instrument has not been used to its best 
advantage from many points of view. The lack of criteria concerning which types of 
enterprises may have their manufacturing programs approved is especially serious: the 
CEPAL-NAFINSA study of 1971 revealed that the majority of cases were "joint investments 
of Mexican and foreign capital'' (2). The rationale of an instrument that grants such 
powerful incentives (for example, the guarantee of a reserved market) to transnational 
enterprises is questionable. 
If this instrument was inscribed within the framework of a well-defined indus-
trial policy, its contribution could be extremely valuable. However, it would be 
necessary to define clearly the sectors to which this policy would give priority and 
the types of enterprises that would be eligible to present programs. The instrument 
should cease to be considered as a means for granting protection to industry; it should 
be considered as a mechanism that permits correct industrial programing and the pro-
motion of industrial projects, coordinating the granting of the different incentives 
that the state offers. This is the only instrument of industrial policy in which the 
state examines the production plans of private enterprises (notwithstanding its being 
voluntary) and facilitates its intervention in the technological aspects. The manu-
facturing programs could become an important instrument of technology policy. 
For the promotion of autonomous technological development, it would be necessary 
to incorporate into this instrument various criteria concerning the principal tech-
nological decisions of the enterprises. With new industrial projects, it is possible 
to examine the process of search and selection of technology. Interest should be shown 
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not only in the aspect of negotiation and the fonnal conditions for the acquisition of 
technology, but in an entire set of key questions. These include (a) the adaptability 
of the technology on the national market scale, and (b) the possibilities of separating 
the technological package and perfonning some of the research and experimental development 
or basic process design activities locally, and manufacturing the equipment and machinery 
in the country. 
The Law for the Promotion of New and Necessary Industries (LINN) 
The Law for the Promotion of New and Necessary Industries (LINN) classifies as new 
industries those devoted to the manufacture of goods not previously produced in the 
country as long as they are not simple substitutes, and as necessary industries those 
devoted to the manufacture of merchandise produced in insufficient quantities in the 
country. The exemptions granted by the Law could refer to import taxes, export taxes, 
indirect taxes, or income taxes. The amount and duration of the exemptions were deter-
mined in relation to the importance of the industries (classified as basic, semibasic, 
and secondary) (3), and in relation to a series of requirements and conditions that were 
very difficult to verify or apply on the part of the fiscal authorities. 
Some of these requirements were the following: the degree of elaboration in the 
plant must be a minimum of 10% (the degree of elaboration was defined as the participa-
tion of the sum of salaries and the cost of electrical energy and fuel used as a percent-
age of the direct total cost); the imported inputs could not exceed 40% of the direct 
cost of manufacture (i.e., a 60% degree integration); and since lg6s-lg6g it has been 
required that the payments of royalties and technical assistance should not exceed 3% of 
net sales. Nevertheless, the restrictive clauses of the technology contracts were not 
regulated. 
Among the additional conditions that were included to detennine the amount of 
exemptions, the following are the most relevant: the quantity and quality of the man-
power employed, the degree of technical efficiency, the utilization of equipment and 
machines produced in the country, the percentage of the national market that would be 
satisfied, the amount of the investments, the social benefits above the legal minimums, 
and the importance of the research laboratories owned by the enterprise. 
To increase the confusion, extensions for up to 5 years could be obtained by the 
basic and semibasic industries, as long as the industry under consideration provided 
evident benefits to various sectors of national production or to the consumers, and if 
the industry was falling short of recuperating from its profits 20% or more of the 
initial investment. 
It is evident that most of these criteria have been dead-letter rules because of 
the great difficulty in applying them. The Regulation that specified the application of 
the Law made a mediocre attempt to define their content, but the result was simply to 
increase the difficulty in implementing the Law. 
The criteria that could have had an impact on the technological behaviour of 
the enterprises were never applied: 
(a) It was never even attempted to define what should be understood by "degree 
of technical efficiency" in tenns of price differentials in comparison with similar 
foreign products, or by installed capacity effectively utilized. 
(b) Regarding the degree of utilization of capital goods, inputs, or raw 
materials of national origin, the excessive fonnalism of the Mexican industrial policy 
has always ignored the difficulties in measuring "national integration" in tenns of 
goods that incorporate components with variable degrees of integration. 
(c) As may be expected, an attempt was never made to define the criterion 
concerning "quantity and quality of manpower employed," because it is practically 
impossible to define a parameter to make comparisons without first defining a strategy 
concerning the utilization of more or less labour-intensive techniques in each sector 
of economic activity. 
(d) Finally, the criterion concerning the research laboratories ended up being 
inoperative without a definition of what was meant by research. 
In any case, the precise definition of all these criteria should have been 
complemented by a degree of institutional support adequate for their application. It 
seems that this set of complementary dispositions simply served as dressing for the 
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principal text of the Law. 
The Law should be classified as part of the substitution industrialization policy, 
emphasizing the manufacture of new articles (even though their relevance to the process 
of development may be nil), and attempting to promote the rapid accumulation of capital. 
In many cases, LINN may have aided in creating a not very favourable climate for tech-
nical change and increased efficiency, because it discriminated against product sub-
stitution (even when efficiency would have been increased). LINN sought to correct this 
by establishing an exception that is almost impossible to fulfill: i.e., when the 
advantages of product substitution represent a 20% savings for the consumer. Further-
more, the period of duration of the exemptions turned out to be too long (the average 
in the enterprises that benefited was 10 years). In many cases, an enterprise classified 
as new could manage to be reclassified as necessary and thus to lengthen even more the 
life of the exemption (moreover, the possibility of obtaining extensions existed). 
Finally, the lack of the Law's selectivity and the difficulty in implementing 
its criteria annulled its impact on the orientation of industrial investment. The 
enterprises that benefited were invariably the largest (the capital invested in the 
exempted plants under this incentive clearly exceeded the average indicated in the 
industrial census) and relatively the most modern, and were located for the most part 
in the Federal District and its metropolitan area. However it is precisely the largest 
enterprises that have the least need for "protection" (because of their larger scales of 
production and their greater possibilities to have access to sources of credit and to 
obtain better conditions in the purchase of machinery and equipment). 
During the last few years the exemptions granted under LINN began to be limited, 
due, in part, to some of the reasons mentioned, but also due to the necessities of 
financing public expenditure, and, finally, due to the fact that from lg71 to 1972 a new 
mechanism was created to replace this instrument. 
The Decree Concerning Industrial Decentralization and Development (ODDI) 
The Decree Concerning Industrial Decentralization and Develo~ent (ODDI) has some 
of the characteristics of LINN, but it also incorporates additional elements - it seeks 
to respond to the objectives of a policy of regional development, and it reorganizes the 
group of industrial promotion instruments through fiscal incentives (facilitating the 
precise calculation of the incentives that may be obtained by a new industrial project). 
Actually, the Decree represents an attempt to rationalize the geographic distribution 
of the industrial activities and to reduce the intense concentration that has formed 
around the principal cities of the country: in lg55 the metropolitan area of Mexico 
City absorbed 16% of the population of the country, 45% of the added value of industry, 
and 62% of the country's investment in higher education. It is evident that the external 
economies in the broad sense of the word (public services, infrastructure, access to 
markets, proximity to decision-making centres, endowment of skilled manpower, etc.) 
constitute a determining factor in decisions concerning the location of an industrial 
plant. 
Seeking to counterbalance such a powerful attraction, this instrument grants a 
series of incentives to the enterprises that establish themselves in the less-industri-
alized areas of the country. 
The amount and duration of the exemptions were fixed discretionally, taking into 
consideration the location of the plant and the following requirements: 51% of the 
social capital must be in Mexican hands; payments for royalties, technical assistance, or 
trademarks must be less than 3% of net annual sales; the technology contracts must not 
contain restrictions against exportation that are against the national interest; the 
credits contracted abroad must be approved; there must be 60% national integration; 
Mexicans must be in charge of the administration of the enterprise; and, in enterprises 
that are to satisfy shortages in national consumption, the price differentials must not 
be greater than authorized (usually 25%). Presently the regulation of the technology 
contracts is left under the control of the National Registry of the Transfer of Tech-
nology (the only requirement proof of registration). 
In the definition of enterprises that may receive tax exemptions, DODI seeks to 
correct the deficiencies of LINN; however the bias still remains in favour of those 
enterprises that perform new activities (although they may be new in one region but not 
necessarily throughout the entire country). Furthermore, the following enterprises are 
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included: those that exploit natural or agricultural resources in each region, those 
that rationalize their production in favour of the consumer or that satisfy shortages in 
national consumption, and those whose promotion has particular interest for the country 
(taking into account the generation of employment, greater integration of the industrial 
plant, the volume of investments in technological research, exports, or their contribu-
tion to development). The Decree points out that the rationalization of production 
should be reflected in a reduction of 5% in the sales price (in contrast with 20% in 
LINN) during a period of 2 years: these are again conditions that are relatively diffi-
cult to fulfill for enterprises that produce substitution goods. 
The exemptions that are offered under the Decree are the following: 50% to 100% 
of the general import tax; 50% to 100% of the stamp tax; 60% to 100% of the income tax 
on profits derived from the sale of real estate that is part of the fixed assets of the 
enterprises; 15% to 40% of the income tax that corresponds to the aggregate income of 
the enterprises that locate themselves in Zone III; authorization to depreciate at an 
accelerated rate investments in machinery and equipment for fiscal purposes; up to 100% 
of the indirect tax (4). 
As in other instruments of Mexican industrial policy, the application criteria 
related to technological decisions suffer from defects that make their implementation 
difficult. The volume of "investments in technological research" is an empty concept 
that could be misleading. Without a definition of what constitutes technological 
research, and without an institutional infrastructure capable of distinguishing between 
the testing of materials or the solution of specific technical problems and the con-
struction of a pilot plant to develop a process or the design of a prototype, this part 
of the Decree is a dead letter. Furthermore, the inclusion of this criterion turns out 
to discriminate against the enterprises that, although they do not carry out tech-
nological research, have established internal units to perform technical activities that 
permit the attainment of knowledge that is indispensable for the acquisition of greater 
technological capacity. 
However, even overcoming these faults, two unanswerable questions remain. The 
first is related to the orientation of R&D in the enterprises: Is it desirable to 
increase the amount and duration of the exemptions, even though the research is designed 
to develop capital-intensive technology, which contaminates the environment, which 
intensively utilizes either natural resources or services such as energy and water that 
are not renewable, or which is related to products or services of little social signifi-
cance (oriented toward artificial product differentiation, for example)? It is evident 
that if this question is not answered, the introduction of a criterion concerning 
technological research could result in an increase in fiscal loss in favour of activ-
ities with high social costs. 
The second question is related to the distribution of the fruits of the research: 
Is it desirable to promote (through fiscal loss) the performance of research that does 
not benefit the Mexican economy? The question is especially applicable to transnational 
enterprises that are operating in Mexico and that are able to carry out R&D activities 
whose results will be utilized by the enterprise as a whole: the subsidiary in Mexico 
may or may not benefit from the results of research that, international strategy has 
defined. This is an important point, especially when one considers that there is no 
limit to the amount of profits that may be remitted by these subsidiaries to the main 
office (5). 
Although the ODDI instrument and others introduce new elements in the policy of 
the promotion of industry, the essential features of LINN that remain are the following: 
(a) There is a lack of selectivity in the promotion of the industrial branches 
and sectors that are considered important for the entire development effort. No 
criterion has been established that could permit a distinction between different branches 
of production for the purpose of orienting decisions about which goods to produce. Thus, 
tax exemptions are still granted for the promotion of the cosmetic industry or the 
industry of "porcelain figures." This fact has serious implications for technological 
decisions made at the enterprise level because the selection of the combination of goods 
to be offered frequently determines the origin and characteristics of the technology 
to be utilized. 
(b) In general, these instruments are subordinate to the same objectives of 
import substitution and rapid capital formation. Therefore, the effects of these decrees 
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on the technological decisions of the enterprises should be examined in light of the 
battery of instruments of industrial policy: protectionism, fiscal exemption for re-
invested profits, high coefficients of depreciation of fixed assets, etc. The final 
result is a bias in favour of capital-intensive techniques and an inducement to the 
maintenance of inefficiencies in production (extremely high cost structures, consider-
able levels of nonutilized capacity, etc.). 
(c) The application criteria are difficult to handle; however, as long as an 
operative definition of each one has not been defined, they will remain dead letters. 
So far, the authorities responsible for the application of this instrument have not 
defined the content of criteria such as the "volume of investment in technological 
research," or the "number of jobs generated," nor can they count on institutional support 
adequate for their application. The same problem arose with the criteria included in the 
New and Necessary Industries Law and its Regulation. 
(d) The lack of coordination with other instruments of the industrial policy 
persists. This is true not only with instruments such as public banking credits and 
fiscal incentives for exportation, but also with instruments related to the conservation 
of the environment. It seems that a general rule is followed of compartmentalizing the 
objectives of the instruments and of establishing a great dispersion of official 
attributions in several public agencies. 
The Decree utilizes only one criterion for determining the different zones of the 
country: the degree of geographic concentration of the industry. Therefore Zone I is 
made up of 95% of the total area and includes regions of relatively unequal development; 
Zone II comprises general townships in the states of Jalisco, Mexico, Morelos, Puebla, 
and Queretaro; and Zone III includes the rest of the country. The different resource 
endowments of each region are not taken into account, nor their possible uses. The 
fundamental cause is that the definition of a strategy of regional development neces-
sarily implies the definition of a development model, and the Mexican government has 
already pointed out that it is not willing to establish orientations for industrial 
development. (Furthermore, when the Decree was issued, the information about the dis-
tribution of natural resources within the national territory was not available.) 
It is not surprising, therefore, that ODDI does not include criteria concerning 
the utilization and conservation of the environment. In general, the regionalization 
it establishes is extremely deficient, and the urban-rural relationship will remain 
unaltered in any important sense by the Decree. 
The Decree seeks to promote industrial decentralization by granting incentives 
to those enterprises that locate in noncongested zones. However, even this limited 
objective is difficult to fulfill for several reasons. Important external economies 
found in the more industrialized zones (services, communications, and especially the 
endowment of skilled manpower) probably outweigh whatever effects any incentive to de-
centralize may have. The amount of programed private investment per man employed is 
less in these zones, as may be seen from the analysis of the applications for exemptions 
that were granted (Table 1). Moreover, the cost of the majority of the public services 
is the same no matter where the plant is located. The Federal Electricity Commission 
recently established a system of differential rates based upon location, but the 
provision of petroleum and its derivatives is carried out under a common rate (or with 
minor modification). It has already been pointed out that the subsidy received by an 
enterprise by way of low prices in these and other inputs (for example, water) makes the 
selection of less capital-intensive techniques (and those that conserve these services) 
unnecessary. It is also important to point out that the price of public services is not 
a major variable in private calculations concerning plant location. 
Furthermore, in the secondary petrochemical industry there exists an implicit 
incentive for concentration in more developed zones. The state enterprises in the basic 
petrochemical industry and PEMEX provide the raw material to plants near a basic petro-
chemical complex in Zone III, as well as to a plant located in the industrial zone of 
the Federal District, with no difference in price. The advantage of locating the plant 
close to the final market, given the characteristics of the process, is evident: in 
general, the product will increase in weight and thus in cost of transportation during 
the last stages of the process. But applying the same reasoning to other branches of 
industry, it is possible to conclude that the Decree will affect different enterprises 
in different ways, according to the characteristics of each process. 
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The analysis of these incentives reveals serious deficiencies and it is advisable 
to doubt their effectiveness. From the point of view of technological development, this 
instrument will not have a relevant impact on decisions to invest resources in R&D activ-
ities. However, it may constitute an unnecessary incentive for the selection of capital-
intensive technologies (6). Nevertheless, in some respects the recommendation of applica-
tion criteria for the Decree may be unimportant unless a strategy for regional development 
is defined that includes the industrial branches whose promotion is desired and that 
defines the priorities of the exploitation of natural resources and the conservation and 
utilization of the environment. Once that strategy has been determined, these incentives 
should promote not only R&D but also the performance of technical activities. Furthermore, 
the tax exemptions should be restricted to Mexican industries (for example, requiring a 
minimum participation of 90% national capital) and not serve "infant" industries such as 
General Foods or Imperial Chemical. Foreign participation may be increased if state 
participation is important in some industrial project. 
Of course, coordination with other instruments of the industrial and technology 
policy is indispensable. The Decree, in particular, should act in coordination with the 
other regional incentives, as well as with the federal states, to avoid the accumulation 
of fiscal incentives in a few enterprises. The intervention of organisms such as CONACYT 
and the Undersecretary of the Environment is necessary. Nevertheless, the definition of 
criteria and the design of new policies and instruments are necessary within these 
organisms as well. 
The General Law of Industries 
The General Law of Industries, aimed basically at establishing priorities for 
industrial development, was promulgated in July 1970 (Decree Law 18, 350). It is aimed 
at promoting and programing industrial development, favouring basic industries and those 
producing capital goods. In this regard, the Law contains within it a specific strategy 
of industrial development that gives priority to the promotion of basic industries and 
the production of capital goods. 
The assignment of priorities to industry consists of the following elements: 
definition of industrial priorities; the allocation of industries by property sectors 
according to priorities; and the establishment of incentives according to priorities. 
Industrial Priorities: The General Law of Industries considers the following 
priorities for the sector: 
(1) First Priority consists of the following: basic industries (iron and steel, 
nonferrous metallurgy, basic chemicals, fertilizers, cement, paper); specific industries 
producing capital goods and other fundamental inputs for production (machine tools and 
automobile parts); electric and steam-generating machinery (heat exchangers, pumps and 
compressors, parts and pieces for the latter); specific basic machinery for mining, 
energy, fishing, agriculture, transportation, communications, construction, and basic 
industry; electronic components and special conductors; aeronautical material; ship-
building; fundamental subassembly elements for land transportation; production of basic 
inputs; organic and inorganic chemical products that are basic inputs for the chemical 
and other industries; and enterprises that produce industrial technology, i.e., those 
that conduct research and industrial development programs. 
(2) Second Priority is made up of the support industries producing goods that 
are essential to the population and inputs for production: social support industries 
producing essential mass-consumption goods to satisfy the individual and collective 
primary needs of the population with regard to food, clothing, housing, health, education, 
culture, recreation, and transportation; and support industries producing goods and 
inputs for productive activities such as agriculture, livestock raising, fishing, mining, 
energy, construction, industry, transportation, and communications. 
(3) Third Priority is made up of complementary industries producing goods that 
are not essential to the population and supplementary inputs for production. 
(4) Nonpriority consists of industries producing luxury and superfluous goods. 
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Allocation of Industries by Types of Property Sectors: The Law considers three 
types of property or ownership of industrial enterprises: 
(1) Public Sector: this consists of enterprises belonging to the state and 
operated under domestic public law. 
(2) Social Sector: this consists of industrial enterprises operating under 
special laws, under the supervision of the state. 
(3) Private Sector: this consists of enterprises belonging to individuals and/or 
juridical persons governed by the Commercial Corporation Law and the Commercial Code. 
Bearing in mind this property structure, the Law establishes that basic industries are 
reserved for the public sector, although the state can develop them in partnership when 
it deems it necessary. The private and social sectors will participate in those indus-
tries not reserved for the public sector and can only, on exceptional occasions, partic-
ipate in the basic industries in association with the state or independently when the 
industrial development plans so require. 
Incentives According to Priorities: The Law establishes for the industries, 
according to their priorities, a group of tax, credit, and other incentives. 
The period in which the General Law of Industries has been applied is still too 
short to be able to arrive at final conclusions from the existing information. Yet it 
is possible to make some comments. The effects of the application of this instrument 
on the Peruvian industrial structure are very limited. Tables 2 and 3 show the results 
of the application of the General Law of Industries. 
From these tables it can be concluded that the application of the General Law of 
Industries has not favoured the participation of the priority industries in the indus-
trial production structure; on the contrary, it has not prevented (if not caused) a 
decline in their participation, an increase in the participation of the third priority 
industries, and a maintenance of the participation of the nonpriority industries. 
The Peruvian STPI team did not attempt to give a full explanation of this fact 
but it provided elements that can partially explain the situation: 
(a) First, the short period of application of the Law cannot be expected to 
lead to substantial changes in the productive structure of the industrial sector; further-
more, absolute validity cannot be attributed to the results inasmuch as they do not show 
clearly differentiated trends. 
(b) Other factors that have apparently played a part in the results noted are the 
pr1c1ng policies and the property system. As is know, the pricing policy establishes 
price controls on a series of products, which are basically included in the first and 
second priority lists, the third and fourth priority items not being subject to any type 
of price control. It is also known that the state participates mainly in the ownership 
of first priority enterprises. 
In view of these remarks and the results shown in Table 2, it can be deduced 
that the growth in the participation of the nonpriority industries (especially third 
priority) can be partially explained by the fact that, being almost totally private 
industries whose production is not subject to price control, they probably found an 
incentive for increasing production or investing in products for which private entre-
preneurs expect greater profits, rather than seeking the incentives granted to the 
priority industries. 
In the case of first priority production, the impact of the pr1c1ng policy is not 
as clear because although these products are considered within the package of products 
submitted to price control, an important percentage of these first priority industries 
is the property of the state. For that reason the impact of price controls is felt 
less than if they had been private enterprises, because the latter do not require direct 
incentives and their investment decisions depend, rather, on political criteria. 
Another explanation for the stagnation of the participation of first priority 
industries appears to be that the maturation period of investments in basic industries 
is so long that the fruits of these investments cannot be appreciated in a period as 
short as that under consideration. In the basic industry enterprises that still belong 
to the private sector, the fact that they do not reinvest appears to be a result of the 
fact that they expected that at some moment their properties would have to revert to the 
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state in accordance with the Law. 
Finally, the stagnation of the participation of second priority production 
(essential consumer goods), as in the previous case, does not appear to have much to do 
with the price factor. It can be explained, rather, by factors such as restrictions on 
demand deriving from the economic crisis and from limitations on the availability of 
inputs that result from the problems of the agricultural sector and the limitations on the 
availability of foreign exchange. 
KOREA 
Instruments for Export Promotion and Their Relation to Industrial Priorities 
Several types of programs have supported the industrial development of Korea. 
Chief among them are the following: incentives and special assistance to industry to 
facilitate investment, operations, and, specifically, exports; financial assistance to 
industry operating through the banking system and through special government funds or 
arrangements; and the program for the development of R&D capabilities to assist in 
technical problems relating to product design, production practices, and similar matters. 
To offset the progressive inflation of its currency, Korea initiated industri-
alization based on the policy of import substitution with high tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions providing protection to industry. Korea completed the import substitution 
of nondurable consumer goods by 1960. A growth strategy based on the further import sub-
stitution of machinery, durable consumer goods, and their intermediate products did not 
seem to be a viable alternative because of the smallness of the domestic market and the 
large capital requirements that this policy entails. Korea then opted for an export-
oriented policy to exploit market opportunities to provide both a high growth rate and 
increased employment. 
This export-oriented policy of Korea makes it impossible to attempt a separate 
examination of the policy instruments related to industrial priorities, on the one hand, 
and the instruments related to export promotion and even quality control and standard-
ization on the other. The set of instruments for all these purposes is very coherent 
in Korea and their grouping is therefore rather arbitrary. The most relevant issues are 
discussed in this section. 
The most important contextual factors to take into consideration for the Korean 
policies of industrialization were the 100% devaluation of the won in May 1964 and the 
doubling of interest and bank rates on loans in September 1965. Along with these were 
the price-stabilization and tax-reform program established by the goverrruent to control 
inflation, and the rise of the ratio of tax revenue to GNP. Furthermore, since 1964 
the government has tried, through successive devaluations, to maintain the won at the 
free-trade level and provide various export incentives both to encourage exports further 
and to offset the modest degree of progressive overvaluation that developed after each 
major devaluation. The system was further liberalized in 1967 when a shift was made 
from the so-called list system, under which only those commodities listed in the trade 
program could be imported, to the negative system, under which all commodities not 
listed were automatically approved. Tariff reform was also undertaken in the latter 
part of 1967 and again in early 1973 to reduce generally the average tariff rates on 
imports. 
The major thrust of the industrial policies was directed toward the export-pro-
motion program. Foremost among the export incentives were customs duties and commodity 
tax exemptions on imported raw materials that are used in the manufacture of export 
goods, a 50% reduction in income tax on export revenues, and a 100% reduction in business 
tax (the highest marginal tax rate on private corporations is 49% and on open corporations, 
27.5%, so that the exemption could amount to about 25% and 14% respectively of net 
income). Preferential interest rates on loans were also introduced. Exporters could 
borrow up to 90% of their requirements at 6%, whereas the commercial rate was 25%. The 
same rate applied to loans for the import of raw materials used in exports. A wastage-
allowance system was also included. The amount of material that could be imported duty-
free included a liberal allowance for wastage or scrap involved in converting the 
material to its final use. In case these were not used for export production, they could. 
be sold or used for domestic production at a substantial profit. 
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The government established annual export targets, and exports were apportioned 
on a firm-by-firm basis through negotiations between the government and the industries' 
export associations. These targets were generally met or exceeded, as credit allocations, 
tax assessments, and import licences were preconditioned on satisfactory export per-
formances. 
This rather complex system of incentives and subsidies has, however, vastly 
increased the proportion of exports in total manufacturing in Korea. Commodity exports 
increased from $55 million in 1962 to $3.2 billion in 1973 and $4.5 billion in 1974, and 
now constitute about 30% of the value added in manufacturing. As suggested by the recent 
studies, the rate of subsidy on total exports was about 7% to 9% in 1968, although for 
manufacturing exports it was in the range of 9% to 11%. The average rates of protection 
were also around 15%, which is quite low by international standards. No appropriate 
measurement of effective protection rates exists, however a measurement that would have 
to take into consideration in some way the prevailing low wage rates of Korea. 
The duty tax exemption was intended to supply exporters wi~h raw materials at 
international prices, and the wastage allowance helped the industry during the initial 
learning process. 
The case for tax concessions and preferential interest rates is somewhat dif-
ferent and more complex. In Korea, interest rates on commercial loans were higher than 
22% from 1968 to 1972, whereas loans from private unorganized money markets have been 
priced at an annual rate of 30% to 40% or more in real terms. The tax concessions, 
therefore, were intended simultaneously to compensate exporters for the high interest 
rates paid on nonpreferential local loans as well as to improve profitability, financial 
structures, and growth capabilities of the export industries. Similarly, the purpose 
of preferential interest rates on loans was to permit exporters to compete in terms of 
credit and payment arrangements that are commonly required in international trade. 
In summary, the instruments examined seem, on the whole, to have had the effects 
intended of stimulating the export industries. Nevertheless, the system did not lead to 
necessary changes in the industrial structure and to the establishment of linkages that 
now seem crucial. As a result, some industries are now faced with the need to undergo 
changes, particularly in stimulating the growth of supplier industries to the end-
producing industries. 
The rapid economic growth has led to a number of industrial weaknesses. First, 
the pursuit of market opportunities has led to specialization not only in industry, but 
also by stages of production within industry (primarily assembly operations). This 
strategy served Korea remarkably well during a time of continuous growth, but also made 
Korean industry particularly vulnerable in times of recession, and made it structurally 
imbalanced too. Second, the administration of export incentives for a large and 
sophisticated economy has proved extremely complex. Finally, industrial growth has not 
been accompanied by an equivalent capability in product design and adaptation to market 
needs. 
The presidential decree of August 3, 1972, was aimed at confronting this situation 
by improving the financial structure of industry and of money and capital markets. The 
export incentive system was also revised in 1973. Its remaining features are the import-
duty drawback, export-financing facilities, and a limited investment incentive. To 
maintain the competitiveness of Korea's exports, the Korean currency was devalued. The 
1972 measures could therefore mark a basic philosophical departure from previous policies, 
which relied on generous incentives to compensate for structural weaknesses in the 
pricing system. In the past they may even have contributed to the growth of these 
factors. By contrast, the new policies aim at correcting these deficiencies directly by 
improving the industries' financial structure and the functioning of capital markets, 
by providing investment incentives for backward integration, by developing R&D capabili-
ties, and by adopting more severe foreign exchange rates. Nevertheless, many programs 
are still in the formative stage. 
This strategy has left Korean industry vulnerable to fluctuations in world trade, 
as illustrated by the underutilized capital in the plywood industry as a result of the 
recession in the housing industry in the United States. Particularly vulnerable are 
those industries that have concentrated on only one intermediate stage of production on 
a subcontracting basis, such as offshore assembly operations (e.g., electronics). These 
industries have not had the time to integrate backward in technology and forward in 
marketing and are therefore particularly susceptible in times of difficulty to being 
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squeezed by their contractor, who controls technology and marketing outlets. The large 
layoff of workers in electronics assembly operations is a particular case in point. 
Machinery Industry Promotion Law 
After its successful drive toward export-oriented industrialization, the Korean 
government designed policies to increase the domestic content of industrial production. 
This policy was mainly concerned with the machinery industry. It was generally recog-
nized that development of the machinery industry was lagging behind other industrial 
sectors. 
The basic legal device of these policies was the Machinery Industry Promotion 
Law. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) is responsible for its implementation. 
Although the basic goal of the policy appears to be sound, such a policy would be 
extremely difficult to implement because of its complexity. The important issue there-
fore is the degree of rationality in its implementation and whether such a policy can 
be effectively implemented at all by the government. Some of these problems have been 
recognized recently by the government and this policy is presently undergoing review. 
The Machinery Industry Promotion Law (promulgated in 1967, revised in 1971) 
requires the Ministry to formulate and announce a master plan for domestic production 
of all the major imported machine products and parts. The Ministry establishes a general 
target percentage of domestic content for machine products, and machine producers submit 
plans for domestic production with specified target dates for each part. The plans are 
then examined and approved by the Ministry and revisions are made twice a year. In 
passenger automobiles, for example, the percentage of domestic content is regularly 
examined by the Ministry, and 1977 was set a target date for complete domestic production. 
Based on such a master list of machinery products, the import restrictions on 
machinery parts are established and announced twice a year. The items produced domes-
tically in sufficient quantities are banned from import. Permission for the import of 
other items is given after certification that domestic supply is inadequate and plans 
for domestic production have been drawn up by the importer. 
This Law also enables the Ministry to use tariff and tax measures for the pro-
motion of domestic production. High tariffs are imposed on products that can be produced 
domestically. Tax benefits are provided when an enterprise succeeds in the domestic 
production of imported items. 
For positive promotion of the domestic machinery industry, the Ministry can 
designate strategic industries that are important for increasing the domestic content 
and can provide direct financing with favourable terms for the enterprise. 
The major responsibility for implementing the policy to increase the domestic 
content of industrial products is given to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and 
within MCI the Machinery Industry Bureau has the major task of preparing plans for 
domestic production and import or tariff restrictions. The bureau chief has the res-
ponsibility for approving the importation of restricted items on the basis of domestic 
production capability. 
The Council for the Machinery Industry was established under the Law to advise 
MCI on matters related to the machinery industry. It consists of high-ranking officials 
from other related ministries, government research centres, and banks, and other 
specialists appointed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry. Among its many tasks, 
the Council can provide advice on plans for the domestic production of imported machinery 
products. 
The Korea Society for the Advancement of the Machinery Industry, on the other 
hand, is a private organization established in 1968 with government approval. Major 
machine manufacturers are represented. It provides consultation to the government about 
policy directions for the development of the machinery industry and offers infonnation 
on technology, markets, and investment to the manufacturers. It has the responsibility 
for screening the importation of items that have been approved by the government in 
general categories. 
This instrument for the promotion of the machinery industry affects all the major 
machinery industries from automobiles and capital goods to electrical appliances. All the 
major companies had to prepare and submit detailed plans for the domestic production of 
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all the imported parts. Therefore, the coverage is fairly complete. 
Yet such a policy requires formidable technical and administrative tasks on the 
part of government officials and cannot be implemented effectively and rationally. The 
number of items involved is enormous and the production of each item can be so complex 
that no government organizations, even with the assistance of outside specialists, can 
perform the task. 
The first problem in such an instrument is that it is almost impossible to define 
the domestic content of a product. Presently, a domestic product is defined by whether 
the final stage of its production was performed within the country or not. This criterion 
is certainly inadequate; consequently a more rational criterion is required. Therefore, 
it is questionable whether "100% domestic production" of a product is indeed a ve~ 
meaningful concept today. 
This policy probably was helpful in promoting a general awareness of increased 
domestic content, but at the same time it has caused an imbalanced industrial structure 
by encouraging the development of industries performing mainly the final stage of produc-
tion such as the simple assembly of parts. 
In these restricted sectors of the industry this policy encouraged the enterprises 
to obtain new technology from abroad (or in the best case develop it on their own), even 
when economically it was less profitable than importing the products. 
By placing the major responsibility for domestic production on the users of the 
parts rather than on the producers, the policy probably encouraged the production of 
parts within a firm instead of relying on a parts-supply industry. Therefore, the 
industries that produced parts and intermediate goods did not develop freely. 
The instrument probably encouraged the low quality and high price of certain 
products by overprotection through import restrictions and tariffs. This instrument can 
actually be used by an enterprise as a means of obtaining a monopolistic position. 
By insisting on maximum domestic content with 100% as the ultimate goal in the 
near future, the instrument can produce various undesirable effects such as high cost 
and worsening of the balance of payments. Sometimes it could be more desirable to import 
certain parts that can be imported more cheaply in the foreseeable future. This instru-
ment could have encouraged overinvestment in production capacity and the purchase of raw 
materials, which most often required the use of scarce foreign currency. 
ARGENTINA 
Law on the Reconversion of the Automobile Industry 
Law 19,185 on the reconversion of the automobile industry was designed to achieve 
the following objectives: 
-a gradual drop in the price of vehicles in the domestic market; 
-the concentration of the assembly and autoparts industries to obtain 
higher productive efficiency with the maximum possible economies of 
scale; 
-an intensive proportion of domestic technology and design; 
-a decrease in the country's outflow of foreign exchange for the importa-
tion of goods or technologies for the said industry, with the resulting 
increase in domestic added value; 
-significant and permanent exports of vehicles and autoparts; 
-consolidation of national capital, with the real decision-making power 
in the autoparts industry. 
The beneficiaries of this Law are the automobile manufacturers and domestic 
enterprises manufacturing autoparts. For its operation, the Law makes use of a mechanism 
consisting of the supervision of the participation of domestic capital imports and 
exports, the type of production, investments, and technological policy in the automative 
sector. 
In the autoparts industry, domestic enterprises enjoy the following benefits: 
special credit lines from the National Development Bank for fixed assets, investments, 
technological development, working capital, or mergers; preferential treatment in credit 
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policy measures applied by the BCRA, and preferential treatment in the state's purchasing 
pol icy. 
The use of standardized and unified autoparts was to be mandatory in the auto-
motive industry. Standardized autoparts were defined as those ttiat satisfied domestic 
quality, operation, and material standards. They are also unified if they can be used 
by several vehicles in common. 
The constitution of new nondomestic enterprises is possible if there are no 
manufacturers, or for purposes of increasing exports of nontraditional products (and if 
during 5 years they guarantee to export 50% of their production, in which case they may 
import matrices, molds, and appliances for their manufacture). 
In the assembly industry, automotive vehicle manufacturing firms that do not 
belong to domestic capital must satisfy the production quotas contemplated for the models 
then being built before launching new models. Matrices, molds, and appliances may be 
imported provided it is a new model for which 90% of the matrices, molds, and appliances 
necessary for its manufacture are manufactured domestically. The applicable tariffs are 
those in force. 
Autoparts that may be imported must be approved yearly provided that they are 
not manufactured domestically or, if manufactured, that they do not satisfy minimum 
price, quantity, or quality requirements. Assembly enterprises may only import auto-
parts in accordance with the item above for no more than 4% to 10% of the FOB value of 
the type of vehicle. 
For both the autoparts and assembly industries, vehicle or autopart exports were 
to enjoy a 50% tax refund, but had to be exempt from payment of royalties and franchises. 
A register of patents, trademarks, and licences was to be established. Those contracts 
that did not contain restrictive clauses and whose payments did not exceed 2% of sales 
were to be registered in it. After registration, the pertinent payments could be 
remitted abroad. 
This is the first policy instrument (prior to Law 19,231, which creates the 
National Registry of Technological Transfer Contracts and Licences) that explicitly 
referred to the prohibition against accepting technological transfer contracts containing 
restrictive clauses and that set up a register of patents, trademarks, licences, etc. 
It made the decision to promote domestic technology and design more explicit. 
Despite the fact that as regards its explicit technological content Law 19,185 
is a pioneer law, its implicit technological content and the way in which it faces 
sector regulation are much richer. 
Production level controls and the obligation to amortize each model adequately 
before going on to a new one, the obligation to use standardized and unified autoparts, 
the restrictions on the incorporation of new enterprises unless they meet export goals, 
and the restrictions on the importation of matrices and molds unless they meet some given 
domestic production objectives, are provisions that have an extremely relevant tech-
nological content. Through them, the incentive to develop domestic technologies is 
linked to a more rational structure than the one that would result (as at present) from 
the free activities of automobile enterprises following the guidelines of their head-
quarter offices. 
The statement regarding intensive promotion of technology, etc., is as vague 
in this instrument as in many other Argentinian policy instruments. However, legal 
provisions gave the state sufficient authority regarding the basic technological 
decisions of the entrepreneurs to allow it to encourage the generation of a demand for 
local technology. 
This Law was repealed, which questions the viability of certain policy instru-
ments that at least try to incorporate slight amendments into the rationality and dy 
namics of some given power structures such as the one embodied in the automotive industry. 
Regional Industrial Promotion Instruments 
Law 20,560 and its regulatory instruments form a legal system aimed at pro-
moting industry and modifying its regional distribution. When promulgated, Law 20,560 
made explicit the following objectives: 
-to achieve a high rate of industrial growth; 
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-to harmonize industrial promotion objectives with the socioeconomic 
needs of the population; 
-to protect the environment and adequate conditions of life from pollution 
as well as from the effects that may be suffered by individuals and 
natural resources as a consequence of industrial activity; 
-to reserve industrial promotion for industries with domestic majority 
stockholdings; 
-to favour production and full employment rather than capital; 
-to encourage import substitution and to favour the exporting sectors; 
-to improve industry's cost structure; 
-to assure the development of national defence industries; 
-to support the expansion and strengthening of medium- and small-scale firms; 
-to create conditions favourable to investment and industrial capitalization; 
-to guarantee dignified and adequate standards of living to the personnel 
employed by the respective enterprises; 
-to achieve geographic decentralization of industrial activities, promoting 
the settlement of basic industries in development areas; 
-to give special support to industrial installations in frontier areas to 
consolidate the settlement and permanence of the population; 
-to establish complementary and support activities with boundary countries 
whenever geo-economic conditions make it convenient; 
-to avoid internal migration by contributing to the attainment of increasing 
labour employment levels; 
-to promote maximum use of natural resources by processing them in their 
zone of origin. 
The so-called priority industrial sectors - forestry and cellulose foods, animal 
and vegetable products and processes, mineral products, metalworking, chemicals, 
packaging in general, etc. (all of these sectors are broken down per product) - can 
benefit from Law 20,560. Other sectors that are not of a priority nature in other 
regions and that satisfy some given requirements can also benefit from it, as well as 
industries already established that have substantial expansion plans for their produc-
tion capacity. 
The mechanism used by the Law can be direct state contributions, state participa-
tion in the firms' capital stock, facilities for the supply of raw materials or for 
rendering the services, the purchase and rental of goods, and prices and rates to 
develop and encourage investments in infrastructure works. Also, these mechanisms 
include technological assistance, credits, tax exemptions, and imports of new or used 
molds and matrices for one year. 
Later on, Decree 713/73 for industrial promotion concerning Law 20,560 was 
promulgated to set down the common guidelines that must be followed by sectoral, regional, 
and special decrees to be given as a consequence of Law 20,560. The main beneficiaries 
of these regulations are industries that are potential exporters or that could potentially 
compete with imports. Therefore, the main objectives of this body of laws is to dis-
courage the development of new activities within the radius of the federal capital, as 
well as the promotion and settlement of industries in other regions of the country. 
To achieve these objectives the two laws offer a series of incentives to enter-
prises to be localized in the promoted areas, provided they employ a given number of 
workers, use local raw materials, assign a certain percentage of their production to 
exports, or a combination of some of these requirements. 
The laws are rich in statements about the major technological objectives sought 
through their application. More explicitly, and in keeping with the regulations, each 
decree approving an industrial localization agreement must define the source and the 
characteristics of the technology to be used by the promoted enterprises. However, as 
part of the research work undertaken by the Argentinian STPI team, over 40 localization 
contracts were sustained and none of them had any reference to the technological 
characteristics of the localization, nor any formal request for technological assistance 
for the installation or operation of the new plant. 
Although this explicit objective was not achieved, the laws had a potentially 
very rich implicit technological content. To achieve the objective of maximum exploita-
tion of regional raw materials with high levels of efficiency (despite the small size of 
the enterprises localized) requires an adequate selection of the basic technologies 
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required as well as continuous technological support. Otherwise such an objective would 
be postponed, within entrepreneurial logic, by the desire to use the instruments as 
simple elements to obtain the special benefits offered by them. 
This last aspect should be analyzed in the light of short-term political require-
ments within which a body of instruments of this nature is incorporated. The fundamental 
objective is to promote the localization of industries in the interior of the country; 
technological development objectives, which imply longer-term decisions and for whose 
implementation a whole technological policy planning and execution structure that does 
not exist in the country is required, must be subordinated to it. Therefore, and on the 
basis of the logic for the priorities that the political environment sets up for govern-
ment action, the technological deficiencies that can be observed may be understandable. 
INDIA 
Fifth Five-Year Plan for the Telecommunications and Electronics Industry 
This section includes some notes on India's plan for teleconmunications and 
electronics, even though it is much more than a limited ''programing" mechanism. In this 
case an entire industry is being shaped by direct government intervention, planning all 
its aspects, including R&D. 
The Planning Commission of India set up a Task Force in 1972 on the tele-
communications and electronics industry, at the instigation of the Steering Group on 
Engineering Industries. The Task Force concerned itself with the broad area of formulat-
ing policies and programs relating to the overall plans of various sectors of the 




-aerospace electronics and communication 
-radar and defence systems 
-computers, controls, and industrial electronics 
-instruments and instrumentation 
-components and materials. 
Based on the Task Force report, the Department of Electronics prepared in July 
1973 the draft plan for electronics for the Fifth Five-Year Plan. Two profiles, a total 
profile and a difference profile, were prepared as part of the Fifth Plan document. In 
the total profile, the electronics activities included in the plans of the Ministry of 
Communications, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
the Ministry of Industrial Development, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Atomic 
Energy Commission, and the Space Commission were also included. Thus, this profile gave 
the total profile of electronics activities in the country under various ministries and 
departments. In the difference profile, all the activities proposed to be started under 
the Department of Electronics were enumerated. 
A Trade and Technology Liaison Conmittee to handle the import and export trade 
between India and East European countries has already been started as a corporation 
called Electronics Trade and Technology Development Corporation (ETTDC). Apart from 
carrying out import and export trade in electronics between India and East European 
countries, this corporation in the public sector has also built an information base and 
has streamlined technical procedural difficulties encountered in this trade. 
Another activity that is to be commissioned shortly is in the area of semi-
conductors. In view of the rapid technological advancement in the semiconductor devices 
area, the need for a new semiconductor devices complex in the public sector dedicated 
to the production of these devices was recognized. Along with the production activities, 
it was recognized that R&D in semiconductor devices involving high-level technology 
(e.g., MOS-LSI technology, LED technology, SC memories, high-density packaging technology, 
etc.) was also necessary. A complex for the production of these devices and for carrying 
out R&D is to be set up shortly. 
Yet another activity that is soon to be started is a corporation for computer 
maintenance. The Electronics Conmission has advocated the setting up of a centralized 
maintenance agency for all imported computers in the country. This is designed to build 
up self-reliance in the maintenance of systems and to carry out system engineering 
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improvements. 
A list of the important manufacturing and promotional activities that were to be 
initiated in the Five-Year Plan is given below: 
-custom manufacture of special tubes 
-CPU and peripheral controllers 
-basic peripherals 
-software development 
-automation promotion centre 
-promotion of control components 
-production of microwave components and instruments 
-custom production of capital equipment 
-two-way communication equipment 
-test and development facilities 
-standardization activities 
-state agency for rural market promotion 
-high-technology and medical electronics instruments development production. 
INDUSTRIAL FINANCING MECHANISMS 
In the STPI country studies, a great deal of attention was given to the banking 
system and other financial mechanisms (funds, specialized credit, leasing companies, etc.). 
The reason for this was the overwhelming importance that financial mechanisms have as 
tools for industrial development and therefore as potential instruments for the promotion 
of indigenous scientific and technological capabilities. The specific cases summarized 
in this section are: 
Mexico - National fund for industrial equipment. 
- National fund for industrial promotion. 
Fund for guarantees and promotion of medium and small industries. 
- National fund for preinvestment studies. 
- Fund for the study and promotion of industrial complexes. 
Venezuela Development of long-term credit. 
- Leasing companies. 
Brazil - National Economic Development Bank (BNDE). 
- Basic Inputs S.A. Financing and Participation (FIBASE). 
- Brazilian Investment S.A. 
- Special Agency for Industrial Financing (FINAME). 
FINEP: Institution for the financing of projects and studies. 
Korea Financial mechanisms for industry. 
Peru - Development Finance Corporation (COFIDE). 
Industrial Development Bank. 
- Mining Development Bank. 
Argentina - Permanent national fund for preinvestment studies. 
The main role of these industrial financing instruments related to their possible 
impact on the pattern of industrial growth and hence on the demand for local technolog-
ical inputs. They can be considered as the most powerful instrument when the state 
controls their operations, in particular when dealing with large projects that go beyond 
the financial possibilities of a given enterprise or group of enterprises (and even 
beyond the possibilities of individual banks). Their role can also be equally decisive 
and powerful by reorienting demand for engineering services and industrial R&D toward 
local suppliers and by establishing norms for credit operations that include clear and 
practical considerations regarding the regulation of technology imports. 
Inflation and scarcity of capital in many developing countries have led many 
researchers to believe that capital is underpriced, that the current - and often directly 
or indirectly subsidized - interest rates do not reflect the real cost of capital, and 
therefore that the tendency to replace labour by capital is much more accelerated than 
what it would be if the real price of capital were established. The problem with this 
argument is that it does not take into account that such subsidized interest rates were 
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one of the keys for the industrialization of the developing countries, and that the aver-
age interest rates of world capital markets normally tend to be even lower. It is also 
generally recognized that labour costs are subsidized by several channels. The sub-
stitution of capital for labour in such a context is nevertheless the dominant tendency 
and cannot be considered, by itself, a negative tendency. 
This tendency of the developing countries to have higher real interest rates 
than the developed countries also appears in countries like Venezuela, where the massive 
oil income of 1974-1976 clogged the economy. Venezuela has encountered many difficulties 
in the development of a long-term capital market. This demonstrated that the availability 
of money in itself is not sufficient, for it needs to be transformed into a rather com-
plex mechanism to foster industrial development. This transformation faces considerable 
obstacles in the developing countries. 
In general, the use of industrial financing instruments in the STPI countries 
analyzed has not been as imaginative as it could have been and has conformed to rather 
conservative financing evaluation criteria of the banking type. There are few examples 
of a clear orientation of the financial strength of the State (and of large private 
finance corporations), in terms of the sectoral priorities of the instruments, as well 
as their discrimination in terms of nationality, size, and technological inputs of the 
beneficiaries. There are even fewer instances of the conscious use of industrial 
financing instruments to foster the development of indigenous technological capabilities. 
In addition to their contribution to the formation of a given industrial struc-
ture, industrial financing mechanisms are also very important because of their potential 
effects on investment decisions in industry through the qualitative considerations they 
can impose as conditions for obtaining credit. In none of the cases studied was this 
potential effectively used. When considerations as to the source of the technology, 
the degree of national integration, and the effects on employment, environment, etc., 
were taken nominally, it was recognized that in practice such considerations were not 
actually considered. IlllTiediate, short-term profit considerations have usually prevailed 
over broader social objectives. 
An important gap in all the STPI studies is that there has been practically no 
mention of the over helming foreign debt situation of the developing countries, which 
has grown considerably in the last 5 years, and which has affected some of the STPI 
countries in particular. 
MEXICO 
The participation of the Mexican state in industrial financing has had two 
basic orientations: selective control of credits granted by the financial system; and 
direct intervention in obtaining savings and channeling them toward the formation of 
capital . 
Through the regulations of the Central Bank, there has been an attempt to direct 
credit toward productive activities (primary and secondary sectors) since the beginning 
of the 1940s. In fact, at that time, a rule was established requiring that at least 60% 
of the portfolio of all banks and financial firms would be destined for loans for 
industrial and land-and-livestock production. As a result of this disposition, the 
share of these activities in the total sum of credits rose considerably, reaching levels 
higher than 40% and 53% in 1970 and 1975 respectively. However, these dispositions are 
too general and do not set priorities within these sectors. Thus, the consumer goods 
industries absorbed more than half the credits to the manufacturing industry in those 
years (7), and a great part of these credits served to finance inventories and sales. 
Moreover, in addition to the absence of sectoral priorities, these measures did 
not indicate an orientation in terms of the type or size of corporations that should 
receive credits. In general, the largest firms absorbed a higher proportion of the 
credits to industry. The guarantees they offer to the local loan agent are greater than 
those of the small and medium firms. Of course, this applies with greater emphasis to 
the subsidiaries of transnational corporations that have intensified their use of local 
sources of credit to finance their operations in recent years. And the largest corpora-
tions are precisely the ones that have greater possibilities for obtaining finance. 
In short, the selective control of credit exercised by the Central Bank has not 
directed the financial system toward sectoral priorities in industry or agriculture. The 
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level of self-financing in industry was also quite high (it has been calculated at 60%, 
owing in good measure to the fiscal stimulus to reinvestment), and instruments to orient 
it do not exist. The greatest part of industrial financing is therefore made in accor-
dance with the pattern of expected profitability of private enterprises (and therefore, 
with the pattern of concentration of income). 
The orientation of credit to industry has not considered criteria regarding the 
choice of techniques. Although credits that could result in increases in employed 
personnel are difficult to obtain because of lack of guarantees (loans to augment the 
working capital of small and medium industry), those that may have a bias in favour of 
capital-intensive techniques are obtained with relative ease (loans for the purchase of 
machinery and equipment for which the capital goods acquired with the credit can serve 
as a guarantee for the creditor). 
One of the elements that contributes most to undervaluation of the price of 
capital is that interest on borrowed capital is deductible from the taxable total. In 
1975, public banking was responsible for 42.8% of the total financing of companies and 
individuals (channeling more than 121 ,831 million pesos). An important part of this 
total corresponds to credits granted by special funds constituted as trust funds in the 
Bank of Mexico and in the Nacional Financiera. An analysis of some of the most important 
trust funds is presented next. 
National Fund for Industrial Equipment (FONEI) 
FONEI, a fund in the Bank of Mexico directed toward financing projects for import 
substitution or for increasing exports, was established at the beginning of the current 
decade. Like the other funds, FONEI operates through the private banking system, granting 
credits for amounts that fluctuate between 3.5 and 37.5 million pesos at an interest rate 
of 12% and for terms of up to 13 years. Private banks receive 2% on the operation for 
serving as intermediaries. The user must present an investment package in which the 
shares of the user itself, the financial intermediary, and FONEI are as follows: 
Industrial Firm (minimum) 
















The financing must be directed toward the following types of projects: instal-
lation or equipping of industrial plants; and plant expansion or modernization if and when 
the products have reasonable possibilities of being placed in foreign markets or of 
serving as import substitutes. Feasibility studies related to projects subject to being 
supported by FONEI can also be financed. The industrial branches for which financing 
can be granted are capital goods, intermediate products, and basic consumer goods (those 
that are consumed by a high percentage of the population or that are considered indis-
pensable for the economic development of the country). 
The criterion regarding the composition of the firms' equity is sheer formality: 
it insists that companies have a majority of Mexican capital (thus, preferential credit 
might be granted to a firm with 49% foreign capital). More than 36% of the companies 
receiving credits from FONEI up to May 1975 were subsidiaries of transnational corpora-
tions and had received 38% of the total resources channeled through this instrument. 
The number of jobs created with the credits received by the transnational firms 
is much lower: generally, the industrial projects of these companies involved a greater 
capital intensity. 
In approving a credit, FONEI considers the following elements: generation or 
savings of foreign exchange, use of labour, value added, industrial decentralization, 
legal organization and technical capability of the firm, profitability of the project, 
market conditions, financial situation of the firm, technology to be used, sources of 
raw materials, and alternative sources of resources. However, the internal rules of 
FONEI do not specify how these elements are evaluated. 
The technology used in the projects may or may not be foreign, the firm may or 
may not carry out research and experimental development activities, etc. Moreover, the 
criterion on industrial decentralization is applied in an extremely flexible manner; 
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51% of the approved projects involved locations in Zone I as defined by the Decree on 
Decentralization and Experimental Development. Finally, as with the majority of the 
financing instruments, the evaluation of a project is completed on the basis of its micro-
economic rationale. 
National Fund for Industrial Promotion (FOMIN) 
FOMIN was created in April lg72 as a trust fund administered by the Nacional 
Financiera. The initial apportionment from the federal government was 50 million pesos. 
FOMIN functions by means of the purchase of common or preferred stock in an amount not 
exceeding 33% of the new equity of the firm. Thus, the Fund participates like one more 
partner of the firms it supports and to which it offers the technical, administrative, 
legal, and financial assistance made available by the Nacional Financiera. The entre-
preneurs can buy the stocks controlled by FOMIN. Finally, when the contribution of the 
Fund is greater than l million pesos, performance of a technical and economic feasibility 
study by the National Fund for Preinvestment Studies (FONEP) is required. 
Its oals are the following: to strengthen regional development by furthering 
industrial decentralization, to create new sources of work, to better the situation of 
the balance of payments, to promote the generation of national technology, and to con-
tribute to a greater integration of the industrial plant. Priority is given to firms 
that process agriculture and livestock, forestry, fishing, and mining products. Further-
more, the following scale of priorities has been set for selecting projects: 
Type of Firm: 
Location of the Firm: 
Destination of Production: 
Technology and Employment: 
Industrial Branch: 
Small and medium, with national capital; 
Zone III and Zone II (which exclude the Federal District, 
the city of Montemey, and the city of Talisco); 
Indispensable consumption industries, export industries, 
import substitution; 
Locally created technology, foreign technology adapted 
to local conditions, or technologies that might offer 
greater employment. 
Land-and-livestock and related industries, chemical 
products, metal mechanics, construction materials, 
electric and electronic products, textiles, wood. 
Although these priorities could be complemented and some of the criteria are 
incomplete, this instrument is the first to define priorities in terms of industrial 
branches. In general, the application of resources has been regulated by the established 
criteria and priorities. Still, the concentration of resources in a few corporations 
is quite intense. Five firms (7% of all those that had received credits from FOMIN) 
absorbed more than 31% of the resources channeled through this instrument (more than 
56.7 million pesos). 
Fund for Guarantees and Promotion of Medium and Small Industry (FOGAIN) 
FOGAIN was created in lg54 for the purpose of channeling resources to firms that 
had no access to sources of credit because of their size. Financing from FOGAIN is 
reserved for companies whose equity is less than 25 million pesos if they are located 
in Zones II and III (defined by the Decree on Decentralization and Industrial Develop-
ment). The Fund was formed with an appropriation of 15 million pesos from the federal 
government and, since beginning its operations, has dealt with 17,173 applications for 
credit for a total amount of 4,614 million pesos channeled to more than g,QOO firms. 
According to official figures, 57% of the total financing was granted to firms 
producing consumer goods, and 43% was channeled to companies in the branches of inter-
mediate products and capital goods. The credits are used basically for the acquisition 
of machinery and equipment. However, criteria on the technology used or the technical 
activities developed by the companies that benefit are not applied by this Fund. Once 
again, the principal criteria are the profitability of the firm and the guarantees that 
are offered. 
FOGAIN applies differential interest rates according to the location of the firm: 
12% on credits for companies located in Zone I; 11% and 10% on credits for firms in 
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Zones II and III respectively. But the Fund maintains a passive attitude toward the 
different industrial branches and zones of the country: applications for credit are 
received even though no active policy has been developed for identifying projects in 
some top-priority branches. The industrial branches that have benefited from FOGAIN 
credits simply reflect the changes in the industrial structure of the last 20 years. 
National Fund for Preinvestment Studies (FONEP) 
FONEP was started when the Nacional Financiera began to require feasibility 
studies before granting credits. The Fund was created in November 1968, and since then 
has authorized 87 operations at a value of 176 million pesos. FONEP seeks to finance 
these studies and has a fund of 364 million pesos for this purpose. The studies financed 
by this Fund are the following: 
-technical and economic prefeasibility and feasibility studies of specific 
projects; 
-specific complementary studies (engineering design, etc.); 
-preliminary studies aimed at identifying, approving, or rejecting alter-
natives viable from an economic or technical point of view which might 
facilitate making a decision on the advisability of a project or group 
of projects; 
-general prefeasibility studies of a regional or sectoral nature; and 
-studies aimed at improving the administrative, operational, or productive 
capacity of private companies and firms from the public sector. 
From the beginning, the resources handled through FONEP have benefited organisms 
in the public sector (government and the decentralized agencies). Fifty-one percent of 
the operations concern firms in the industrial sector, 15% in agriculture and forestry, 
and 24% in services. 
FONEP has available a directory of consultants who can be contracted by companies 
receiving credits. Many companies offering such consulting services are foreign; to date 
there has been no policy on hiring national firms. The capacity to perform technical 
and economic feasibility studies in almost all branches of activity exists in Mexico. If 
they do not have the capacity in some branch, they can subcontract to external consul-
tants. But generally it can be argued that hiring foreign firms to conduct these 
studies is not justifiable. Besides, a feasibility study frequently makes recommendations 
on suppliers of technology, of engineering services, and of capital goods; as far as 
possible, the chance that foreign consultants might orient the demand for these elements 
to foreign sources should be avoided. 
Fund for the Study and Promotion of Industrial Complexes 
This Fund was created in December 1970 with an initial appropriation of 5 million 
pesos. The purpose of the Fund is to study the possibilities of creating industrial 
complexes and their promotion. Once the infrastructure of an industrial park is con-
structed, the financing of land sales is carried out through the Fund. 
Through establishment of an industrial complex, firms can have access to the 
centralized services of an infrastructure (from water, sewage, paved roads, and electric 
power to residential areas, telecommunications, and computer centres). In addition, 
certain services can also be acquired or contracted for in a centralized fashion: 
financing, commercialization services, etc. 
It is quite difficult to analyze the impact of this instrument on the tech-
nological decisions of the companies established in the industrial parks. However, in 
the majority of the industrial parks, the services of commercialization and financing 
have not been centralized. Nor is it very likely that in the near future centralization 
can be promoted for technological research or technical activities (maintenance, quality 
control, or training of labour). 
The common characteristic that all Mexican trust funds share seems to be the 
lack of specific sectoral priorities. Another one is their failure to distinguish 
between various types of credit-receiving firms (particularly with reference to the 
composition of their equity). The majority of the trust funds do not exert any criteria 
about the origin of the technology employed by the beneficiary firms or about the 
conducting of research or technical activities. 
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The final destination of the credits scarcely seems to concern these trust funds. 
The interest rate is the same regardless of how the credits are used (for acquiring fixed 
assets or expanding working capital). A difference in the interest rates applied to 
agencies in the public sector and to private enterprises does exist, but these are pre-
ferential rates, much lower than the rate applied by the private coITTTiercial banking system 
(18% to 19% in 1975). Consequently, the concession of these credits implies a subsidy 
to the beneficiaries whose benefits are not easy to identify. 
More and more, the transnational firms apply to local sources of credit to finance 
their expansion: their contribution of resources is worthless in this case and contrasts 
strongly with the flow of profits that will be remitted abroad as royalties. In this 
context, conceding credits with preferential interest rates to transnational firms con-
stitutes an economic folly. 
The federal trust funds ought to incorporate substantive criteria over the use 
of credits and the technical characteristics of the beneficiary companies. In the first 
place, the sectoral priorities of these instruments ought to be determined. Investment 
projects should be actively identified, and the system of differential rates should dis-
criminate against branches or sectors that are not high priorities. Moreover, the choice 
of technologies must be shaped as far as possible. Also, criteria should be applied 
based on the level of integration (as FOMEX currently does) and on payments for imported 
technologies. With the application of these and other criteria, the excessive weight 
given at present to criteria based on the microeconomic rationale of the beneficiary 
firms might be counteracted. 
Finally, payments for interest on credits for corporations should not be 
deductible from the taxable total (for income tax). This is a measure that unnecessarily 
cheapens the cost of capital and that reduces the tax base of the firms. 
VENEZUELA 
Among the instruments affecting the technological behaviour of the industrial 
sector, those that finance the acquisition of technology are particularly important. In 
Venezuela two elements are important: on the one hand, the country's dependence on the 
supply of foreign technology, and on the other, the specific economic conditions result-
ing from the production of oil. 
In this context the Venezuelan study tried to define the role played by foreign 
credit in financing the importation of technology and, in parallel, to explore the 
possibility that internal credit develops a more signi icant role, which might have the 
associated effect of improving the negotiating capacity of the national buyer. 
First, it is necessary to examine whether the national banking system can be an 
alternative to foreign financing and more specifically whether the considerable resources 
derived from oil can be converted into finance capital for new investment projects. The 
reply to this is of central importance given that the bargaining position of technology 
buyers is visibly weakened when they depend on external financing. 
Development of Long-Term Credit 
In Venezuela finance capital does not come from the evolution of an autonomous 
economy, but is the result of the penetration of foreign capital, and especially of its 
appropriation of part of the ground rent (agrarian and oil). Strictly speaking, accu-
mulation of this type does not give rise to finance capital but to money capital (8). 
National financing conceded through private commercial banks, mortgage banks, 
finance associations, loans and savings institutions, state banks and funds, and state 
financial corporations has been oriented predominantly toward commercial and mortgage 
activities, which compared with industrial or agricultural activities are far safer and 
allow higher profits in a shorter period. 
This orientation also corresponds to public financing organizations, which 
according to a study carried out by the Venezuelan Development Corporation (CVF) have not 
covered the deficiencies in the private system and have tended instead to follow the 
same patterns with respect to interest rates, terms, and credit distribution between 
regions and sectors of the economy. 
National banks operate without paying heed to technology policy. The nature of 
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the technology, where it comes from, the conditions in which it is acquired, local tech-
nological capacity, etc., are all of no relevance to Venezuelan banks. Even the public 
financial entities behave in a similar manner, although they do have some norms regarding 
the use of technology. These norms, however, are expressed in a very general manner -
"technology that promotes the use of national raw materials" and "technology favouring 
the use of labour" are two such vague norms that are practically impossible to put into 
practice. Private banks are even further away from including elements of technological 
policy as criteria for their operations. In this case the profit criterion dominates 
absolutely and excludes any other considerations. It is important that since private 
banks directly administer part of the state's financial resources - by means of the 
funds, basically - profitability becomes the only criterion for the investment of these 
resources. 
As a first approximation, the role of foreign banks can be estimated by comparing 
the conditions under which they concede loans with those of national banks. 
The normal interest rate in the internal market is 11% a year on debit balances. 
This rate is used by the mortgage banks, commercial banks, finance associations, and the 
CVF in the case of warranties. Regarding the Industrial Credit Fund (FCI), the major 
part of the credits has been conceded at 8% and 9% (only a minimal number at 6% or less). 
Meanwhile the current interest rates in the international market fluctuate between 6.5% 
and 8.5% (apart from the fact that they are frequently subsidized by the government of 
the country from which the credit comes). 
The commissions charged in the internal market are generally higher than those 
in the international market. In the first case, they vary between 0.5% and 5.5%, leaving 
aside the savings and loans associations where commissions are higher. In the world 
market, the commissions oscillate between 1.5% and 2%. 
In Venezuela long-term credit is just beginning to develop and has existed only 
in mortgage loans and recently in the case of the FCI (in principle, for 65% of its loans). 
The recently formed finance associations dedicate only a very small proportion of their 
funds to long-term operations and then only as commissioners of state funds. 
Foreign banks, on the other hand, have resources for any type of credit, although 
it should be noted that long-term credit has recently been getting scarce and has been 
covered by short-term renewable rotating credit. 
In the international market far more importance is given to guarantees conceded 
by the state either directly or by means of participation in the share capital of the 
firm receiving credit, or through a commitment to an increase in state participation, 
should financial difficulties arise. Foreign loans normally allow up to 3 years remis-
sion period and sometimes up to 5 and 7 years. In the internal Venezuelan market only 
the Agricultural Credit Fund (FCA) offers a period of remission for the most backward 
areas of the country, and the CVF in the case of warranties allows l to 5 years. 
Loans obtained in the internal market normally cover 75% of the investment. 
Commercial banks give short-term loans with the warranty of credit notes and cover up 
to 90%. The international market, on the other hand, lends up to 100%. Internal credit 
is very specialized and is oriented toward commercial and mortgage activities. Thus 
there is a scarcity of credit for industry and agriculture. This is not true of external 
credit. 
Finally, it must be pointed out that the national credit system has difficulties 
in fulfilling the schedules for investment capital, something that does not occur in the 
international system. In general it can be said that the larger the capital required 
and the more relevant it is for industrial (and technological) development, the less 
adequate the nationally supplied credit is, and the more the interested firms have to 
resort to foreign credit tied to a number of inputs (hardware and software). 
The relative scarcity of long-term capital does not have only historical causes. 
The current central problem that serves as an obstacle to the development of long-term 
capital is inflation. At the same time that the large resources derived from oil 
appeared, inflation accelerated. The inflation rate is now higher than the interest rate 
and therefore the latter is becoming negative. In Venezuela there is no system for 
indexing debit balances. The foreign exchange surplus derived from oil exports, on the 
other hand, is not easily made available in the internal market. Apart from other 
factors, this surplus behaves as capital; this means that it seeks high and guaranteed 
profit rates, which it looks for in the international markets. 
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According to the Superintendency of Banks, a large proportion of the capital 
derived from 1974-1975 oil exports was exported to the eurodollar market, that is, to 
the short-term international capital market. It is thus not easy for this money-capital 
to be transformed into large sums of long-term credit for the international market. More-
over the national banking structure has not been adapted for this transformation. 
Venezuelan banks are very specialized and the finance associations are very recent. Com-
mercial banks are totally inadequate for such purposes. The fact that the state in-
creasingly has to use external credit to cover an important part of its financial re-
quirements is perhaps the best evidence of the difficulties of transforming its euro-
dollar deposits into long-term credit. 
In Venezuela there are no organic links between banks, industries, and technology 
suppliers. Such links become essential for the large credit operations with long-term 
capital, where competing firms operate with "package deals" in which the technology sup-
pliers are intimately associated with the financial system. On this point the remarks of 
Rudolph Petersen, President of the Bank of America until 1969, are very illuminating. 
"At the moment, the cutting edge of international banking activities is found in the 
capacity to bring together capital, loans, resources and knowledge into an integrated 
block and to provide the necessary means for these ingredients to flow across national 
frontiers." 
Technology suppliers frequently offer financing as part of their package. These 
firms are clients or subsidiaries of banks and have a privileged and open credit line 
with the bank for carrying out their operations, and often - as in France - they do so 
with the guarantee of the government of the country in which the parent company is based. 
In summary, the comparative advantages of external credit - leaving aside the 
relative scarcity of internal resources for long-term credit - are due precisely to the 
packaging of foreign investment (direct or disguised investment) with the commercializa-
tion of technology. The profitability of financial-commercial operations is not estab-
lished exclusively on the banking operation as such, but on a whole complex of operations. 
Involved in this is the interest of the governments of the countries where the parent 
company of the foreign bank or firm is located in promoting and protecting their national 
companies, especially in the current circumstances of accelerated worldwide commercial 
competition. The possibility of thus allotting the profit rate and compensating through 
trade or technology the reduction of interest rates (or vice versa) is prohibited at the 
moment for national banks. Having indicated the importance of foreign banks and their 
advantages over national banks, the conditions in which foreign banks operate in 
Venezuela are considered next. The Venezuelanization of banks established recently by 
the Banking Law has two fundamental characteristics: 
(l) Foreign banks in Venezuela cannot operate independently but are obliged 
to operate through a national bank or a representation bureau previously authorized by 
the Superintendency of Banks. According to the law the offices of representation cannot 
receive any sort of deposits or intervene in operations that in any way imply obtaining 
internal resources. 
(2) The representation bureaus do not directly concede credits but negotiate 
operations with interested persons. However, these measures, which are part of the 
Cartagena Agreement policy, have not eliminated foreign banks as financial instruments. 
On the one hand, regarding short-term credit operations (importations), foreign 
banks open credit lines that are not limited in their scope by any internal legislation. 
The only limit is the bank's own financial possibilities. On the other hand, no legis-
lation prohibits a local firm from obtaining credit in the international market and 
paying off the loans in the same marke~. This can be done apparently without any legal 
requirement for internal control because there is no exchange control. This allows the 
development of hidden forms of foreign investment by international banks. 
On the basis of all that has been said, the Venezuelan team made recommendations 
directed toward increasing the possibilities of the use of internal credit as an instru-
ment of technological policy to improve the manner in which imported technology is 
acquired and to stimulate local technological capacity. To this end the following areas 
of action were suggested: 
(a) The preamble of the Project of the Law creating the Technology Bank should be 
revised to widen its radius of action, especially regarding the availability of credits 
for the disaggregation and depackaging of the technology to be imported, for the 
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international search, selection, and evaluation of technology, for the selective impor-
tation of technology, and finally for financing the acquisition or experimental develop-
ment of national and Andean subregional technology. 
(b) Complementary norms and guides should be drawn up for the projects seeking 
financing presented to banks (state or private), incorporating as evaluation criteria 
items regarding the technological policy of firms seeking financing so as to judge the 
adequateness of their policy in terms of national economic and technological development 
policy. 
(c) A proposal should be studied for creating credit lines in banks, which, 
similar to the obligatory 10% for agriculture, establishes a minimum percentage for the 
development of scientific and technological activities in the widest sense of the term, 
in conditions at least competitive, or better still, advantageous compared with external 
credit. 
(d) The systematic use of the funds of the FCI and the FIV should be promoted 
as substitutes for external credit in operations of technology purchased abroad. Strict 
criteria should be used, which include adequate depackaging and which assign priority to 
the acquisition of locally generated technological inputs. 
Leasing Companies 
Because of their special characteristics, the leasing companies recently estab-
1 ished in Venezuela are dealt with separately. 
Leasing companies perform financial operations that involve renting out equipment, 
machinery, and durable consumer goods that the lessor has the option to buy. As a 
financial operation this has recently been incorporated into the national Banking Law, 
although regulations regarding functioning have not yet been drawn up. 
The leasing companies used to buy the machinery that the client required and then 
rented it out to him, generally for not less than 18 months or for more than 5 years. 
However, because of recent government measures (25-5-76) aimed at restricting money 
supply, renting out for periods longer than 18 months is now not permitted. The loan 
normally covers the total cost of the machinery or equipment. The lessee pays a monthly 
rental payment fixed by the lessor on the basis of the cost of the equiµnent, its degree 
of obsolescence, the risk implied, and the agreed terms. The principal advantage for 
the lessee is that he does not have to mobilize large amounts of capital immediately or 
make advance payments. The lessee can deduct the rental fees directly from his taxes. 
Leasing companies have generally been promoted by national banks and through them, by 
foreign banks and probably foreign commercial concerns. 
In a survey of a few leasing contracts, the Venezuelan team was able to establish 
some common features, which are briefly described below. 
The company that leases the equipment normally takes responsibility for all the 
expenditures on repairs, maintenance, spare parts, or equipment improvements, but the 
lessor has ownership of every new part or improvement introduced to the leased equipment, 
with no possibility of recognition of what would be the equivalent of "land or house 
improvements." 
The lessee is obliged to pay the lease even when he has not used the equipment 
and has denounced the contract, requiring it to be terminated. Payment is obligatory 
while the lessor maintains that the contract is legal. The lessee is made responsible 
for all the expenses incurred for freight, duties, transport, delivery, storage, 
insurance, and others, but has no right to determine where the equipment is to be 
installed. The lessee is responsible for all the expenses incurred for personnel 
training, third-person accidents, professional fees, and legal and administrative costs, 
and is obliged to submit his balance sheet to the lessor, who can carry out audits if 
he so wishes and "verify the administrative norms" of the lessee. The expenses thus 
incurred are paid by the lessee. The lessor usually does not accept in the contract any 
responsibility for faults and defects that the leased equipment might have, or the 
consequences these imply. 
The recent government decision to prohibit operations of this sort for periods 
longer than 18 months will probably restrict the rapid expansion these firms had been 
enjoying. However, since the government's measure can be modified and probably evaded, 
and since important investments have already been made in this way, it is necessary to 
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examine the consequences of these firms from a technological point of view. 
To begin with, it is important that the operations of the leasing or hire-
purchase companies are themselves very similar to a foreign investment, even though the 
firms themselves may be legally national. As a whole the leasing operation is not easily 
distinguished from a foreign investment accompanied by loans and tied to the importation 
of inputs and machinery (thus, of "embodied technology'' sold as a "black box"), with 
controlling rights over the lessee's balance sheets and with administrative practices very 
similar to those of a parent company in relation to its subsidiary. 
The leasing companies act in practice as representatives of banks and foreign 
industry, as intermediaries in financial and conmercial operations. Free from the 
restrictions imposed by Decision 24 of the Cartagena Agreement and the corresponding 
Venezuelan national rulings, and effectively free from practically any legal control, 
the leasing companies attend to their clients' needs, carrying out all the financial 
operations and purchases required, deciding for the client all the details of the opera-
tion, and advising in the selection with great bargaining power. 
Once the lessee has signed the leasing contract, he has practically renounced all 
possibility of autonomous decision-making. The leasing company has the right to determine 
the location of the machinery, how it is to be used, and its maintenance. The lessor 
appropriates any improvements introduced to the leased machinery and equipment and has the 
right to control the accounting and financial operations of the lessee. It also has the 
right to decide whether the lessee can acquire or lease neN equiJlllent or machinery and 
to impose conditions on these operations. 
Apart from the fact that this is by definition a technological package, the 
current contractual norms explicitly forbid any maintenance or repair of leased equipment 
and machinery by the lessee. These operations serve as an elementary basis for tech-
nological learning. 
Leasing operations have strong effects on the use of capital-intensive technology 
in that the expenses incurred by the lessee are income-tax deductible; thus capital costs 
are considerably lowered. 
All the points discussed indicate the existence of strong disincentives for 
technology disaggregation in leasing operations, and on the other hand, strong incentives 
for indiscriminate technology importation. In addition, since the lessor appropriates 
all the improvements introduced into the leased machinery and since the lessee is obliged 
to accept the lessor's control over additional new equiJlllent he might want to acquire or 
lease, the lessee has no incentive to become interested in his own technological learning 
or development; rather, technological apathy is induced. 
Because the leasing companies have been operating for only a short time in 
Venezuela and their effects are only partially known, a more detailed analysis should be 
made to reconmend measures that might fill the current vacuum regarding knowledge of 
their operations. 
BRAZIL 
Up to the first half of the 1960s the inadequate financial system was one of the 
barriers to faster industrial growth in Brazil. Made up almost solely of monetary assets 
and bank debts, it offered no alternatives to inflation for credit expansion. Because of 
inflation and the legal limitation of the interest rate, credit was limited to short-term 
credit for the financing of circulating capital granted by the conmercial banking network 
and to medium-term credit granted by the "financeiras" (i.e., credit and financing soci-
eties). Long-tenn credit for financing the fixed investment of industrial enterprises 
was practically nonexistent, in view of the fact that the National Economic Development 
Bank (BNDE) was mainly linked to the financing of investment in infrastructure (power and 
transport), steel, and chemical industries. 
It was only after the reforms affecting the monetary system, the banking system, 
and the capital market introduced in 1964, and with the creation of special funds for 
medium- and long-term industrial financing, that a wide reorganization of the financial 
system was started, it being adapted to the needs of industrial financing. Although the 
implementation of those reforms was linked (in a long-term perspective) to the objective 
of containing inflation, it represented the institutional basis for most of the new 
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financial techniques and institutions, which, among other effects, encouraged industrial 
growth. The most important changes introduced as of the mid-1960s included: 
(a) New specialized financial institutions were created, such as the ones making 
up the housing financial system and the investment banks. 
(b) New techniques were introduced and the "financeiras'' specialized in direct 
consumer credit (financing the commercialization of durable consumer goods). Medium-term 
financing of circulating capital was thus left to investment banks and regional and state 
development banks - which also work in "repassing" (i.e., as intermediaries) financing 
for fixed capital - and short-term financing of circulating capital was left to the 
commercial banks. The latter underwent a process of mergers and annexations, which aimed 
chiefly at reducing operational costs (increased by the excessive expansion of the 
banking network) and the cost of money for the final borrower. 
(c) New regulations were introduced for modernization of the stock exchange 
markets. 
(d) An important financial innovation, the "correcao monet<l'ria" (i.e., price 
indexation), was introduced and a flexible exchange rate was adopted. 
The result of these changes was a marked alteration in the structure of the 
financial system, which can be assessed by the change in the relative participation of 
the assets in the hands of the public outside the banking system. The most important 
change is undoubtedly the loss of the position of monetary assets in the financial 
system, with the corresponding increased participation of nonbanking financial inter-
mediaries, which has become prevalent since 1972. Although a large part of this was 
structural change, it gives an approximate idea of the diversification of sources of 
financing external to the enterprises. The promissory notes, after banking operations, 
became the most important source of credit for current activities, allowing the medium-
term financing of durable consumer goods through the nfinanceiras" and of circulating 
capital for the enterprises through the investment banks. As to long-term loans for 
fixed investment, the domestic supply was increased with the creation of specific funds 
for industrial financing in the sphere of the public financial intennediaries (BNDE and 
the Bank of Brazil) and of the Central Bank, and, after 1969, with the inflow of loans 
and financing from abroad. 
Among the several funds with a nationwide scope that were created or reformulated 
in the period (besides the regional and state development banks) the following should be 
mentioned: 
(a) In BNDE: FRE (i.e., Fund for Economic Reequipment), which had previously 
financed investments in infrastructure (power and transport), steel, and chemical indus-
tries, thereafter granted credit to practically all branches of manufacturing; FIPEME 
(i.e., Fund for the Financing of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises}; and FINAME (Fund 
for the Financing of Machinery and Equipment), which in 1971 was changed into a public 
enterprise subsidiary to BNDE and whose activity has been acquiring a strategic impor-
tance in the financing of domestically produced capital goods. 
(b) In the Bank of Brazil: FINEX, FDI, FIRUM, FAD, FUNDIPRA, and PASEP. 
(c) In the Central Bank: FUNDECE (Fund for the Democratization of the Capital 
of Enterprises); and FIBEP. These are funds of an accounting nature; in FUNDECE the 
financial agents are the Bank of Brazil and regional and state development banks, and in 
FIBEP they are the Bank of Brazil, BNDE, and FINAME S/A. There is also the PIS (i.e., 
Social Integration Program), which is a fund administrated by the Federal Savings Bank 
and with an important role in the recent financing of dcimestically produced machines and 
equipment. 
(d) In the National Housing Bank (BNH): REINVEST, which finances fixed invest-
ments for enterprises in the branch of building materials. 
These funds have constituted the only sources of investment capital for indus-
trial enterprises. The private financial system by itself offers no alternatives. In-
vestment banks, which should work essentially in this sphere of credit, have most of 
their medium-term credit granted for circulating capital. "Underwriting" operations 
still mean very little in tenns of the volume of resources. The market of primary 
titles of enterprises, on the other hand, is practically nonexistent for reasons dating 
back to the inflationary past and because of the natural preference for short-term titles. 
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Credit supply to the private sector has a very well-defined profile. Short- and 
medium-tenn credits for circulating capital are mostly supplied by the commercial banks, 
the Bank of Brazil (decreasingly), and increasingly by the "financeiras" and investment 
banks. Long-term credits for fixed investment are internally supplied solely by public 
agencies and official banks: BNDE, FINAME, BNB, BROE, Bank of Brazil, and BNH (which 
finances house building). 
From the viewpoint of the need for industrial financing, the fall in the partici-
pation of loans and financing contracts for circulating capital, together with the 
corresponding rise in the participation of those for investment capital, is still more 
important. This apparently would have benefited industrial investment, which even today 
is hampered by the shortage of long-term credits. Nevertheless, it should be stressed 
that the near totality of the rise in participation of the supply of investment capital 
can be explained by the growth of BNH loans and financing contracts, which have a specific 
destination. It is significant that credits from BNDE, FINAME, and, to a lesser extent, 
the Bank of Brazil have followed approximately the annual growth of the total credit 
supply. However, the domestic supply of long-term credits is still insufficient, espe-
cially in sectors such as the ones responsible for the national production of machinery 
and equipment. 
It must still be seen in which ways the reform of the domestic financial system, 
as well as the creation of new funds for industrial financing and the new fonns of col-
lecting resources abroad, have stimulated industrial growth since 1967. It is obvious 
that the greater encouragement originated from the fact that the enterprises could count 
on new sources and a greater availability of resources. However, the most important 
changes affected short- and medium-tenn credits for circulating capital. Industrial 
growth began to benefit from the development of the financial system directly through the 
credits for circulating capital supplied by special financing funds linked to the public 
agencies, by the investment banks, which replaced the "financeiras," and chiefly by the 
new lines of credit abroad. Industrial growth benefited indirectly through the financing 
of the consumption of industrialized products (durable consumer goods) in which the 
"financeiras" specialized. As to long-tenn credits, the rise in their supply was re-
stricted to public financial intennediaries (chiefly BNDE and regional and state develop-
ment banks) and to the credits from abroad, the latter in a growing proportion. As was 
remarked above, the private financial system offers as yet no alternatives in this sphere 
of credit. 
National Economic Development Bank (BNDE) 
The National Economic Development Bank (BNDE), created in 1952, corresponded to a 
large extent to the offici l endorsement of the suggestions and priority projects drawn 
up by the Brazil-United States Joint Commission. It is the most important institution 
of basic industrial financing in Brazil and it played an extremely important role as a 
support to the process of industrialization. 
From its foundation in 1952 until 1956, BNDE financed almost exclusively invest-
ments in infrastructures (power and transport). As of 1956, besides maintaining the 
financing of infrastructure, BNDE expanded its activities to the direct financing of the 
modern industrial sectors. Its supply of funds for manufacturing industry favoured steel-
making and the chemical and automobile branches. 
BNDE's main source of funds was originally the Fund for Economic Reequipment 
(FRE) made up of charges on income tax and of compulsory deposits of part of the tech-
nical reserves of insurance and capitalization companies. Besides these resources, the 
Bank also received deposits of money originating from the sale in the country of American 
agricultural surpluses provided under the so-called Wheat Agreement. 
Besides granting loans after the analysis of projects was considered satisfactory, 
the Bank followed up the physical evolution of investments. In many cases it even con-
trolled the operation of new units, conditioning the liberation of funds already approved 
to the fulfillment of certain requirements. It thus exercised the functions of control-
ling and orienting the expenses in the favoured sectors, besides that of being a centre 
of analysis of the government's sectoral programs. 
Although BNDE is not an agency with a specifically regional action, it indirectly 
influences the special distribution of investments through the transfer of resources it 
makes to regional development banks and similar bodies through its several funds. This 
indirect influence reflects a strategy of action on the part of the Bank: BNDE's present 
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policy consists of decentralizing its activities through expansion of the transfers to 
regional and state development banks and private investment banks. This strategy led to 
the creation in 1972 of the Special Program of Loans to Development Banks (PEB), which 
was linked to the Fund for Economic Reequipment (FRE), and which would work basically 
through transfers to development banks; and more recently to the creation of the Special 
Program of Financial Support to the Basic Industry in the Northeast (PIO/NE), now 
engaged in financing the setting up of the first phase of the Northeastern Petrochemical 
Pole. The results of this policy of decentralization have already made themselves felt in 
quantitative terms; although the country's southeastern region still receives the majority 
of resources available from the several funds and programs, its participation decreased 
in 1972. 
At present, BNDE acts through several funds, the Scientific and Technological 
Development Fund having the most weight. The main objective of this Fund is the pro-
motion and support of programs and projects aimed at the development and improvement of 
techniques, processes, and products. The Bank also operates through its agencies or 
subsidiaries, such as the following: 
(a) Basic In uts S.A. Financin and Partici ation FIBASE : The aim of this 
agency is to ac ieve in the shortest possib e term t e production of the basic inputs 
needed for development within the country, especially in the sectors of fertilizers, non-
ferrous metals, paper, and cellulose, as well as organic and inorganic chemical products. 
This financial institution is an operational mechanism of BNDE and an inductive and dis-
cretionary instrument. 
(b) Brazilian Investment S.A.: This agency's aim is to orient investment toward 
the national private enterprises through the use of small (risk) capital. 
(c) Special Agency for Industrial Financing (FINAME): This agency aims at 
financing the sale of capital goods through operations that enable them to compete in the 
international market. 
In late 1971, FINAME's Long-Term Program was set up, operating with terms of up 
to 8 years and aimed at improving the commercialization of machines and equipment produced 
to order (which, in view of their larger size, greater technological sophistication, and 
longer time of making, need resources on a longer-term basis and with special conditions), 
and of sets of equipment produced for industrial units. 
In October 1972, FINAME's Special Program was elaborated with the aim of creating 
competitive conditions of financing for national equipment through the extension of the 
term basis up to 15 years and an interest rate of 3% to 6% per year plus monetary correc-
tion. It was hoped that this would make feasible the import substitution of those 
capital goods being ordered in the foreign market for lack of adequate internal financing, 
as well as enable the incorporation of new technologies of production, within the frame-
work of the general directives of industrial policy. 
In this sense, although FINAME is not very important in quantitative terms, it 
is expected to represent a strategic element in the maintenance of industrial growth 
based on the growth of the production of capital goods, precisely on account of the 
qualitative importance it has taken in view of the Long-Term and Special Programs and of 
the great flexibility of its operations. 
FINEP: Institution for the Financing of Projects and Studies 
FINEP is a public enterprise acting as the executive secretariat to the National 
Fund for Scientific and Technological Development. 
It aims at giving financial support to priority projects for scientific and 
technological development aimed at implementing the Basic Plan for the Scientific and 
Technological Development Plan, in accordance with the orientations given by the Ministry 
of Planning and General Coordination. 
FINEP is a financial institution that implements the development plans of the 
government through the financing of studies and projects such as the following: 
-feasibility studies of industries, agricultural activities, agro-industries, 
agriculture, and cattle; 
-regional or sectoral projects of development; 
-studies for the utilization of natural resources; 
-technical assistance and economic consulting services; 
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-program of support to the national consulting firms, which may entail 
financial help for physical infrastructure, rotation of capital, and 
training of human resources; 
-program for the development of industrial technology aimed at encour-
aging national industrial enterprises to create their own technology 
through the development of new products and processes, the investment 
in research and development centres, and the training of human resources. 
The principal users of FINEP are institutions linked to the public sector that 
have improved their capabilities in the process of planning and make decisions on impor-
tant projects. 
The resources of the National Fund for Science and Technology Develoment admin-
istered by FINEP are oriented mainly to the modernization of the institutional infra-
structure in science and technology for the formation of human resources for science and 
technology. The sectors most favoured by the Fund are first the educational and second 
the industrial. 
There is no formal evaluation of FINEP, but its history proves it to be a dynamic 
institution that has accomplished its original functions and has become an important 
supporter of scientific and technological development. Together with the National 
Research Council, FINEP has participated in the elaboration of the Basic Plan for 
Scientific and Technological Development. 
The resources of FINEP have come from external credits (USAID-BID), the Federal 
Union, and the results of its financial operations. 
The Korean government influences the operation of its financial system through 
the Central Bank (under the Bank of Korea Act), as most governments do throughout the 
world. In addition, the Ministry of Finance on behalf of the goverl'Yllent acts as the 
dominant shareholder of most of the nationwide commercial banks and all of the special 
banks. Even with such control over the volume and direction of money supply and the 
channels through which savings flow toward investment, the government was unable to 
stabilize the private movements during the last decade. Because of persistent inflation, 
domestic savings were not expanding at a rate sufficient to finance the high rate of 
investment planned by the government under its Five-Year Development Plans. 
A large part of investment in Korea were therefore financed by credits from 
foreign suppliers of capital goods. This resulted in a low demand for capital goods 
production technology in Korea. 
Persistent inflation also suppressed the growth of long-term capital markets in 
spite of the wishes of the government. As a result, activities to supply new technology 
could not obtain long-term financing as needed, and the deficiency in financing was made 
even worse by the lenders' natural preference for real properties as collateral for loans 
in an inflationary environment. An effective control of inflation and an expansion of 
domestic long-term capital markets is needed to develop the necessary financial environ-
ment that can favour technological development. 
During the last decade the Korean government financed between 12% and 26% of 
total investment in Korea. The Economic Planning Board administered the financial activ-
ities of the government through the budget. It also controlled foreign loans and invest-
ment, which financed between 15% and 44% of total investment. 
The Ministry of Finance controls the financial institutions through which private 
savings are channeled to investors. Through the Monetary Board and the Central Bank (the 
Bank of Korea), which operate under the Bank of Korea Act and the General Banking Act, 
the Minister of Finance influences the operations of commercial banks, which include: 
-five nationwide commercial banks 
-ten local banks 
-the Korea Trust Bank 
-nine foreign bank branch offices. 
In addition, the Ministry of Finance directly controls eight special banks, 
established by special legislation, which include: 
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-Korea Development Bank 
-Korea Exchange Bank 
-Medium Industry Bank 
-Citizens National Bank 
-Korea Housing Bank 
-National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation 
-Central Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives 
-Export-Import Bank. 
The total assets of all banking institutions were equivalent to 76% of the GNP 
in 1973. The commercial banks together held 48% of the total assets of banking insti-
tutions as of the end of 1973, while the special banks held 52%. At present the govern-
ment owns more than one-third of the total shares of four out of five nationwide com-
mercial banks and the Korea Trust Bank. 
In addition to the regular banking institutions, the trust accounts of the Korea 
Trust Bank, life and nonlife insurance companies, short-term finance companies, mutual 
credit companies, and the Korea Stock Exchange are the important nonbanking financial 
intermediaries that are beginning to assume an increasing role in the financial system. 
The bulk of trust funds placed at the Korea Trust Bank are in an account called 
"money-in-trust," which is almost identical to a bank deposit. The total assets of the 
trust department account for about 6% of the total assets of banking institutions. Life 
insurance is underwritten by six companies and nonlife insurance by 12 companies; their 
total assets as of the end of 1973 were equivalent to 3% of those banking institutions. 
Short-term finance companies were institutionalized in 1972. They are expanding 
rapidly as discount houses of commercial bills. The mutual credit companies, also 
institutionalized in 1972, are small-scale businesses. Their total assets as of the end 
of 1973 were equivalent to only 1.4% of the assets of banking institutions. The Korea 
Stock Exchange operates under the Securities Transaction Law. The stock market is in the 
early stage of development with a market value of listed stocks equivalent to 11% of the 
total assets of banking institutions. 
The Korean government has almost complete control over the financial system in 
Korea. In addition to the monetary policy instruments of the Central Bank, its ownership 
of most banking institutions puts total responsibility for controlling the volume and 
direction of money supply on the government. Since the beginning of the first Five-Year 
Development Plan in 1962, the financial system has been heavily used to channel savings 
into selected development projects. 
Korea's rapid economic growth was accompanied by rapidly r1s1ng prices, especial-
ly in the early stages. In 1962-1966, because of persistent two-digit inflation during 
the last few decades, it is difficult to evaluate the profitability of a business with 
confidence and objectivity. Lenders, therefore, tend to require real properties as 
collateral for loans. Since creative entrepreneurs often do not own real properties, the 
lenders' preference for real properties as collateral restricts the financing of activ-
ities to develop new technologies. When they are restricted to self-financing, the pool-
ing of resources for activities with economies of scale tends to become difficult, and 
activities to supply new technologies are likely to be neglected. 
Heavy reliance on the foreign suppliers' credit reduces the demand for domestic 
capital goods production technology. For example, the expansion of capacity in steel, 
aluminium, and copper industries in Korea is partly financed by foreign suppliers' credit. 
Since these are industries that process imported raw materials with imported equipment, 
their employment and net foreign exchange earnings potentials are limited. They absorb 
a large share of domestic savings, however, as they require large-scale infrastructure 
investment for their exclusive use. Although their opportunity cost in terms of domestic 
investment resources is high, their contribution to national income and employment 
measured by their domestic value added, evaluated at international prices, is small. 
If expansion of capacity in these industries is justified, it would be on the 
ground of learning new technologies. Since they are built under turnkey contracts, they 
do not normally contain many learning activities. These projects, therefore, must 
contain an independent program of technology learning to be economically justified. 
The control of inflation is a prerequisite for the normal development of long-
term capital markets and a higher rate of domestic savings. A widespread indexation has 
been used in Brazil, for example, as a helpful device in an effort to reduce the rate 
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of inflation while accelerating the rate of economic growth through a revisal of long-
term capital markets and an expansion of domestic savings. Such a development will 
satisfy the preconditions for the development of technologies in capital goods industries 
and the adequate financing of activities to supply new technologies. 
PERU 
Development Finance Corporation (COFIDE) 
COFIDE was created in March 1971 as a state financing institution giving credit 
and financial support to all of the productive and service sectors. It therefore covers 
the public, private, and social property sectors of the Peruvian economy. 
Because of its key position within the investment process, this instrument has a 
potential influence in determining the technological conditions in which those projects 
are carried out, basically through (a) the utilization of its negotiating capacity to 
obtain favourable technological conditions in projects with foreign financing in which 
COFIDE acts as fiduciary middleman, and (b) the selective granting of credit on the basis 
of technological criteria, and the imposition of conditions that lead toward greater 
internal technological development in the case of projects financed with COFIDE's 
resources. 
The main function of COFIDE is to support both state and private entrepreneurial 
action, providing the necessary financial resources, developing the domestic stock market 
in a parallel manner, and securing and channeling domestic savings. COFIDE can perform 
the following functions: 
-establish enterprises and acquire shares in them; 
-manage the shares of given enterprises; 
-coordinate and regulate the issuing of stocks, bonds, certificates, and 
other documents of enterprises in the public sector; 
-act as middleman or trustee in the stock market; 
-acquire and maintain bonds, certificates, and other documents in portfolio; 
-negotiate credits; 
-grant medium- and long-term credits, preferably through financial 
middlemen; 
-issue and float stocks, bonds, and other types of securities in the 
country and abroad. 
At present, COFIDE is the primary national financial body and its activity is 
directed principally toward supporting the entrepreneurial function of the state, co-
ordinating with the state enterprises, and financing their main development projects. 
In this way the loans have been oriented toward the sectors where the state has 
placed major emphasis: mining, hydrocarbons, energy, and industry. Through its finan-
cial activity it has helped link the national economy more intensely and effectively to 
the international financial system and the world market. 
But, on the other hand, COFIDE has not utilized its negotiating capacity to 
impose favourable technological conditions. More importance was given to factors (for 
the selection of external credits) such as the conditions under which credits are granted, 
that is, interest, periods for amortization, etc. 
Furthermore, in the selection of projects financed with its own resources, 
criteria such as profitability, capital recovery period, etc. have predominated over 
technological or social criteria; it has thus behaved like any private bank. 
Industrial Development Bank 
The Industrial Development Bank was created in 1936. In 1971, with the re-
organization of the financial system and the creation of COFIDE, it ceased to be func-
tionally subordinate to the Ministry of Industry and passed into the administrative area 
of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, together with the other state development 
banks. 
Its action is directed toward giving financial support to the industrial, fishing, 
and electricity sectors, and also priority services to small industries and handicrafts. 
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In addition to the criteria employed in granting credits, the Industrial Bank is 
able to purchase and build experimental pilot plants and manage them directly or through 
a contract with a specialized enterprise. It finances research studies and grants study, 
research, and training fellowships. 
The objectives of the Industrial Bank are to promote and support industrial activ-
ities, the production of electricity, and the development of the fishing industry and 
national handicrafts, according to the priorities established by the General Development 
Plan. 
The credits granted by the Industrial Bank have been oriented toward the most 
dynamic branches of the economy. Those credits are adapted to the nature of the demand 
and the evolution of the market and do not favour any particular orientation. The loans 
granted to consumer goods firms accounted for 28.7% of the total loans in 1973 and 46% 
in 1975, paralleling the nature of the relative expansion of the domestic market. 
Loans to the enterprises classified as producers of capital goods fell during 
the same period from 46.2% of the total loans in 1973 to 26.1% in 1975, with a note-
worthy decrease in the production of transportation materials, and especially fishing 
vessels, which accounted for 90% of the total loans for capital goods. 
The Industrial Bank has practically restricted itself to furnishing resources at 
a lower rate of interest than the commercial banks, without establishing any policy 
orientation or any considerations of technological policy. 
Mining Development Bank of Peru 
The Mining Development Bank initiated its activities in 1941 as a financial body 
linked exclusively to the mining sector. Through Decree Law 18,303 of September 1970, 
it was reorganized and defined as a decentralized public organism incorporated within the 
economy and finance sector. Its specific function is to give credit, financial, and 
technical assistance services to the mining sector. For this purpose, it functions with 
economic and administrative autonomy, though subordinated to the financial policy guide-
lines laid down by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
Parallel to its function of giving credit and evaluating the projects it finances, 
the Bank gives technical assistance services, principally to small and medium-sized 
mining firms, develops projects, designs and sets up processing plants, develops new 
mining zones, disseminates new systems for prospecting, producing, and processing, and 
markets inputs and machinery for mining activities. 
In the last 5 years the state's main emphasis in the mining sector has been on 
the development of large projects with modern technology and large capital investments 
to enable this sector to fulfill the role that is explicitly assigned to it in the 
Development Plan as the principal national supplier of foreign exchange. Under these 
circumstances the rapid implementation of the projects and high income return have taken 
precedence, as criteria, over the production of domestic technological development and a 
technical infrastructure parallel to the demand generated precisely by those projects. 
Within this context small and medium-sized mining firms, which are exactly the 
firms that the Mining Development Bank should give its support to, have assumed a 
secondary role. In the face of the crisis in this sector, due to the instability of 
world prices and the rises in input costs, the action of the Mining Bank has been 
basically limited to lessening the negative effects of those factors upon private mining. 
ARGENTINA 
Permanent National Fund for Preinvestment Studies 
Law 17,584 established a fund for the partial financing of different technical 
studies and analyses related to the identification and evaluation of investment projects, 
both at the private and the public level. The type of studies covered by this fund are 
those related to research in general, the development of natural resources, and sectoral 
studies capable of identifying specific programs; also included are studies of piecemeal 
engineering and the task of formulating the basis for public bidding. One of the aims 
of the Law is to develop a permanent and interdisciplinary group of consultants of a 
highly professional level. 
When this Law was recommended for approval, it was stated that the above-mentioned 
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tasks, because of their technical complexity and specialization, should be entrusted to 
groups or teams of expert consultants. Considering that there exist in the country 
several groups of specialized consultants integrated with Argentinian professionals, it is 
also in the national interest to maintain and increase both the technological level and 
the occupational level of these teams. Nevertheless, this fund has had little success in 
accomplishing its main objectives, mainly because of the limited administrative capacity 
attached to it, which led to a passive attitude toward possible users. 
STATE PURCHASING POWER 
Next to industrial programing and financing, the use of state purchasing power 
can be considered among the instruments with a powerful role to play in defining the pat-
tern of demand for technology. In most of the countries studied the state budgets re-
present a very large proportion of the total consumption and of total investments, and in 
many STPI countries the state has become a direct producer by the intermediary of large 
firms, in particular in the basic industries sector. 
It is therefore evident that the government's conscious policies can introduce a 
given type of behaviour in state enterprises and departments that favours the development 
of indigenous scientific, technological, and engineering capabilities. When purchasing 
goods or services, state firms or departments (ministries, autonomous government institu-
tions, etc.) can demand not only greater participation of national technological and 
material inputs but also constant qualitative improvements in the goods or services domes-
tically supplied to or by them. This implies that the state firms or departments must be 
willing in some cases to incur possible additional costs, tolerate possible delays, as 
well as venture into possible lower qualitative results, taking all these as necessary 
risks involved in the learning process and as consequences of the dependent character of 
the country. Without making virtue of necessity, it can nevertheless be said that such 
flexibility is not always possible and is very seldom present. The following cases are 
examined in this section: 




Purchasing policies of the state. 
- State enterprises as policy instruments. 
- Buy domestic law. 
- State investment policies. 
- State enterprises as technology policy instruments. 
The evidence found in the STPI studies shows that the purchasing power of the 
state has acted only as an indirect policy instrument in scientific and technological 
development. Its effects are not always positive. The case of Venezuela where the cri-
terion of urgency is predominant over any other has created serious setbacks and brought 
about negative consequences on the internal engineering efforts of state firms aimed at a 
greater assimilation of technology. The possible benefits of the purchasing power of the 
state are not, therefore, an automatic result of its sheer size. 
VENEZUELA 
State enterprises represent one of the most important instruments of technolog-
ical policy according to the limited experience of some Latin American countries and the 
far wider experience of advanced nations. In the latter, it is very difficult to imagine 
the development of key sectors involving advanced technology without the existence of a 
clear and determined policy on the part of these firms. 
In Venezuela the situation has been completely different. State management has 
had very different interests and goals and more than anything has been characterized by a 
tendency toward straightforward importation due to a lack of interest in generating, 
adapting, and improving productive technologies, and moreover a lack of interest in opti-
mizing the conditions 1n which foreign technology is acquired. This, in turn, is related 
to the overwhelming interest of the state to modernize and expand industry as fast as 
possible and by the shortest route available. 
This section deals with the state firms in terms of their current and future 
significance as tools for technological development. Account is taken of the fact that, 
according to the Fifth National Plan, these firms will have a decisive role in national 
economic development and will be almost as important in the creation of a national 
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technological capacity. 
Since oil was discovered the development of the Venezuelan economy has depended 
fundamentally on the state. From that time until 1973, public expenditure was always 
more than a quarter of the national income. In addition, more than half the fiscal 
revenue has come from the oil wealth and nearly 40% of fixed investment is of public 
origin. However, despite this, the direct participation of the state in production has 
been small. 
In the economic sphere the state has acted as a dispenser of credits, exonerations, 
subsidies, etc., for private capital. It has also provided an adequate physical infra-
structure for private capital to act (i.e., irrigation systems, roads, etc.). As an 
entrepreneur its activity has been limited and has always responded in one way or another 
to the idea of public service. The state has entered into productive activities in 
sectors that are not attractive for private capital, either because of the risks involved 
or because of low profits. Often it has subsidized private investors by means of low 
prices; the state steelworks and petrochemical industry are very clear examples of this. 
Since 1974, however, there has been a change in the economic function of the 
Venezuelan state, as a result of the so-called New Development Model adopted. The key 
elements in this are the basic industries orientated toward exportation. The justifica-
tion for the adoption of the New Development Model is found in various factors. First, 
the new pattern of the international division of labour has begun to give rise, for 
various reasons, to a displacement of certain industries from advanced to developing 
countries. This is occurring, for instance, in certain of the so-called heavy industries. 
Second, there are already visible signs that the process of import substitution is 
becoming exhausted. National industry is unable to compete with foreign industry and 
therefore cannot contribute in a significant manner to the fulfillment of the new strat-
egy. Finally, conditions exist for the formation and development of these basic firms: 
natural resources, physical location, a relatively good financial situation as a result 
of the rise in oil prices, etc. 
The Fifth National Plan states that in principle the development of the basic 
industries is the responsibility of state firms. However, it goes on to establish fairly 
wide exceptions. Thus in the case of the steel industry, the Plan states that private 
capital will not participate in the basic process industry except "when technical or 
economic reasons justify it." It also indicates that in processes other than basic ones, 
unrestricted participation is permitted. As regards the petrochemical industry, joint 
ventures for basic products are prohibited except when necessary, but they are permitted 
for by-products, providing the state holds 51% of the investment, and for complementary 
products without the majority participation of the state. 
The New Development Model presupposes modification in the rationality that 
orients the behaviour of the state firms. They can no longer operate ambivalently, 
that is with private enterprise criteria as firms, but must operate with public criteria 
as state entities. By becoming the defining elements of the new strategy, the state 
firms clearly have to be concerned above all with profits, and it is only in these terms 
that they may be evaluated. 
The Technological Behaviour of the State Firms in Basic Industry 
The most striking fact, as was pointed out earlier, is that the state firms have 
little or no concern for the technological aspects of development. This was true when 
they had a limited role, almost only as a support for private capital, and is still true 
although their objectives have changed and their role is more important. They have 
behaved as if technology were a fixed and external fact whose characteristics and condi-
tions of acquisition are imposed by the foreign supplier. Their behaviour has been 
clearly dominated by a perspective that only takes into account the immediate situation. 
The preeminence of economic considerations, or more correctly, of the objectives of 
production, has pushed aside any other sort of concerns. The stimulation of national 
technological potential has been sacrificed for the security that established goals will 
be fulfilled on time. The risks inherent in the participation of Venezuelan research 
workers or engineers in the design and installation of industrial plants, contrasted with 
the confidence inspired by the technological package brought from abroad, has become the 
principal brake on the development of a local technological capacity. Thus the guiding 
thread in negotiations about the purchase of technology is constituted by the weighing 
up of these risks, not only for the user, but also for the supplier. The latter weighs 
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them up in the same way as the former: he fears local participation for two reasons -
first, he wishes to protect his image of being efficient, and second, exporting packages 
means better profits associated with the ascendency over the buyer. 
This approach, short term and concerned primarily with the economics of the 
situation, has justified the technological passivity of the basic firms. The contracting 
of turnkey plants in which the technology is acquired quickly and safely closes the door 
to the possibility of local learning. The first negative effect is that it prevents the 
assimilation of technology through experience by national managers, research workers, 
engineers, and technicians. In other words, it blocks off a source of external tech-
nological economies, which are of undoubted importance for the industrial process of the 
country. 
The disaggregation of the technological package, decisive in a strategy based on 
learning by doing, producers benefits that almost certainly will not be capitalized by the 
plant owner who imports the technology in the first place, but will be external to his 
project. In the case of a private firm, it can easily be understood that the incentives 
offered by disaggregation might be minimal, since they might even benefit competitors. 
The situation should be different, however, in a state firm, where the external economies 
generated in this way should be seen in the long term from a social point of view (9). 
The criterion of social effects has not and does not govern the behaviour of the 
state firms. The development of technological capacity has always been seen as a goal 
that, to be achieved, implies sacrificing the achievement of the fundamental objectives 
of the firm. When the aim was that the state should dispense a good, cheap, and prompt 
service, anything that might act against the quality, price, and convenience of the 
service in question was pushed aside. In the present situation, within the New Develop-
ment Model, the goals are quantitatively and qualitatively different. In view of the 
imminent end of the process of substitution, the basic firms represent the key to capital 
accumulation in an economy that has to structure itself and grow by means of exports and, 
on the other hand, that should fulfill its role efficiently in the international division 
of labour. Given these goals it seems there is not much room for a consciously developed 
learning process. Technological learning is covering only the requirements for the use, 
maintenance, and optimization of equipment. 
The Venezuelan STPI team maintained that the function assigned to the state firms 
within the national economy has largely determined their technological behaviour. The 
latter has always been subordinated to economic policy as a result of the dilemma between 
production goals and technological goals. This dilemma is sustained by the firm opinion 
that the acquisition of technology in packages assures the adequate achievement of the 
established production goals by passing all the responsibility to the foreign supplier. 
To put it the other way around, the dilemma originates in the idea that to the extent 
that local technical participation in the various phases of an industrial project is 
allowed, to the same extent are quality and efficiency endangered, and consequently the 
economic growth of the firm is also endangered. 
There are four points to make regarding the previous paragraph. The first is 
somewhat obvious: even when it is disguised as economic urgency, this attitude openly and 
passively accepts that in the international division of labour it is the task of some to 
produce knowledge and of others to make use of it. This acceptance leads axiomatically 
to the corroboration of the domination exercised by advanced nations by means of tech-
nology. 
On the other hand, turnkey contracts have entailed problems that cannot be 
ignored or minimized, e.g., delays, flaws, excessive costs, etc. The path followed by 
Venezuelan state firms in the basic sector is instructive in this respect and shows that 
purchasing in packages also implies risks that are probably directly related to the 
absence of the buyer in the formulation and implementation of the project. This appears 
to demonstrate that local learning is also necessary for immediate growth. 
Third, it is not true that the choice between economic and technological goals 
can be dealt with without looking further than the short term. To be valid, the dilemma 
would have to take into account the external diseconomies produced by the importation of 
packages in terms of the future global development of the country. 
The fourth and final comment follows from the previous ones and leads to the view 
that the dilemma is really a false one. In effect, a dilemma between economic and tech-
nological policy can only be maintained if it is believed that the latter's goal is the 
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immediate and total replacement of foreign technology. This is not the case if the tech-
nological goal is understood as the progressive incorporation of national capacity in 
accordance with the development of local abilities and contained in a long-term strategy 
that does not distinguish between the economic and the technological, since present 
technological decisions have future economic repercussions. There is no dilemma then. 
The problem is not that if economic growth is desired, then local technological growth 
should be sidestepped, and if technological growth is desired, then economic growth will 
be threatened. Both goals should be dealt with within a general long-term policy. 
Purchasing Policies of the State 
In the previous section the relative importance of the Venezuelan state within 
the national economy was mentioned. It is therefore unnecessary to go into this question 
any further. By its sheer purchasing power - among other factors - the Venezuelan state 
plans a decisive role in the development of the country. 
In Venezuela, this capacity has not been used as an instrument for promoting the 
demand for local scientific and technological services. The state's purchasing policy 
has never had as its explicit aim the direct acquisition of R&D services, whether for 
the production of new technologies or for the modification or adaptation of existing 
technologies; nor has it been used for the acquisition of the engineering and consulting 
services necessary for the formulation and implementation of industrial projects; nor, 
finally, for the acquisition - under special conditions - of goods incorporating local 
technological services. 
The Buy Venezuelan Decree, promulgated when industrialization was just in its 
very beginnings and - until recently - not substantially modified, clearly reveals the 
purchasing policies of the state. This Decree, as its preamble states, takes into con-
sideration that "a large share of national consumption is channeled through the Public 
sector, therefore it is necessary to adopt certain measures to direct the purchase of 
this sector towards the internal market so as to stimulate national production." The 
first article reads therefore: "the organisms of the Central Public Administration, the 
Autonomous Institutes, the State Enterprises and other agencies of the Decentralized 
Administration will not purchase imported commodities when they are available from a 
national supplier, in the terms contemplated in the present law." 
In general terms, this Decree could be a positive instrument for directing the 
internal demand toward local scientific and technological resources. In fact, however, 
it has only been a statement of good intentions, mainly for three fundamental reasons: 
(1) There are no mechanisms for its application. The Decree is weakened by its 
vagueness, which transforms its effective content into just a general framework for the 
behaviour of the state. 
(2) The public sector has not developed any policies that could result in concrete 
hopes for the potential local supplier. It does not have, for instance, a definite and 
publicized medium- or long-term purchasing plan, nor has it standardized the purchase of 
batch products. 
(3) There is a definite tendency toward importation, as a result of two inter-
related phenomena: the local technological weakness, and the security that comes with 
the goods and services contracted abroad. The preeminence of established economic goals 
leads to the purchase abroad of the technology and capital goods required, in the 
stipulated time and form. This means that the internal supply of technological services 
or machinery and equipment implies "risks that should not be incurred." 
Besides, it is worth pointing out that by its very wording this Decree tends to 
become ineffective. Article 4, for instance, includes a caveat that reads: "(this 
article) will not be enforced if the purchase of goods produced abroad is in the opinion 
of the Minister or the highest authority, urgently needed." 
The Decree becomes a discretionary instrument given such a norm. In effect, 
imports of goods and services have not been curbed because they can easily be qualified 
as "urgently needed." 
Furthermore, Article 2 indicates that for this Decree "the price of the 
nationally-produced goods cannot be higher than the similar imported products or sub-
stitutes." 
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Even if it is too early to evaluate the repercussions of this Decree, it is fair 
to ask if it will not end up favouring foreign goods and services, because the national 
supplies, being new, are not in a condition to compete with supplies imported from the 
industrialized nations. 
BRAZIL 
State Enterprises as Policy Instruments 
State enterprises are probably the most direct form of intervention whereby the 
state directly intervenes in the production of goods and services, replacing the private 
entrepreneur. State enterprises in Brazil control most of the intermediate goods sectors 
(steel, oil, petrochemicals, power generation, telecommunications, railways, iron mining, 
etc.). This is indicative of the limitations of the possibilities for a full-fledged 
industrial development based on private enterprises in a dependent and peripheral country. 
It seems a valid assumption that the conditions and interests governing the 
creation of the state enterprises would very much define their policies as regards the 
use of national or foreign sources of technology. 
State enterprises in Brazil, as in other countries, have an ambivalent behaviour: 
an entrepreneurial behaviour concerned with profits and capital accumulation, and a 
governmental behaviour that implies that the policy of the enterprise will very much 
respond to the interests of the ruling political group. 
State enterprises in Brazil, as in other countries, tend to concentrate in the 
capital goods producing sectors; that is, they are the suppliers of goods and services 
that constitute essential inputs to the production of the other units of the economic 
system, which generally are privately owned. This is one of the most widespread forms of 
channeling state subsidies to private industry. 
The Brazilian study suggested that the strategy adopted for the development of a 
state enterprise, and accordingly the criteria for choosing technologies, have very much 
to do with its financing pattern. Some of the state enterprises are dependent on foreign 
resources that are provided by foreign banks or international development agencies. 
The criteria applied by national banking institutions, such as the National 
Development Bank, are usually conservative, demanding thorough analysis of the profit-
ability of the project and the capacity for repayment of the loan. This short-term view 
based on private profit considerations may considerably limit the autonomy and the 
potential of state enterprises. 
Therefore, it is suggested that when enterprises base their expansion programs on 
foreign loans or on conservative banking institutions, such as the National Development 
Bank, foreign suppliers and their domestic branches tend to be preferred instead of 
national suppliers, either on account of scale of operations or experience, or because 
national suppliers cannot match the prices of the foreign suppliers. 
The internal availability of public resources for financing the expansion pro-
jects of state enterprises is fundamental for the use of the potentialities of state 
enterprises, but it is not enough. 
The state enterprise that has to finance itself on the basis of its own profits 
will usually try to increase its profitability through an increase in productivity, because 
it is forbidden to make profits from higher prices. This would probably lead the firm 
to give more attention to technical and engineering problems, and then to research and 
development activities. This attention could lead the state firm to improve technological 
decisions. 
It is therefore possible to establish a correlation between the technological 
development effort of an enterprise and its financing pattern. Given the conditions of 
the national industry of capital goods and of engineering firms in the country, the 
domestic technological development effort should rely on the initiative of the state 
enterprises themselves. 
Planning is of fundamental importance for a greater use of appropriate national 
technology. The decision about what can effectively be produced internally and what must 
be imported requires a minimum delay in preparation and mutual consultation necessary to 
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increase the national industry's share in technological supply, furthering its develop-
ment. 
Given the conditions of lack of capacity for planning in the national industry of 
capital goods and the almost complete lack of engineering enterprises with know-how in 
basic engineering design, it seems that the state enterprise will have to be, at least in 
the beginning, the starting point for the development of this kind of knowledge in the 
country. 
It is clear that, although the participation of the financial costs of engineering 
services may often be very small in the total cost of an investment project, the activity 
of consulting engineering has great economic importance both in defining the several 
stages of an investment project and in its future development. 
The largest consumers of consulting engineering services are the state enter-
prises. The development of the national structure of engineering should therefore be 
based primarily upon those enterprises' investment policies and effective support. This 
predominance of the state enterprises as consumers indicates that the decisions about the 
engineering services they contract should not be left to the exclusive criteria of their 
administrators. 
The Brazilian STPI team tried to understand the forms of connection that are 
established between the state enterprises operating in the steelmaking, hydroelectric, 
and petrochemical sectors and the enterprises of consulting engineering, whether they be 
local (national ones and foreign subsidiaries) or foreign. To do so, the team identified 
the spheres of action of both local and foreign enterprises of consulting engineering, 
by means of the technological characterization of the sectors under consideration. 
It was also intended to analyze the most typical forms of relationship between 
state enterprises and project firms. With that end in mind, the team stressed the process 
of selection of the project firms, the surveillance of the engineering services by the 
state enterprises, the kinds of association between national project firms and foreign 
engineering, and the nature of the contracts of consulting engineering services. 
Nevertheless, to understand the relationship between state enterprises and 
project firms, the aspects mentioned above had to be complemented by a study of the main 
problems national project firms were facing. These problems have been hampering the 
achievement of greater efficiency in the process of absorption of technology and in the 
organization and administration of the projects developed by these enterprises. 
Generally, it can be said that the solution of several of the difficulties faced 
by national and local consulting enterprises depends to a large extent upon the procedures 
adopted by the state enterprises. 
Following this line of reasoning, the following items were especially stressed as 
external factors exerting an influence upon the consulting finns: 
-the lack of better planning in the contracting of services by the 
state enterprises; 
-the requirement of previous experience; 
-the lack of general norms regulating the contracting of services; 
-the diversification of the procedures of the various state enterprises 
concerning the systems of recording data about consulting firms, the 
rules for submitting proposals, etc. 
It seems that the knowledge gathered by the state enterprises can be transferred 
more easily to the national engineering firms - with better commercial and contractual 
conditions - than that gathered and transferred by foreign engineering firms. Therefore, 
process engineering in the state enterprise would not act as a competitor against the 
national private sector, but would work side by side with it, strengthening it. 
This being so, the participation of the state enterprises in the basic process 
design in certain sectors would lead to a redefinition of the tasks of engineering between 
national and foreign enterprises, so that local engineering finns could be called upon to 
participate in more qualified tasks in the supply of engineering services. Such an action 
on the part of the state enterprises would also induce a greater participation of the 
national capital goods industries in the country's industrial activities. 
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ARGENTINA 
Buy Domestic Law 
The Buy Domestic Law is aimed at using the state's purchasing power by directing 
it to the domestic supply of goods and services, thus favouring both domestic industry 
and domestic engineering and consulting. This is clearly stipulated in the Law, which 
speaks about favouring "the industrial and construction sector as well as engineering and 
consulting services." 
The Law assigns engineering and consulting services a special importance. It 
explicitly states that due to "the density of its intangible capital brought about by 
training, knowledge, experience and the decision and organization capacity of its profes-
sionals and experts ... this type of capital cannot be transferred instantaneously but 
rather must be domestically created and requires long years of cumulative efforts on the 
part of society." 
There are two specific aspects of the Law that should be especially mentioned, 
given the effects they had on the development of domestic engineering: 
(1) It is mandatory for foreign consultants to associate with domestic firms to 
be able to participate in tenders. This is leading to temporary joint ventures with 
different implications and consequences: "in case an international tender is called for, 
no condition which explicitly or implicitly could discriminate against domestic enter-
prises, may be included. Furthermore, the foreign finns participating must associate 
with domestic enterprises ... " (Article 8). 
(2) Engineering and construction are differentiated; if effectively enforced, 
this differentiation would make possible the domestic development of true engineering 
finns independent of construction firms: "Domestic professionals as well as the domestic 
engineering and consulting firms included within the present law must be absolutely 
independent of equipment suppliers or manufacturers, contractors for public works or 
financial agencies which may compromise the objectivity of their judgement" (Article 15). 
This instrument and the one that preceded it, the Buy Argentinian Law, are the 
first formal attempts to use the state's purchasing power to promote industrial develop-
ment as well as to develop domestic consulting capabilities. 
After a period of resistance, especially on the part of the officials charged 
with its application in state enterprises and agencies, the Law started operating as an 
efficient means of directing the state purchasing power to domestic industry, leading 
in some cases to the establishment of a special department for the purpose of developing 
domestic supplies. 
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the Law has yet been a major factor 
in the development of technology creation or absorption capacity on the part of domestic 
enterprises supplying goods to the state. There are in fact no instruments concomitant 
with the Buy Domestic Law's action, promoting the technological development of state 
suppliers. To this must be added the limited investment planning capacity, particularly 
from the technological point of view, shown by most state enterprises. In this field 
the time factor is essential, and without adequate forecasting of state requirements it 
cannot be expected that private entrepreneurs will undertake the necessary investments. 
In the final analysis, the technological success of the Buy Domestic Law depends 
on the technological capacity of the state enterprises themselves. 
PERU 
Public Gross Fixed Investment in 1968-1975 
Table 4 gives a breakdown of the national gross fixed investment according to the 
public and private sectors. It shows how important the state is as an economic agency, 
above all on account of its investment activities. However, in trying to generate the 
means of production necessary for the productive structure, the state has, in fact, 
increased the need for foreign resources a.nd has not utilized the country's own financial 
resources. 
This effort has distorted the economy as well as, among other things, reducing 
supply and inflating demand, but the worst problem is that public investment, far from 
50 
substantially changing the productive structure, has in fact increased its dependence on 
foreign resources, both financial and technological. 
Public Gross Fixed Investment by Sectors: Table 4 gives the percentage breakdown 
of public gross investment by sectors for 1968-1975. The importance of the following 
sectors can be observed: 
(a) Oil plus mining are the sectors "earning and saving foreign exchange." 
(b) Agriculture was the second most important investment area between 1973 and 
1975. However, in 1974, 88% of the total cost of the projects corresponded to four large 
projects, Chira-Piura, Tinajones, Majes, and Olmos. Therefore, it is the coastal agri-
culture, which is basically agriculture for export, that received almost all the state 
aid. 
(c) Infrastructure: transportation, coITTTiunications, and electric power are also 
important areas of public investment. Like agriculture, most of the investment is in 
the coastal areas, although considerable efforts were made, especially in 1977, to build 
access roads in the jungle areas. However, it should be questioned whether these efforts 
are in the interests of oil exploitation rather than the result of a wish to develop the 
jungle, although it cannot be denied that the state has been trying to integrate the 
jungle for many years now. 
Therefore, it can be said that the emphasis has been placed on sectors earning 
and saving foreign exchange, and on the infrastructure to serve these sectors. Further-
more, the state does not only invest itself, but it also promotes other investments. The 
state is the great promoter of foreign investment in oil and mining, and its efforts to 
develop these sectors are far greater than the figures for the public gross fixed invest-
ment suggest. 
On the other hand, although agriculture for the domestic market and industry 
appears to be important in the plans, they only receive 10% of the gross fixed investment, 
despite accounting for 40% of the Gross National Product. 
It appears that, despite all its good intentions, during 1968-1975 the Peruvian 
government was not able to make the agricultural sector more dynamic, although it has 
undoubtedly changed the production relationships. Nor has it transformed the industrial 
sector by freeing it from its characteristics of a dependent and parasitic sector, with a 
bottleneck in the external sector, which is so characteristic of all import substitution 
processes. The investment pattern has not changed and is still oriented toward exports. 
In this aspect the country's domestic pol icy is a reflection of world economic trends. 
New investments are constantly being sought for the available capital, which is always 
ready to help exploit raw materials and oil, which are always profitable, but, excluding 
the customary activities of the large corporations' affiliates, is more wary of taking 
risks in the industrial sector. 
This phenomenon, which is partly a result of the small size of the domestic mar-
ket, could be modified by the emergence of the Andean Pact expanded market. For example, 
there is a trend toward setting up mixed companies like those started by INDUPERU (Andean 
Tractors, Andean Motors, Machines, Tools, etc.). 
The huge infrastructure projects have attracted foreign capital too, although 
in this area most of it is from the socialist block countries. 
Technological Consequences of the Public Investment Pattern During 1968-1975: 
Public fixed investment has behaved like gross fixed investment as a whole and has tended 
to concentrate technology in the exporting sectors: oil, large-scale mining, agriculture 
for export, and infrastructure. 
However, the other sectors, agriculture for domestic consumption, industry, and 
small-scale mining, which would make the economy more dynamic, capitalize relatively 
much less, despite the fact that the state's efforts in the industrial sector tend to be 
based on capital-intensive technology. An analysis of the relationship between gross 
production value (GPV) and employment, which was done for public investment projects 
planned or already implemented at the beginning of 1977, shows that the public sector was 
attempting to develop capital-intensive projects. 
In 1973 the GPV/employment ratio was 0.739 for the industrial sector and 1.109 
for public investment projects as a whole, broken down as indicated in Table 5. 
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One fundamental technological aspect of publ1c investment is the technological 
training it generates and the consequent development of local technological capacity. 
Although technological training is very important when examining a country's technological 
capacity, it has been little studied and there are few tools for measuring it. For 
example, it is very important to know whether a particular foreign investment generates 
technological training and, consequently, an increase in technological capabilities in 
the country. The same should be known about the training generated by the activities of 
national, state, and private sectors that use foreign technology, and above all by plants 
running on a turnkey method. 
The impact of public investment in Peru, in this respect, is very clear. 
MINEROPERU and INDUPERU in the mining and industrial sectors, together with PETROPERU 
in the oil sector, are the state corporations in charge of performing studies, carrying 
out investments, and establishing other state firms involved in productive activities. 
These corporations have developed a certain capacity to carry out preinvestment studies 
and select technologies. However, as they must guarantee profits, they have usually 
chosen advanced technologies, all of which have been developed abroad. For example, 
Stage I of the Cerro Verde Mining Project was exploited by MINEROPERU using imported 
technology and techniques, although there were alternative technologies developed in 
Peru. Furthermore, Stage II of the Cerro Verde Project has been carried out with the 
turnkey method, using foreign technology. 
Although the Andean Pact's policy is to "disaggregate the technological package," 
the trend has increasingly been for state corporations to use technology under licence, 
and even to contact foreign firms during the preinvestment stage, instead of administering 
it themselves. Frequently, they prefer to use foreign licences when it would have been 
possible to negotiate and select the technologies more freely and use local technological 
inputs - they prefer to hand the projects over to companies that manage them on a turnkey 
basis. 
For example, although PETROPERU has its own technical and engineering capacity 
in the area of refining, it has followed the trend of delegating projects as turnkey, 
which increases the projects' cost by 20% to 40%. 
MINEROPERU has incorporated this trend explicitly into its concept of "integrated 
financing". The idea behind this is that foreign indebtedness is not in itself a 
problem, although it should obviously be rationalized at a macro level. According to this 
philosophy, it does not matter if foreign loans are obtained to finance a project if this 
project will earn more foreign exchange than that needed to service the debt. The idea 
of integrated financing means that the foreign partner is in charge of choosing the 
technology and of the total development of the project, so that it is impossible to 
desegregate the technology and to provide significant technological inputs from local 
sources. 
Project costs have been rising continually on account of the worldwide economic 
crisis and the inflationary trends since 1973. For example, the cost of the oil pipeline 
was calculated at $700 million but ended up costing $1.069 million, so additional loans 
had to be found. Obtaining financing and purchasing equipment and inputs involves nego-
tiations; supply problems and inflated costs become very difficult management problems 
for the state to deal with, especially when public finances and the balance of payments 
have been affected by the crisis. All this is aggravated by the critical situation of 
the public enterprises, which are deficit ridden, require state subsidies, and must be 
supported because they provide basic inputs for a very weak economy and industry. 
The financing and management capabilities of state, mining, and industrial 
companies, including PETROPERU, are not developed to the point of being able to cope with 
this situation. For this reason, they find it easier that the foreign partner manages 
their large investment projects. 
INDUPERU will contract a foreign firm, which still has to be chosen, to do the 
feasibility study for an integrated petrochemical project it is in charge of. The first 
stage of the project consists of a feasibility study, choosing technologies, studying 
the financing sources, and basic engineering. 
In accordance with its concept of integrated financing, MINEROPERU has signed an 
agreement with INI (Instituto Nacional de Industrias) from Spain to exploit one of the 
most important phosphate mines in all of Latin America. After doing a feasibility study, 
INI could choose to exploit the mines itself through a joint venture with the state, 
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where it would have 49% of the shares. Possibly, in a joint-venture firm the state could 
exert some control over foreign interests and also protect its own interests, but in any 
case, the technology and negotiations will be controlled by the foreign firm, especially 
when its financing and management capabilities are greater than those of the state, which 
seems to be the case here. 
Thus, faced with the economic crisis existing since 1974, and with the need for 
their investments to be profitable, public corporations and the state in general have 
decided to abandon the principle of "controlling and negotiating the technological packet'' 
and hand the technological negotiations over to their foreign partners. They obviously 
want to make sure that estimates, costs, and timetables are kept, even though the project 
will be more expensive, and not run the risks involved in supplying inputs, searching for 
additional financing, and dealing with the technical problems that may emerge and that may 
threaten to delay the completion date. 
The Development Finance Corporation (COFIDE) and its Technological Consequences 
A study by F. Sagasti (10) on the possible use of industrial financing as an 
instrument of technology policy examines the role played by the Industrial Development 
Bank during the 1960s with its loans, and the leverage they gave the Bank. The study 
concludes that this leverage was not used to direct the loans toward an integrated devel-
opment of industry and even less to promote the development of a local technological 
capability. At the end of the study Sagasti suggests that, given that COFIDE has been 
playing an increasingly important role in industrial financing since the beginning of the 
1970s and has replaced the Industrial Bank to a large extent, the comments made about the 
Bank may be applied to COFIDE too. 
In the study, Sagasti suggests some measures a financial entity like COFIDE could 
adopt to promote and encourage technological development. 
First, as COFIDE basically grants credits for fixed assets as opposed to working 
capital or to finance repayments, it could control the percentage of machinery imported 
and insist that a detailed study be done on whether part of the equipment could be sup-
plied locally. At present, COFIDE does not exercise this type of control. 
Neither, for example, are the loans granted subject to the elimination of clauses 
restricting exports or to the stopping of over- and under-invoicing when the firm operates 
under a foreign licence. A minimum level of expenditures on research and development to 
promote local technological capacity is not a precondition either. Nor does COFIDE grant 
the loan on the condition that a study of the possible contribution of the local tech-
nological infrastructure is made. 
In fact, COFIDE does no technological evaluation of the projects it finances and 
the limited attempts to do this have come to nothing. First, COFIDE does not have an 
infrastructure capable of doing such an evaluation, and second, it has never received 
enough requests to justify a selection of projects and the granting of selective credit 
on the basis of technological considerations. 
Furthermore, if COFIDE were to set these kinds of conditions, it would clash with 
the state organizations whose functions are supposed to be the evaluation of technology 
and who have the necessary infrastructure to do it. COFIDE's evaluation is mainly 
economic and financial, like that of the other state organizations and the public sector 
in general, which are pressured by the need for profitability. In reality, COFIDE and 
the state corporations seem to cooperate on this point. There are many cases where the 
companies bring their own financing and technology and COFIDE only guarantees the loan. 
State-Owned Companies as Technology Policy Instruments: The Example of the Cement and 
Paper Industries 
This section discusses some aspects of the cement and paper industries, which are 
owned by the state. An attempt will be made to draw some generalizations that could be 
used as guidelines for assessing the importance of state enterprises as technology policy 
instruments (TPI), and the possible way in which they could influence the development of 
technological capabilities. 
There are usually two alternatives for supplying the technology needed in the 
investment process: the technology is either produced or bought. Thus, to examine the 
character of the state-owned companies as technology policy instruments, it is necessary 
to ask: 
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-What technology do the state-owned companies produce? 
-What technology do the state-owned companies buy? 
-What technology do the state-owned companies consume? 
Each of these aspects will be examined in turn. 
The Production of Technology by State-Owned Cement and Paper Enterprises: In 
Peru the state has a monopoly over the cement industry and paper pulp preparation. How-
ever, the nationalization process is not completely finished, for it is a very recent 
phenomenon and one that is not yet very well defined. Therefore, it is necessary only 
to examine these firms' activities since 1974 to get their complete history as state-owned 
enterprises. From the perspective of the generation of technology, the figures showing 
the participation of these enterprises in the technology research projects organized and 
promoted by the Industrial Technology Institute (ITINTEC) will be presented. 
ITINTEC (11) has stated that since it took over the functions of evaluating, 
authorizing, and supervising company research projects financed with the 2% of the net 
income of industrial firms, it authorized a total of 213 projects for a total of S/325 
million up to April 1976. For administrative reasons the projects were only authorized 
in 1971 (60 for a total of S/63 million), 1974 (89 for a total of S/142 million), and 
1975 (64 for a total of S/120 million). The report says, "It should be emphasized that 
in 1974 projects to be financed using the 2% of the Net Income collected since 1971 were 
presented." Whereas few projects were evaluated during 1972 and 1973, a ~arge number of 
projects were approved in 1974. Therefore, it is more interesting to analyze 1974, even 
more so if it is remembered that the 1975 figures are still provisional. 
Table 6 shows that in 1975 the state-owned companies corresponding to the 
industrial sector were responsible for 24.6% of the allocation for research projects, and 
the paper and cement industries were together responsible for 20.5%. The paper industry 
had the larger part of this (15.9%) and the remainder (4.6%) was in the cement industry. 
Thus, in 1975 these industries were very dynamic in technological research. This 
dynamism was most marked in those companies that had previously belonged to the Grace 
Group, and when they were under private ownership, the same had been true. 
The same trend exists in the cement industry. It is not the Empresa Publica 
Cementos Yura that promotes technological research among the cement industries, but the 
companies that were privately owned until recently: Cementos Lima and Cementa Andino. 
Moreover, the majority of the investment in research done today by the state-owned 
companies as a whole is done by the companies that were originally created with private 
capital. These firms stimulated the technical development of their personnel and offered 
them the possibility of training to learn and master the technological skills needed in 
these production areas. This was done in conjunction with the national university 
centres, which designed a suitable curriculum, arranged the students' practical work 
exercises in these companies, and even functioned as recruiting agencies for the per-
sonnel needed by the companies. 
Table 7 outlines what happened in 1974, and the figures are somewhat different. 
First, the state-owned companies' share was slightly higher, totaling 35.5% of the total 
for the industrial sector. The most outstanding fact is that one state-owned company, 
SIDERPERU, was responsible for almost all this (32.7% of the total). However, the cement 
industry came second with 2.4% of the total, whereas the other state-owned companies only 
did 0.4% of the research projects. 
Because the projects in 1974 were mainly financed with the resources accumulated 
in the ITINTEC fund during 1972, 1973, and 1974, the sum granted to SIDERPERU should not 
be taken as corresponding to 1974 alone. Moreover, this apparent disparity is a result 
of the size of the company, and above all of the fact that it makes very large contribu-
tions to the ITINTEC fund. 
In 1974, only one project was approved for the paper industry; it was for a 
private company, J.P. Atlas S.A. (S/l ,702,000). Adding the sum granted to Papeles 
Especiales S.A. (S/180,000) in 1975, the total amount invested in research by the private 
sector in this field was only S/1,882,000. 
Finally, Table 8 provides some information on the relation between the con-
tributions the companies make to the ITINTEC fund and the sums they receive from it. 
Table 8 shows that in 1974 the state-owned companies contributed more than 
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S/43 million to ITINTEC (this includes only the most important and only those with a 
majority state ownership); this figure is only slightly less than what they received 
(S/49,276,000) from the fund that year. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the private companies help to finance technolog-
ical research in the state-owned companies. But, as ITINTEC financed the research 
projects in that year with the funds accumulated over the 2 previous years, the opposite 
could also be true. In reality, this latter conclusion is more probable. 
There are no official estimates, but it is possible to calculate that state-owned 
companies received about S/80 million of financing from ITINTEC between its founding and 
1975, and these companies contributed more than S/160 million to the fund during the same 
period. In other words, it is probable that ITINTEC distributed approximately 1% of the 
net income of the state-owned companies among the private firms. Even if these calcula-
tions are correct, this conclusion cannot be taken as final. What happened in 1974 shows 
that this trend could change in the future, with more large projects like the SIDERPERU 
one in 1975. 
Table 8 shows that the contribution made by the state-owned cement companies in 
1974 alone (S/7,633,000) covers the total financing they received from ITINTEC in 1974 
and 1975 (S/7,592,000), and the state-owned paper industries' 1974 contributions 
(S/14,865,000) also covered the funds they were granted in 1974-1975 (S/14,896,000). 
TechnologB Consumption in the State-Owned Cement and Paper Companies: This section 
is based on the c apter dealing with technology in an internal report prepared by The 
Registry of Industry and Tourism. This report does not differentiate between state-owned 
and private companies, but as the cement and paper industries are monopolies (at least in 
the case of paper, as far as producing pulp is concerned) it can be assumed that the data 
on these industries refer mainly to state-owned companies. 
Between 1963 and 1968, the paper and cement industries were not among the most 
dynamic, neither when all the manufacturing industries are taken into account, nor when 
compared just with the producers of intermediate goods. 
Between 1968 and 1973, the paper industry grew faster and became one of the most 
dynamic sectors during this period. The opposite happened in the cement industry, for 
this sector had an apparent recession during 1968-1973, even though a different picture 
may emerge if figures on total investment are examined in addition to growth rates. 
To assess the consumption of technology, it is possible to use the concept of 
technological modernity employed by the Ministry of Industry and Tourism. This is defined 
as the index of investments in machinery and equipment expressed in monetary terms com-
pared with the total stock of machinery and equipment. There are three principal levels 
within the criterion of high investment: first, those sectors with more than S/l ,000 
million a year; second, sectors with between S/500 and S/l,000 million; and finally, 
sectors with between S/201 and S/500 million. A modernizing sector or group is one with 
a high comparative investment index and one in which the total sum invested is also large. 
Based on these criteria, the Ministry points out that between 1968 and 1973, the 
cement industry was "one of the industries with high indexes of modernization, that is, 
one of those industries whose investments were at least S/1,000 million." Spinning has 
the highest index, followed by industrial chemical products and fertilizers, iron and 
steel, and finally cement. 
By combining this criterion with that of the volume of investments, it can be 
inferred that although the growth rate in the paper industry is higher than in the cement 
industry, the latter has one of the fastest rates of modernization and it surpasses the 
paper industry. 
Therefore, both the cement and paper industries can be qualified as intense and 
modern in the consumption of technology when compared with the rest of the country's 
manufacturing industry. Moreover, because these industries have relatively high produc-
tivity levels and because they produce for the domestic market, they should have a 
favourable influence on the industries using their products as inputs. However, a more 
detailed study of the inputs used in the paper industry is required; Table 9 shows that 
a considerable proportion of inputs were imported. 
The technology used by this industry, as far as its inputs are concerned, is 
basically derived from the production of cellulosic pulp from sugar cane bagasse, and 
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from bagasse in general. This is a typical characteristic of the national paper industry. 
In fact, the national paper industry has been developed in close connection with the 
sugar industry, because of this input. For this reason the state's efforts to develop 
the industry are following the path laid down internally by the private firms before 
nationalization; consequently, the new state enterprises and the research projects are 
inseparable from the efforts to incorporate this by-product of the sugar industry into 
the paper industry. 
Nevertheless, as Table 9 shows, in 1970 this industry was still very dependent on 
international supplies for its inputs. No less than 45.5% of the cost of the inputs was 
spent on imports. Therefore, the "bleached pulp" project offers the best possibilities 
for reducing this technological dependence in the future. 
The Purchase of Technology in State-Owned CaTient and Paper Industries: 
different aspects of the problaTI of purchasing technology should be examined. 
what are often called "incorporating technology by importing capital goods and 




Around the middle of the 1960s, dependent industrialization in Peru became more 
intense, and import substitution of durable consumer goods and basic intermediate goods 
started. This change was manifested in the composition of imports, where the emphasis 
on finished products was replaced by capital and intermediate goods. 
Capital goods for industry began to account for more of the country's total 
imports: whereas they represented 18% of the total imports in 1965, in 1968 the figure 
was 22% and in 1973, 27%. The imports of raw materials and intermediate products have 
varied considerably; in 1965 they represented 38% of total imports, in 1968 the figure 
was 46%, and in 1973 it decreased to 38% again. 
The imports of all three categories did not change percentage-wise with respect 
to the total in 1968 and 1973. By looking at figures on imported capital goods, it can 
be observed that the majority of the capital goods are industrial machinery, 65% in 1968 
and 64% in 1973. The other types of goods - components and accessories for industrial 
machines, other fixed equipment, machinery and office equipment, and tools - represent a 
small percentage. This means that embodied technology is present in two-thirds of the 
total imports. 
Within this general framework, the capital goods imports by the caTient and paper 
industries, and other intermediate goods producers, have been increasing in relative 
importance during the last decade. However, the quantity of capital invested is only 
significant in the cement industry. The paper industry imports raw materials and inter-
mediate goods in greater quantities. 
FISCAL MEASURES 
Measures related to the fiscal treatment given to enterprises, sometimes asso-
ciated with subsidies, price control mechanisms, and credits, aim at modifying the en-
vironment that determines business decisions, with the expectation of achieving an 
effective change in business behaviour. They do so by offering enterprises the possi-
bility of reducing their tax burden, thereby increasing their profitability if they abide 
by certain conditions established by government to achieve its industrialization aims. 
In general these instruments were considered very weak because they usually alter 
the conditions for business performance only marginally; this becomes rather obvious when 
one recognizes that they are ex-post-facto mechanisms that are usually present in a 
simultaneous and redundant form, with many fiscal incentives piling on top of each other. 
Their rationalization into a single fiscal instrument is virtually impossible because of 




- Coefficients of depreciation of fixed assets. 
- Fiscal treatment of payments for royalties and technical 
assistance. 
- Other taxes. 





Tax deduction for expenses in repairing and reconstructing 
machinery. 
- Tax holiday for metalworking industries. 
- Fiscal treatment of industrial enterprises. 
- Taxation system. 
The industrial policy of Mexico has utilized fiscal incentives for more than 
50 years: in 1926 a decree was issued that established a 3-year exemption from all 
federal taxes for industrial enterprises with national capital not exceeding 5,000 pesos 
in gold and 80% of whose employees were Mexicans, and that utilized national raw mate-
rials. The next instrument of this type was established in 1939, this time directed at 
import substitution (the tax exemptions were reserved for enterprises that developed 
"entirely new" activities). From that moment on, various instruments of this type suc-
ceeded one another, differing by slight variations in the amount and duration of the 
exemptions, in the definitions of "new" and "necessary" industries, in their acceptance 
or rejection of extensions, etc. 
The characteristic features common to them all are the lack of selectivity, the 
lack of discriminatory treatment for different types of enterprises, the inclusion of the 
"most favoured enterprise" clause, and others. No instrument was endowed with applica-
tion criteria concerning increases in efficiency, origin, or type of technology utilized, 
technical or research activities performed by the enterprises, composition of social 
capital, etc. 
Various fiscal measures relate to expenses directly related to technological 
decisions. Although these measures might have been inserted into the scope of fiscal 
policy long ago, they now constitute an instrument that can directly affect the direction 
of corporate-level technological decisions. Moreover, unlike the criteria for applica-
tion of some fiscal exemptions, these provisions have indeed had a concrete application. 
The fiscal measures examined are the following (12): 
- Coefficients of depreciation of fixed assets to determine the calculation 
of the income tax; 
- Fiscal treatment of payments for royalties and technical assistance. 
Before examining these instruments, some of the features of the Mexican fiscal 
system in relation to the pertinent problem are summarized. In the first place, striving 
for economic expansion has kept fiscal pressure relatively low (in particular, that over 
income derived from capital). 
Varied and even contradictory objectives have been assigned to fiscal policy -
e.g., obtaining resources for financing state activities; contributing to savings and 
capitalization (particularly in the manufacturing industry); promoting decentralization 
and regional development; facilitating renewal or replacement of assets and the importa-
tion of capital goods; and fostering exports. Clearly, the battery of instruments of 
fiscal policy is not responding to a group of coherent objectives for industrial policy: 
it has been integrated through the response (in different periods of time) to short-term 
pro bl ems. 
In this context, the tax structure has been continuously modified during the last 
20 years, with income tax continuing to acquire importance. 
The income tax rate has been characterized by low progressiveness. Currently, 
the progressive rate on corporate profits only reaches 42%, applicable to the amount of 
1,500,000 pesos. Beyond this amount, the proportional rate of 42% (that is, the highest 
marginal rate) is applicable. 
Taxes are only applied to profits that are actually distributed. No tax is 
levied on reinvested profits (in the fiscal year in which they are realized, or in the 
following year) for industrial, agricultural, livestock, or fishing purposes. Nor does 
the tax apply when profits derived from the sale of fixed corporate assets are directed 
toward the acquisition of depreciable goods in areas defined as subject to development. 
It is difficult to determine from the information available exactly to what degree these 
measures have contributed to increasing the productive reinvestment of profits. Cer-
tainly, no control over these funds exists, and this instrument could have increased the 
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corporate liquidity available for the acquisition of goods without any discernible effect 
on efforts toward industrial development. 
The Income Tax Law (LISR) authorizes the taxpayer to deduct from the taxable 
amount "nonnal expenditures of the business." Included among these normal expenses are 
payments to persons outside Mexico for technical assistance and costs of advertising 
(totally deductible: 60% in the fiscal year in which they were incurred and the re-
mainder in the following 3 years). Such deductions can be quite high and in practice 
are extremely difficult to control effectively. The road to tax evasion is wide open. 
Coefficients of Depreciation of Fixed Assets 
For calculation of taxable revenue, firms may make a series of deductions autho-
rized by the Income Tax Law because, in general, they are considered normal or appropriate 
to the conduct of the business. These deductions include the depreciation of fixed assets. 
In reality, the concept of depreciation encompasses what is considered the essential part 
of capital consumption (capital wear-and-tear). Obsolescence is a concept rather dif-
ferent from depreciation, because it implies a reduction in the worth of an asset for 
technological or economic reasons: if an asset becomes obsolete, the value that has still 
not depreciated normally will be totally depreciated in the fiscal year in which it is 
replaced. In summary, it is assumed that wear-and-tear on capital is a normal expendi-
ture of a business and therefore deductible from taxable profits. 
Under the Income Tax Law of 1954, the coefficients of depreciation could be 
modified for fiscal purposes with the authorization of the Ministry of Finance. In 1962, 
this situation was changed. While the possibility of using coefficients of depreciation 
higher than those authorized by the Law was explicitly established, this possibility was 
subjected to the following conditions (those that are observed at present): 
(a) The authorization will be made through general agreements (by regions or 
by branches of activity, types of assets, etc.). 
(b) Any firm interested in applying the method of accelerated depreciation ought 
to obtain a "concrete agreement" from the fiscal authorities. 
This instrument seeks to serve as an incentive to bring about modernization of 
the industrial plant. Corporations can deduct larger amounts from taxable profits, pay-
ing less tax during the first years. But the taxable base will increase for the last 
years; in fact, after having depreciated (for fiscal purposes) the assets in question, 
they can no longer be considered deductible: the treasury will recuperate what it did 
not collect during the first years. Hence, this incentive is the equivalent of an 
interest-free loan that the state offers in the first years and recovers when the balance 
to be depreciated is considerably reduced. However, a corporation that is authorized to 
depreciate certain machinery in an accelerated form, and that then sells the machinery 
once it has been depreciated (fiscally) and acquires new equipment, would find that the 
advantages of accelerated depreciation continue to benefit the firm indefinitely. 
These schemes have been rarely utilized, for the Ministry of Finance has not 
worked out the general agreements (nor has there been strong pressure from entrepreneurs 
to see it done). This might be explained by the taxpayers' fear of increased inspection 
of their activities (particularly their investment plans) by fiscal authorities. More-
over, the presence of idle capacity and of overprotection in many branches of industry 
brings about a situation in which no pressure to renew equipment exists. Finally, the 
normal coefficients of depreciation authorized by the Income Tax Law may be sufficiently 
high for certain industries, and, under the Law on New and Necessary Industries and the 
Decree of Decentralization and Industrial Development, authorization for accelerated 
depreciation can already be obtained (see the section on industrial programing). 
In relation to the coefficient of 35% for equipment destined directly for research 
on "new products or technological development in' the country," it is necessary to indi-
cate that no criterion of what is meant by these concepts has been established. Appar-
ently, fiscal authorities do not have available the capacity to perform the necessary 
evaluation so that equipment destined for other uses would not be included under this 
heading. It is not difficult for a pilot plant to produce resins with commercial uses 
or for certain instruments to be used for quality. 
It is not farfetched to suppose that the incentive to renovate and modernize 
assets has also been an incentive to speculate. In any case, it is also logical to 
assume that overcapitalization of productive techniques has been encouraged. Doubtless, 
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other considerations of greater relevance weigh here as well (relative position of the 
firm in the field, volume and nature of its demand, dominant channels of competition, 
etc.), and it is difficult to determine with precision the magnitude of the bias inherent 
in this fiscal instrument. 
Firms in the petrochemical industry use equipment that is assigned a markedly 
smaller coefficient of depreciation (in fact, more according to actual depreciation). The 
LISR assigns a coefficient of 9% to the equipment most used by these corporations: re-
actors, distilling towers, heat exchangers, compressors, various kinds of containers, and, 
in general, equipment pertinent to continuous process industries. Other coefficients 
established by the Law are also applicable, the particularly important ones being those 
for pollution control equipment (35%), equipment destined for research (35%), and modular 
electronic computer equipment. 
In the industries of this branch, maintenance practices considerably lengthen the 
life and efficiency of equipment. Yet the most important firms in each branch, those 
possessing greater productive capacity and greater intensity of capital, use maintenance 
techniques that are equally capital intensive. Once the engineering of a process is 
acquired from a foreign engineering firm, it is not surprising that the project design 
incorporates the maintenance techniques most common in the highly industrialized coun-
tries. 
A consensus was also observed in the branches of the food industry over the 
suitability of the coefficients to prevailing conditions in the industry. 
Fiscal Treatment of Payments for Royalties and Technical Assistance 
In 1969 the Ministry of Finance completed a study of payments that various firms 
made abroad for technical assistance. The study was motivated by fiscal preoccupations 
(basically, the fact that considerable payments were made to countries like the Bahamas, 
Curacao, Panama, and Liechtenstein, all tax havens, and that payments existed for purpose 
unjustifiable in terms of the line of business of the corporations; for example, soft 
drink bottling companies and advertising agencies). 
As a result of this study, the fiscal management of payments abroad for technical 
assistance was reformed. Before 1971, these payments had been taxed at a fixed propor-
tional rate of 20%, much as payments for royalties were taxed at a progressive rate 
(whose highest marginal rate reached 42%). To eliminate the incentive for companies to 
channel payments for royalties and for remission of profits abroad as payments for tech-
nical assistance, the two concepts were made equivalent in January 1971 and are subject 
to the progressive tax up to 42%. This measure provoked reactions in the private sector, 
particularly in the Confederation of Industrial Chambers, which declared that it "did 
not agree with declaring the payment of royalties a general problen ... for in reality 
'technical assistance' comes to compensate for our deficiencies in research and experi-
mental development material" (13). On the other hand, it was criticized for placing a 
mechanism that could be useful for the transfer of technology (as is technical assistance) 
under the same tax as a channel that occasionally is less effective for the transmission 
of specific technical knowledge (the case with licences for the use and exploitation of 
patents, which require payment of a royalty normally calculated over net sales). How-
ever, for transnational corporations, the incentive to present profits remitted abroad 
as technical assistance or royalties continues to exist. 
An important element in these problems is that the fiscal authorities lack the 
capacity and technical support to verify whether it is a matter of a new technology or 
knowledge. The treatment is the same for all branches of industry and for payments of 
royalties. No coordination exists to control these aspects with the National Registry 
of the Transfer of Technology (which, as has been seen, has even authorized contracts in 
which the taxes are covered by the party that makes the payments) or with CONACYT. 
Other Taxes 
Other aspects of the tax system might come to have effects on technological 
decisions. The first is the sales tax, a tax with cumulative effects that is applied 
on each sales operation at its full value without deduction for taxes previously paid. 
As its effect is cumulative, it favours the vertical integration of corporations in 
order to avoid taxes caused in each phase of the production process and of distribution. 
This tends to discriminate against businesses that have labour-intensive techniques, 
for in general they have a lower degree of plant integration. However, the impact of 
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this tax might not be the detennining factor in the decision of a firm to increase the 
level of plant integration. One possible explanation is that the tax is borne by the 
final consumer. None of the 67 firms visited indicated that the tax had· been taken into 
account in increasing the level of integration. 
Other taxes that have a negative impact on the use of labour-intensive techniques 
exist in Mexico. First, there is the federal tax on expenditures for r6'Tluneration to 
working personnel, which assesses 1% against the total of the payroll. This tax revenue 
was originally destined to aid education. Moreover, certain states have also set local 
payroll assessments: in Nuevo Le6n, the rate is 2%, and in the State of Mexico, 1%. 
Clearly, the impact of these instruments is much greater than that of indirect taxes. 
Also, the social charges for social security and housing have the effect of raising 
labour costs. The contributions that firms must make to the Mexican Institute for Social 
Security (IMSS) reach 9% of the value of the payroll; and the contribution to the 
National Housing Fund for Workers comes to 5%. Thus the cost-increase impact of labour 
is 17% in Neuvo Le6n, 16% in the State of Mexico, and 15% in a place that has no payroll 
assessments. However, reforms in the Federal Work Law establish that "contributions to 
the National Housing Fund for Workers are expenditures of social foresight on the part 
of corporations" (Article 141) and therefore can be deducted from the taxable total 
(Article 20 LISR). This treatment is not given to fees for IMSS in spite of inter-
pretations for their deductibility advanced by employers' groups. 
Fiscal policy in Mexico has formed part of a strategy of development that has 
kept the acceleration of the process of capital fonnation as a central objective. Con-
siderations of generation of employment, choice of techniques, and autonomous technolog-
ical development have not been given much attention in the fonnulation of this policy. 
The measures related to undistributed profits, and to the great number of deductions 
they permit, considerably reduce the taxable base of the corporations. But the lack of 
control and selectivity (difficult to incorporate in fiscal instruments) have made this 
an instrument that is unable to pursue the objectives of scientific and technological 
policy. 
It would be difficult to conclude that the coefficients of depreciation autho-
rized by fiscal legislation have served in general to modernize the industrial plant. 
Before the existence of high levels of idle capacity in many branches of the manufac-
turing industry and of excessive levels of effective protection, it is likely that no 
significant pressure to renew assets existed. It is likely that these coefficients have 
promoted overcapitalization of production techniques, and in some instances speculation 
with serious implications has been encouraged. This has been the result of the applica-
tion of coefficients as high as that for machine tools. In face of the coexistence of 
significant levels of idle capacity and renovation of fixed assets, it can be concluded 
that the coefficients of depreciation for fiscal purposes are extremely high for certain 
branches of industry. Nevertheless, it becomes quite difficult to adjust these co-
efficients to more realistic levels and almost impossible to define a treatment differ-
entiating among types of industry without having this instrument inserted in a broader 
framework of industrial and technological development. 
The present fiscal treatment is inadequate because under the present system 
practically any corporate expenditure can be considered as normal to the business and 
thus can be deducted. Hence, tax evasion is encouraged and the deductibility of research 
and experimental development expenses fails to provide any incentive because it is 
unnecessary to carry on such activities to deduct expenditures. Moreover, as fiscal 
authorities do not have the technical and material capability to verify the content of 
such activities, expenditures on technical activities more closely linked to production 
than to the experimental laboratory can be presented as costs of research and develop-
ment. Furthermore, the instrument lacks selectivity and confers the same treatment on 
technological developments related to the production of cosmetics or luxury consumer 
goods as on those related to mining or food production. Finally, the same treatment is 
given to expenses related to the development of capital-intensive technologies as to 
those that would encourage the development of more labour-intensive techniques. Clearly, 
the faults of this instrument also derive from the lack of a broader framework, which 
might permit the introduction of an element of selectivity in its management. But 
inefficiencies also arise from the absence of coordination between fiscal authorities 
and specialized institutions. 
The incentive that currently exists to channel profits abroad in the form of 
payments for royalties or for technical assistance cannot be countered except through 
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greater control and vigilance on the part of fiscal bodies and the institutions that 
supervise the formulation and enforcement of policy on the importation of technology: 
CONACYT and RNTT. This last body ought to establish and enforce the criterion of not 
permitting payment of royalties for the use of trademarks or technology between wholly 
owned subsidiaries and the parent firm. Finally, the possibility of deducting payments 
for royalties and technical assistance ought to remain subject to effective control over 
their content (at least in those cases where payments exceed a determined amount; for 
example, more than 2% of net sales). Payments for the use of trademarks should not be 
deductible unless the product is destined for export. 
In terms of the impact of all these elements of the fiscal system on the choice 
between capital-intensive or labour-intensive techniques, two points are important. The 
first, and less critical, is the fact that labour's impact on costs has been emphasized 
in the past without taking into account that the simplistic insistence that "labour's 
cost has increased 12% or 15% contrasts with the impact of distorting effects on the 
price (or, better, the prices) of capital. To what extent is the use of capital-intensive 
technologies stimulated through the action of other instruments of industrial policy? A 
corporation can obtain credit from a public financial institution at a preferential rate 
of interest, or reinvest its profits, which will then not be taxable. It can also buy 
automatic, labour-saving machinery abroad. This machinery can be imported with a sub-
stantial (or total) exemption from the import tax under one of the existing schemes; it 
can then be depreciated for fiscal purposes by applying the coefficient of 35% (and can 
be sold in 3 or 4 years as secondhand machinery); and if there are layoffs, the compensa-
tion will be deductible from the taxable sum. Obtaining credit for the purchase of 
machinery is always easier if the item itself constitutes a guarantee. But how can a 
small firm guarantee a loan to increase its payroll? Clearly, distortions also exist 
in the price of capital (whether it is understood as financial capital or as goods 
utilized in production, that is, capital goods), which make it fail to reflect its true 
scarcity. 
The second point is that decisions over the choice of techniques are conditioned 
by a number of elements and not only by differences between the relative prices of the 
primary factors. 
Other considerations are more important in many industries. The structure of 
the branch, the scale of production, the channels of competition, the nature of demand, 
and the rigidity of substitution among factors are elements of great significance in the 
choice of techniques. Even the price of services such as power and water can form a 
fundamental variable: in process 1ndustries, an important factor in choosing between 
continuous-flow or intermittent technologies is the critical consumption of these 
services. But if these services are subsidized, the incentive to select a technique 
that saves them can be weakened. All these aspects have been ignored in Mexico, but 
they clearly show the need to articulate technological policy with industrial policy. 
COLOMBIA 
Depreciation of Capital Goods for Tax Purposes 
This is a recent Decree-Law that established that for tax purposes capital goods 
could be depreciated over a period of 5 years, whereas previously this period was 10 years. 
It aimed at accelerating the depreciation rate for accounting purposes. This 
rate does not coincide with the real depreciation rate, especially in Colombia where, 
due to import costs, a machine frequently has an economic life 5 or 10 times greater than 
the one presented by catalogues. The formal objective is to accelerate the process of 
machinery replacement and to facilitate the import of new capital goods for entrepreneurs. 
This decree influences companies in general and especially those that must rely 
heavily on machinery and equipment as a basis for their productive process, i.e., com-
panies using capital-intensive technologies. 
The results of these measures cannot be evaluated because they were enacted only 
a short time ago. However, they could provide effective incentives for the import of 
machinery and equipment, although that depends on broader policy decisions of the enter-
prises regarding the use of the additional profits they have derived. 
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Tax Deduction for Expenses in Repairing and Reconstructing Machinery 
Contradicting the previously discussed instrument, this instrument is aimed at 
extending the productive life of the equipment to reduce the payments abroad for new 
capital goods. It is one of the key policy instruments that have played an outstanding 
role in Colombia in shaping the process of technological development within the import 
substitution strategy. 
This policy instrument, combined with that of ~he now-abolished depreciation of 
capital goods over a period of lD years and with the import restrictions on equipment 
and spare parts, exerted a formidable pressure on the enterprises with high investments 
in industrial equipment to build up internally their maintenance and repair capacity. 
A significant technological capacity and know-how started to grow around the maintenance 
and repair shops of large enterprises in which the investments in fixed assets represent 
a high or significant proportion of the costs of production (for example, the textile, 
beer, and glass industries). The fiscal reform of 1974 eliminated this tax instrument. 
Tax Holiday for Metalworking Industries 
The main objective of this Law issued in 1960 is that of promoting the develop-
ment of the metalworking industry in Colombia. It is a Law of the Republic and favours 
a specific industrial branch during a fixed term of 15 years. This Law is not likely 
to be renewed. Its main objective is the establishment of a tax holiday for those enter-
prises in the metalworking branch of production, including all the textile factories 
that have converted their factories into metalworking enterprises. 
It had a transitory effect upon the metalworking branch of industry and all the 
firms conforming to it, but its effect was very slight over the entire sector because it 
created a set of special conditions for a specific branch of industry. 
This policy favoured the displacement of industries that belonged to the textile 
sector by the metalworking branch of industry. These new enterprises have thrived 
through the manufacturing of equipment not destined to the textile industry: lathes, 
reducers, drills, large valves, etc., because these goods enjoy a satisfactory tariff 
protection. One of these enterprises started manufacturing looms 6 years ago. A North 
American trademark and licence was employed and the resultant quality· of the product was 
very good. These looms are still being manufactured but only as a secondary line of 
production. 
To take advantage of the tax holiday offered by this Law, those enterprises 
decided to convert their large maintenance and repair shops into separate metalworking 
firms. This is one of the main origins of the Colombian capital goods industry. Another 
important origin of this industrial branch is the establishment of maintenance and repair 
shops for the Colombian railroad network, which was created toward the beginning of this 
century. 
Technologically, this was not of great importance because it only slightly shifted 
the attention of the enterprising sector, which seldom decided to introduce real innova-
tions in certain production lines. 
These industrial incentives based on "take-ofr' subsidies have proven to be 
relatively inefficient in Colombia. Therefore it is to be expected that they will be 
substituted by global industrial-incentive policies based on a system of priorities. 
This same inefficiency applies in terms of technological development, which is favoured 
only as a result of the attention granted by the enterprising sector. 
VENEZUELA 
Fiscal Treatment of Industrial Enterprises 
Among the mechanisms for taxation employed by the Venezuelan state, direct 
taxation of a firm's income is of special interest for this module. The utilization of 
this type of taxation as an instrument of economic policy largely depends on its rela-
tive importance within the general taxation structure. 
According to data from the Ministry of Finance these taxes represent less than 
65% of total public revenue, including oil revenue of nationalized firms, and only 10% 
if oil revenue is excluded. This situation has permitted the creation of a fiscal 
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structure very favourable to the use of these taxes as instruments of economic policy. 
In effect, leaving aside the small 10% contribution to the current financing of the state 
apparatus, there are numerous possibilities for using them as mechanisms to stimulate or 
inhibit given economic activities (14). 
Until now, the state's criterion when using this type of taxation as an instrument 
of economic policy has been that of using it to stimulate or promote and not to inhibit 
given activities. In other words, within the limits established by the Income Tax Law, 
use has frequently been made of exemptions and exonerations but never of tax increases (15). 
The expansion of the local productive apparatus has been the central aim in the 
manipulation of these taxes as instruments of economic policy. Within this general aim, 
the fundamental goal is to stimulate the displacement of capital toward one or another 
region or economic activity (the improvement of resource allocation through the increase 
in capital mobility). As a result, objectives such as full employment, price stability, 
and improvement in the balance of payments have been permanently in second place despite 
the fact that they often appear to justify the use of these taxes. 
The application of this tax mechanism in the manner shown - which can be clearly 
seen in the way in which exemptions and exonerations are established and approved - has 
accelerated the process of capital accumulation by firms at the expense of expanding the 
industrial productive base. At the same time, income distribution, internal market ex-
pansion, regional development, etc. - all important in terms of a global development 
policy - are relegated. 
Until now the state has never used direct taxation of a firm's income as an 
instrument of scientific and technological policy. This type of taxation, without any 
consideration for scientific and technological development, indirectly has had negative 
effects on the latter. The use of this form of taxation as an instrument of economic 
policy has contributed to the increase in the existing tendency toward the indiscriminate 
importation of technology. 
The above is explained in terms of the model of industrialization by import sub-
stitution. Such a model is characterized during its early stages of evolution by the 
necessity to import technology embodied in machinery and equipment so as to construct a 
productive apparatus capable of satisfying the demand pattern previously covered by 
goods from abroad. 
Within the general ideas put forward here, more careful consideration should be 
given to the system of taxation on firms so that a closer assessment can be made of the 
repercussions and possibilities of this tax mechanism on national technological develop-
ment, in particular in relation to the depreciation of machinery and equipment. 
The reserves for depreciation of machinery and equipment used in the productive 
process are income tax deductible. These reserves include expenses relating to the wear 
and tear of fixed assets and are sub acted from the total income of the firm, thus 
reducing the net amount of taxable income. 
Since this type of expense is transferred to the value of the firm's current 
production, it is clear that this encourages the latter to reduce the formal period of 
probable productive life of the machinery and equipment and/or to increase the amount 
depreciated annually, because it allows faster recuperation of the investment in capital 
goods and offers the possibility of improving productive efficiency through new invest-
ments in the same firm or other economic activities. 
In some countries there are quite precise legal mechanisms that allow the use of 
the depreciation reserves as instruments for stimulating new investments and for modern-
izing the firm. The accelerated depreciation and/or the reduction of the fiscal life of 
capital goods explicitly contemplated by these mechanisms favours these objectives by 
allowing fast recuperation of investments, diminishing the net amount of taxes and 
maximizing the financial profitability of investments. 
From this point of view, the use of depreciation allowances in the way shown 
above is equivalent in practice to giving the firm a "loan" that the state can recuperate 
at the end of the fiscal life of the machinery or equipment thus financed, but that will 
never be recuperated by the state if the finn, at that moment, decided to acquire new 
equipment or a new machine. In Venezuela there have never been incentives based on the 
concession of accelerated depreciation and/or reduction of the periods of probable 
productive life of capital goods. 
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However, it is important that to the extent that the present Income Tax Law 
confers discretionary powers on the institutions that supervise its application, it 
offers possibilities for firms to exert pressure so that they can manipulate the de-
preciation reserves of their balance sheets in a form consonant with their particular 
interests. Thus the firm always has the chance to justify why it considers as reasonable 
a given period of probable productive life of one or another type of machinery or equip-
ment through employing different criteria to depreciate identical pieces of equipment 
according to the productive function of each and often even the department using each one. 
Various other factors together make this the most rational method of procedure 
from the microeconomic point of view. Briefly, these are described next. 
If the aim is to minimize production costs, the firm will replace machinery and 
equipment if the new investment and new labour costs associated with the change compen-
sate, from the point of view of profits, for the cost incurred in the maintenance and 
repair of the existing machinery and the present labour costs. This is somewhat sche-
matic, but given the situation in Venezuela, the accelerated depreciation of capital 
goods tolerated by the current Income Tax Law contributes to encouraging the firm toward 
the first of the above alternatives, that is to renew its fixed assets rather than pro-
long their use. There are various reasons operating in favour of this. 
The first of these has to do with accounting procedures. By shortening the 
fiscal life of productive goods, the firm substantially diminishes its taxes and, as 
pointed out above, enjoys a sort of credit, which it does not have to pay off if it 
pursues a policy of continuous renovation of fixed assets. 
On the basis of the analysis made, the principal consequences of the manipulation 
of depreciation reserves for the technological development of Venezuela can be indicated: 
(a) The rapid modernization of the industrial sector is favoured but not as a 
result of market pressures. The national market is characterized by its reduced size, 
overprotection, concentration, etc. These characteristics lessen the importance of the 
renewal of machinery and equipment as a means to defend or improve the firm's competitive 
position. 
(b) Continuous massive importation of embodied technology is induced, primarily 
in the form of capital goods. 
(c) Technological learning on the part of local firms is not stimulated. There 
is no pressure for the significant development of equipment maintenance and repair activ-
ities, and the progressive training of labour directly related to machinery operation is 
made difficult. 
(d) Another factor is therefore added by the fiscal system to those that encourage 
the overmechanization of Venezuela's industries. 
KOREA 
Some Remarks on the Tax System 
During the last decade, government investment expenditures ranged from 3% to 6% 
of the GNP, national defence expenditures from 4% to 5%, and general government expendi-
tures from 5% to 7% .. Total general government expenditures ranged from 11% to 18% of 
the GNP. Approximately two-thirds of these expenditures were financed by indirect taxes 
on goods and services and one-third by direct taxes such as income taxes on individuals 
and corporations. 
In 1973, indirect taxes on goods and services amounted to 8% of the GNP, direct 
taxes to 4%, and local taxes to 1.4%. The total tax burden amounted to 13.4% of the GNP. 
At present, indirect taxes are collected under 10 different tax laws with some 
80 differentiated tax rates ranging from under 1% to 250%. The market prices, therefore, 
are seriously distorted by taxes. A distorted price structure cannot serve as an effi-
cient information system that leads to an optimum allocation of resources in the market 
economy. This distortion could be eliminated if all indirect taxes were unified into a 
value-added tax with a single rate and a minimum of exemptions. 
The Kore.in government has been preparing for the introduction of a value-added 
tax since 1972. A feasibility study was done in October 1972, and various administrative 
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preparations were underway in 1975. Implementation is expected to begin within the next 
few years. 
At present the corporate income tax law gives a tax credit on the spending for 
research and development activities commissioned to established research institutes such 
as the Korea Institute of Science and Technology. But its effect seems to be weak. Since 
corporate income tax is charged on profits, it penalizes firms that could be efficient 
and also could contribute to technological progress, while inefficient firms making no 
profit are not liable to pay tax. If corporate profit taxation were absorbed by a value-
added tax, the unintended subsidy to inefficient firms could be eliminated. 
PRICE CONTROLS 
The effects of price controls cannot be clearly defined. They can increase 
profitability in a given industrial branch if it is a question of a guaranteed minimum 
price, or vice versa they can decrease profitability if it is a question of a maximum 
price. But in both cases, depending on a number of other factors, price controls can 
lead to greater technological efficiency, either because they increase funds that could 
be invested in technological improvements, or because the price rigidity can help induce 
the introduction of cost-saving innovations or improvements. 
The only case examined in the STPI project was the Colombian price control 
mechanism. In this case, it was found that under conditions of price controls and because 
of the many rigidities that surround other decisions, one of the options open to entre-
preneurs is to adopt a policy of technological improvements aimed at optimizing the 
already-installed equipment and machinery, thus reducing fixed investments per unit of 
output and accelerating capital rotation and therefore their profitability. This possible 
source of minor technical improvements is seldom looked at. 
COLOMBIA 
Price Control Mechanism 
The price control mechanism is applied by the National Prices Administration of 
the Ministry of Development to regulate the price of some products. There are three 
general principles on which this government pol icy on prices has been based. 
The basic principle states that all goods considered as basic must be submitted 
to price control. The purpose of this measure is to control the prices of all those 
products that affect to some extent the so-called "canasta familiar" (wage goods). Al-
though this fundamental principle has been for many years the basis of all government 
price control policies, in recent years it has lost much of its importance. This has been 
partly due to the use of other policies that have contributed either to increasing com-
petition or to improving all distribution systems, with the consequent effect on the 
prices of basic consumption goods. 
The second principle on which the price control policy is based is that all those 
market imperfections that may contribute in one way or another to increasing prices must 
be controlled through price control on some inputs. Such is the case with all veteri-
narian products, which remain under price control, whereas other inputs such as barbed 
wire may vary considerably, causing a continuous decrease in the price of the former in 
relation to other inputs, thus making their use more attractive to the entrepreneur. 
A number of products that were under price control since 1970 have been gradually 
taken out of the list because of the enormous difficulties encountered by the government 
in exerting adequate control at the consumer level. At present, other regulatory instru-
ments such as import liberation and IDEMA (subsidiary distribution) are being used. In 
cases of great scarcity, the control policy is totally inefficient, giving rise to 
speculation or contraband. 
The price control policy does not consider at all the technological factor; 
nevertheless, because of the extent to which it affects the incomes of all enterprises 
and their earning power, it forces some enterprises to modify their behaviour. This 
principle refers to the control of monopolistic prices. Nevertheless, it has been 
extended in practice to the correction of other types of market imperfections such as 
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oligopoly. Likewise, the price control policy has been used to correct market deficien-
cies not only in the production of goods and services but also in their distribution. The 
above-mentioned use of price controls is a true innovation introduced during the previous 
administration because, before then, prices were controlled at the factories only, thus 
ignoring the possible effects of the distribution process. 
The third principle on which the price control policy is based states that this 
control may be justified whenever it is desirable to obtain a distributive effect and 
there are no other plausible means to achieve it. The most common distributive effect is 
one that contributes to progressive income distribution. Perhaps the best example of 
this effect is the rent freeze, in which the less wealthy are supposed to benefit the most, 
to the detriment of the wealthier who seek to benefit from the rental of their properties. 
Besides the distributive effect on income, there may be a distributive effect on 
production factors. 
A special paper written by Dario Abad for the Colombian STPI team analyzed this 
question in some detail. He states that in the Colombian price control system, which 
takes into account unit cost and capital rotation, the alternatives open to the entre-
preneur are: 
-to leave business altogether, as seems to have frequently happened with 
milk products; 
-to diversify production, shifting toward products where price controls do 
not exist, which seems to be the most common response, in particular in 
pharmaceuticals and food products; 
-to lower product quality (or diminish batch quantities, as in the case of 
match boxes); 
-to change the declared assets of the firm to artificially increase unit 
costs and demand a price revision; 
-to adopt a technological policy aimed at a better utilization of already-
installed equipment and machinery, thus reducing fixed investments per 
unit of output and diminishing total fixed costs per unit of output. With 
such policies a firm can achieve lower unit costs and faster capital rota-
tion, thus improving its profitability, which was restricted by price 
control. 
Obviously the latter is the most difficult and long-term option. For this reason 
the private entrepreneur will adopt one or a number of the various strategies mentioned 
above. However, in companies having certain characteristics, the effect of price control 
on technological management is clearly discernible. The following working hypothesis 
can be formulated: 
"All productive activities that are submitted to a price control policy will in 
time opt for the technological strategy if the following characteristics exist: 
(1) Price control is maintained for long periods of time, price readjustments 
are infrequent, and the tendency of the government is to maintain artificially low prices 
or political prices. 
(2) The production process is capital intensive and therefore involves consider-
able volumes of production requiring considerable investments in fixed assets. 
(3) Production is specialized and not versatile, i.e., it is difficult to alter 
the line of products by substitution. 
(4) The company operates in a highly concentrated market, i.e., in monopoly, 
oligopoly, or cartel conditions. 
(5) The products are subject to universal quality standards and it is difficult 
to alter their quality while maintaining their market acceptance." 
Although the price control policy does not have the specific aim of obtaining 
good technological management of the companies, it seems evident that it has a signifi-
cantly beneficial effect on the technological management of companies with certain 
characteristics. 
This remains, however, a mere hypothesis, but it is a hypothesis that appears to 
be supported in Colombia by the existence of certain productive activities in which good 
use of installed equipment, low fixed costs per produced unit, and high productivity 
levels have been achieved. 
66 
EXPORT PROMOTION MEASURES 
Most of the developing countries that have achieved a certain degree of import 
substitution industrialization have attempted to break their growth bottlenecks both by 
encouraging exports or by increasing import substitution. 
Export promotion can consist of assembling a number of other instruments aimed at 
concentrating protection of, and assistance to, those industries more likely to penetrate 
some sections of the world market. In such a policy the effects in terms of technological 
development can be ambiguous. Some STPI teams, such as the Mexican one, argued that 
export promotion measures cannot be successful unless the industry under consideration is 
reasonably efficient, which implies that even at a home market level it can produce 
cheaper and better products than competitive foreign products. The different views arise 
from the fact that most governments aim at improving efficiency by means of widening 
markets instead of widening markets by means of improved efficiency. 
On the other hand, as shown in Korea, the success of export promotion policies 
under the conditions of the post-World War II economic boom can be transformed into an 
economic crisis as serious as the one present in countries that did not succeed in pro-
moting manufactured exports. The balance of payments problems, the consequent growth of 
external indebtedness, and the growing protectionism of advanced industrialized countries 
have put the Korean economy in a critical situation. Scientific and technological con-
siderations in such a situation acquire a totally different nature. They are more costly 
in immediate terms, although their benefits could be most important in the medium and 
long term. The possibilities of developing indigenous technologies might be limited for 
the time being to engineering efforts aimed at improving plant utilization and raw 
materials and at energy savings. (It should be noted that because of the closely knit 
character of the Korean policies, export promotion measures have to a large extent been 
discussed in the section on instruments for industrial programing and for setting indus-







- Fund for the promotion of exports of manufactured goods. 
- Indirect tax rebate certificates for exporters of technology 
and services. 
- Export promotion instruments. 
- Export inspection law. 
- Nontraditional exports fund. 
- Special credit system to promote exports. 
Fund for the Promotion of Exports of Manufactured Goods (FOMEX) 
Established in 1963, FOMEX seeks to finance the export operations of national 
producers, to protect them in face of the risks implicit in this type of operation, to 
back import substitution, and to aid exporters of technology and services. Initially, 
the Fund was sustained by resources drawn from the application of a 10% ad valorem tax 
on imports of luxury articles and some undefined portions of the tariff. 
Currently, its source of funds is the establishment of a rate of 1% on all imports 
except agricultural products (as of January l, 1975). It has also obtained credit lines 
for more than $40 million with the Interamerican Development Bank and private U.S. banks. 
FOMEX operates by rediscounting the documents of private commercial banks that earn 3% 
of the total amount of each operation for serving as intermediaries (but, in effect, the 
resources committed are the Fund's). Of course, many banks favour offering these pre-
ferential credits to firms in the industrial group to which they themselves belong. 
FOMEX undertakes the following activities: financing sales, preexport credits, 
and import substitution. Up to 1975, these operations represented 76%, 21%, and 2% 
respectively of the total funds handled by the Fund. These resources have represented a 
growing proportion of the exports of manufactured products in Mexico. From 1964 to 1975, 
the percentage of the total exports of manufacturers financed with resources from FOMEX 
grew from 1.7% to 34.6%. 
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Most credits were destined to traditional exports of the Mexican manufacturing 
industry. In fact, FOMEX has been an important support for the export of manufactures, 
but it has not led the growth of sales abroad. It has limited itself to passive support 
of the export of manufactured goods without selecting industrial branches to which it 
could offer high-priority support. 
The only criterion the Fund pays attention to when granting credit is the per-
centage of national integration: 50% for exports and 60% for import substitution. This 
criterion is merely formal, for it is almost impossible to verify the degree of national 
integration. On the other hand, the intervention of the Fund takes place after the 
decision to export has been taken and, therefore, it cannot influence the mode of 
production. 
An additional aspect of the operations of FOMEX is its impact on the export of 
engineering services. Many engineering firms have used the services of the Fund to offer 
integrated packages of engineering and financing in international biddings. Contracts 
that otherwise would have been lost were awarded to Mexican firms on account of this 
support. 
The operation of the Fund through private banking complicates the selective 
application of credits and the regulation of aspects such as the structure of equity, 
the relations with research and experimental development centres, and the royalties paid 
for foreign technology. 
Indirect Tax Rebate Certificates for Exporters of Technology and Services ~IS) 
This mechanism is aimed at encouraging exports of technology and management 
services, construction, and the operation of special services. 
Since 1971 the policy of promotion of exports has utilized the system of rebates 
of indirect taxes. The most important indirect tax in Mexico is the sales tax, which is 
levied in general on all merchandise transactions at the rate of 4%. Its cumulative 
effect on the final price has been calculated by the Ministry of Finance as 11% on the 
average for manufactured goods. Exporters can request and obtain Certificates of Rebates 
of Indirect Taxes (CEDIS) with which they can pay the total of this rate when the exported 
product has a national component higher than 60%, and half of it (5.5%) when the national 
component falls between 50% and 59%. The Certificates can be utilized to pay taxes of 
any kind charged to the company that obtains them. 
This instrument was extended in 1973 to benefit the exporters of technology and 
management services, construction, and operations specified in a contract. The concept 
of technology is the same as in the law concerning the National Registry of the Transfer 
of Technology. The basis for the rebate is the value of the services that, by contract, 
the exporting firms offer to private or public foreign institutions. If the Mexican 
component in the contract is 50% of higher, the refund is 100% (thus, CEDIS will be 
equivalent to 11% of the payment), and if the Mexican component is less than 50% but 
greater than 40%, the rebate will only be 50%. When the Mexican component is less than 
40%, the rebate is given at the rate of 100% but only in cases where national inputs are 
involved. From the beginning of 1973, an additional rebate of taxes of 4% was given 
when the exportation was carried out by export consortia and service companies. For 
machinery and equipment (as well as for other products) that are included in the contract, 
the fiscal stimulus of the conventional CEDIS can be obtained. The exporters must be 
Mexican citizens if they are individuals, or the majority of capital must be Mexican in 
the case of firms. 
In order that this benefit be reflected in the most critical phase of an indus-
trial project subject to bidding, the agreement stipulates that the Ministry of Finance 
must make its decision in the shortest time possible, but always prior to the bidding. 
This permits the incorporation of the rebate in the estimates. Furthermore, it concedes 
the "maximum tax allowance in force" when introducing into the country the machinery and 
equipment utilized in the implementation of a contract abroad (under the condition that 
this machinery has not benefited from CEDIS and that it is utilized for at least 12 
months). The maximum tax allowance in force today amounts to as much as 100% of the 
import tax and therefore represents an important advantage. Machinery acquired abroad 
can be imported tax free and utilized in other projects (instead of having to be sold in 
the international market for used machinery). 
Clearly, civil and industrial engineering firms are the principal beneficiaries 
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of this incentive. In fact, the instrument was created precisely at the insistence of 
various civil and industrial engineering firms and of the National Association of Engi-
neering Firms (ANFI). At the beginning the possibility of establishing some kind of 
protective mechanism that favoured local firms was considered. But this mechanism turned 
out to be very risky, for it was considered that the demand for engineering services 
might remain unsatisfied. The result was the creation of the Certificates for exporters 
of technology and services (16). 
The instrument is too new to be able to evaluate its effects. However, an impor-
tant conclusion can be advanced. Stimuli of this kind can form an important element in 
the change of strategy that has come about in firms commercializing their technology 
abroad. In the past, the technological developments of national corporations have been 
commercialized on the world level through highly specialized foreign corporations. Such 
is the case with the HYL process of direct reduction of sponge iron. The case of the 
other corporation that is currently commercializing a process - producing paper by 
beginning with waste pulp from sugar cane - is totally different. Indeed, Bufete Indus-
trial has become the exclusive world agent for the Bufete Industrial-Cusi process. The 
CEDIS for exporters of technology (and the additional CEDIS for operations through 
consortia) can in the future encourage this sort of strategic consideration of the com-
mercialization of technology without intermediaries. In fact, 24% of the value of the 
refunds until February 1975 was related to operations realized through a consortium. 
In any case, it is appropriate to question whether these incentives will give 
national engineering firms the capability for basic engineering that is so greatly needed 
from them. The formal incentives consisting of increasing corporate liquidity might have 
less impact than a stimulus consisting of a close linking of these firms with the invest-
ment programs of the public sector. 
BRAZIL 
Export Promotion Instruments 
Export promotion instruments in Brazil are aimed chiefly at the use of idle 
industrial capacity in the country, and thereafter at the promotion of industrial 
development. 
The first incentives created were (a) the new regulation of the "drawback" system, 
which, although set up by the Law of Customs Tariffs of 1957, was only implemented in 
June 1964; (b) exemption from the Industrialized Products Tax in November 1964 (at the 
time, consumption tax), which was only regulated in October 1967; and (c) exemption from 
income tax (deduction from the taxable profit of a portion corresponding to the percent-
age exported), regulated in October 1965. 
The government also created the National Council of Foreign Trade (CONCEX) and 
established a wide system for export financing: in the Brazilian Central Bank, the Fund 
for Export Financing (FINEX) provides the funds with which the Bank of Brazil - through 
the Foreign Trade Department (CACEX) - can finance exports and production for exports, 
as well as other related operations. 
In 1967 the system of incentives was enlarged, with the creation at the Central 
Bank of a special line of refinancing aimed at supporting financing contracts related 
to the production of manufactured goods for export. Moreover, the 1967 Constitution 
itself established the exemption from the Tax on the Circulation of Commodities for all 
exported manufactured products, a disposition that was regulated in 1968. But the 
vulnerable point of the policy of export promotion was still the exchange policy. 
The policy of readjusting the exchange rate at long intervals - usually a large 
readjustment and belated in relation to inflation - was a serious factor creating dis-
couragement and insecurity for the exported goods. Because of that, the adoption in 
August 1968 of the flexible exchange rate (in reality, a system of small devaluations 
at short intervals) can be considered the keystone of the system of incentives to exports. 
It gave the assurance, previously lacking, that exporters would not see their revenues 
deteriorate in real terms on account of a possible exchange overvaluation. And it had 
historical connotations, as exporters were freed from a burden that had inhibited their 
growth for many years and, as a consequence, the growth of Brazilian foreign trade as a 
whole. 
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In the second half of 1969, CACEX consolidated in a single instrument the 
mechanism of financing exports. The system consisted of the following types of operation 
and corresponding financing mechanisms: (1) financing production for exports, comprising 
the productive cycles at short terms and at terms beyond 180 days; (2) financing the 
exports proper, comprising short-term operations and medium- and long-term ones (180 days 
or more); (3) financing by CACEX of exports to be paid by the foreign importers, when 
they in turn have sold the commodities, comprising capital and durable goods; (4) finan-
cing, also by CACEX, of commercial promotion and marketing, comprising market studies 
and analyses, publicity and diffusion, participation in fairs, setting up of representa-
tion abroad, and so on; and (5) financing, still by CACEX, of the sale of services abroad. 
Later on, in April 1971, the Central Bank established that the banks entitled to 
operate with foreign exchange could refinance the export of capital and durable consumer 
goods, as well as the sale of technoeconomic and engineering studies and projects made 
for undertakings abroad, up to the limit of 85% of the value invoiced. CONCEX consoli-
dated and perfected the system of financing by CACEX for the export of manufactured 
products with resources from FINEX; the system comprised two types of operation, each 
with different forms: the financing of exports and the supporting of complementary 
financing. 
In mid-1972 new incentives were created, aimed at attracting investments to 
increase productive capacity for export as well as to constitute exporting commercial 
enterprises. At first the incentives were directed at enterprises producing manufactured 
goods that presented special export programs, under the condition that they abide by 
certain directives. Those incentives consist of the following: 
(1) There is an exemption from import and IPI (industrialized products) taxes, 
up to the limit of one-third of the net value of the annual average export of manufactured 
goods predicted in the enterprise's export program (here it was possible to include 
expenses related to freight and insurance, when paid to national enterprises). In this 
incentive, imported capital goods related to the incentives administrated by the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade (MIC) cannot be included. 
(2) The goods to be imported are not subject to the Law of Similarity (which 
requires a special procedure to import goods when similar ones are produced domestically); 
but these imports should be approved by MIC in the case of capital goods, and by the 
Council of Customs Policy (CPA) in the case of intermediate goods and raw materials. 
(3) Tax benefits not totally used in a certain year can be transferred to 
following years, up to a maximum of 3 years. 
(4) The transfer of the tax credits (IPI and ICM) previously established is 
allowed between enterprises of the same economic group that has presented an export 
program. 
(5) Enterprises are entitled to reduce from their taxable profits the portion 
corresponding to the export of manufactured products equal to the portion of production 
that was exported. 
With the purpose of administrating these new incentives and with the power of 
stating a conclusive opinion about their granting or not, the Commission for the Granting 
of Tax Benefits to Special Export Programs (BEFIEX) was created in late 1972. The 
Commission's conclusive view should be sent to the Finance Minister for him to decide, 
and the same applies to the applications asking for an anticipation of the benefits 
granted. 
The set of measures of incentives to the growth of installed productive capacity 
directed to the export market was further enlarged later on. The government established 
the exemption from the "investigation of similarity" - required by the Law of Similarity 
- for the importation (thus exempted from the import and IPI taxes) of complete industri-
al sets fully working in their countries of origin, under the conditions that (a) once 
brought into Brazil, their production is directed essentially to export and (b) their 
entry into the country is approved by the President of the Republic, advised by the 
Ministers of Finance and of Industry and Trade. 
The evaluation of the industrial set is done by CACEX. The sale in the domestic 
market of an annual portion of the production established before the industrial ensemble 
is imported into the country is allowed only in the extreme cases of nonexistence or 
insufficiency of similar national production or when an exceptional internal or external 
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conjuncture made this sale advisable. It is also stressed that these industrial en-
sembles will benefit from all the tax advantages applicable to the export of manufactures. 
The next most important step was the setting up of incentives to the creation of 
trading companies, although obviously not directly related to the growth of industrial 
production aimed at export. The beneficiaries are intended to be small and medium-sized 
producers, who, on their own, would be the least able to promote the commercialization 
of their products abroad, absorbing all related expenses. The incentives to the fonna-
tion of trading companies were also created late in 1972 and they extended to the 
producer-seller the tax benefits granted by law as incentives to export. The most impor-
tant of these incentives allows the exporting commercial enterprise to deduct from the 
profit subject to income tax an amount equal to the difference between the value of the 
manufactured products bought from producers-sellers and the FOB value in national cur-
rency of the sale of the same products abroad. In March 1973 the government regulated 
the formation of these companies; it established norms about minimum capital, it liber-
ated part of the compulsory deposits of commercial banks with the Central Bank to allow 
them to buy new shares of national exporting commercial enterprises as well as to offer 
the latter the necessary financial support, and it created a special line of rediscount. 
As a conclusion, it seems undeniable that the promotion and diversification of 
exports - by means of a system that successively withdrew the burdens weighing on ex-
ports, subsidized them and finally directly encouraged the growth of productive capacity 
- contributed to the resumption and maintenance of industrial growth in the 1967-1973 
period. At first the utilization of possible margins of idle capacity in industry was 
promoted; some industrial sectors began to grow as a function also of their exports; and 
finally, both because of the increased profitability and as an answer to direct stimuli, 
new investments gave dynamism to the industrial activity geared to exports. 
Export Inspection Law 
The purpose of the Export Inspection Law is the improvement of export products 
and the guarantee of their quality standards. This Law requires that certain designated 
commodities can be exported only after they have been duly inspected and passed by the 
government or private testing laboratories approved by the government. 
The Law specifies the procedures for establishing the type and methods of inspec-
tion for different products. According to the past performance in export and the number 
of claims, it is possible to allow total exemption from inspection or self-inspection at 
the industry. The enterprises with foreign investment exceeding 50% and exporting all 
of their products are also exempt from inspection. The major operational mechanism of 
this Law is the requirement that certain designated commodities can be exported only 
after inspection at the test laboratories. A violation of this clause is punishable by 
law. 
As the Korean industrialization strategy is centred around export promotion, 
the policy instruments discussed earlier under Industrial Programing are also pertinent 
to this section. 
Nontraditional Exports Fund 
Decree-Law 19,625, issued on November 28, 1972, is directed at the industrial 
sector and aimed at financing nontraditional exports, that is, those that have had a 
certain degree of processing and are classified as manufactured goods. It is a legal 
provision ordering the establishment of a special fund for financing those exports, 
administered by the Industrial Bank. The explicit aims of this Fund are: 
-to finance the manufacture of the product for export; 
-to give financing to the buyer; 
-to acquire export reimbursements; 
-to grant special guarantee endorsements, letters of guarantee, bonds; 
-to finance the opening of markets by opening credits; 
-to finance market studies, participation in fairs, publicity, etc. 
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Loans for nontraditional exports rose considerably after the establishment of the 
Fund, going from S/163.2 million in lg71 to S/2,640.5 million in lg73. A large propor-
tion of these loans was concentrated in a small number of products, especially fishing 
vessels. In lg72 these vessels absorbed 6g% of this type of loan and in lg73, 57%. The 
reduction in the total amount of this type of loan in lg74 was due to decreased produc-
tion by the shipyards. No overall evaluation of this recently created instrument is 
available in the Peruvian report. 
ARGENTINA 
Special Credit System to Promote Exports 
Under the control of the Central Bank a special credit system was created in 
Argentina for financing promoted exports with deferred payments. This credit system is 
directed at industrial and mining enterprises that, in the Bank's view, present adequate 
administrative, technical, economical, and financial capacity to produce articles or 
render services that fit the requirements of the international market and have a satis-
factory history as to "seriousness" and "competence." Also, the special credit can be 
addressed to consulting enterprises for technology or for research studies related to 
industrial and mining activities performed with "serious and efficient professional ism." 
This system operates by accepting drafts resulting from sales abroad with 
deferred payments for technical services, research, and studies performed by scientists, 
technicians, or enterprises, or institutions or teams under the direction and responsi-
bility of technicians or scientists residing in the country. 
It is therefore a mechanism that facilitates financial conditions in transactions 
involving the sale of technical services abroad and is entrusted to the banking system. 
It operates in isolation, because there are no other mechanisms through which opportuni-
ties for the export of technical services are searched for or induced. It works only 
ex post facto. 
OTHER MECHANISMS 
The pattern of demand for technology is also influenced by the action taken by 
the relatively large enterprises to foster the development of the smaller industries that 
supply it with inputs and components. A policy instrument of this type was identified 
in India. 
INDIA 
Development of Ancillary Industrial Activities 
In lg6o, a separate Ancillaries Division was created in the Small-Scale Indus-
tries Development Organization (SSIDO); it had the aim of inducing large enterprises to 
subcontract, and it used incentives rather than compulsory measures. SSIDO has organized 
exhibitions and seminars to bring together the large and small units and has arranged 
for special studies in different states to ascertain the scope of development of ancil-
laries. The establishment of a number of industrial estates providing basic infrastruc-
ture and services is also a move in this direction. 
Even though the development of ancillaries involves both public and private 
enterprises as main promoters, during the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the government requested 
the public sector undertakings to take the development of ancillary industries seriously. 
Also, at the time of awarding the licence to produce, the large undertakings are asked 
to spell out the items that they propose to farm out. There are now as many as 10,000 
small-scale units supplying ancillary items, such as components, subassemblies, and 
tooling. In addition, all units set up primarily for the replacement market also fall 
under the ambit of ancillary industries. During lg70-1g71, the value of parts and 
components produced by the ancillary group alone amounted to nearly $50 million, and the 
development of ancillary industries is bound to grow with the development of the economy. 
The government guidelines for the growth and development of ancillary industries 
by public sector enterprises, established in lg71, include, among others, the following 
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provisions: 
(a) A formal resolution should be adopted immediately by the Board of Directors, 
committing the enterprises to a program of developing ancillary industries. 
(b) A full-time officer in the senior management level, not below the rank of a 
deputy general manager, should be appointed as Ancillary Development Officer, whose 
primary responsibility should be the development of ancillary industries. 
(c) Particular lines of production and items of manufacture should be identified 
and earmarked as being of topmost priority, so as to off-load their production to ancil-
lary industries without delay. 
(d) A survey of existing ancillary units should be made and a list of priorities 
for development should be drawn up indicating the new units that need to be set up and 
the improvements that need to be made in existing ones. 
(e) Publicity and propaganda should be undertaken for disseminating information 
on various aspects relating to ancillary development. 
(f) An Ancillary Development Advisory Committee should be constituted to select 
as members entrepreneurs consisting of the Chief Executive of the Enterprise, representa-
tives of the Development Commissioner, Small-Scale Industries, and the Ancillary Develop-
ment Officer of the enterprise. The initiative is, however, to remain with the Develop-
ment Commissioner, Small-Scale Industries. 
(g) The public sector enterprises should take on the responsibility for providing 
technical know-how and managerial guidance. 
(h) The parent enterprise should be responsible for providing to the ancillary 
industry the imported/scarce/critical raw materials, drawings, tooling, process quality 
control equipment, training facilities, and maintenance of equipment, including the 
supply of spares and plant/machinery on sale from its own factory, to the maximum extent 
possible. 
A survey was conducted to evaluate the impact of these provisions. The survey 
identified two distinct patterns: one in which a symbiotic relationship exists between 
the present units and the ancillaries, and the other in which this relationship is 
relatively weak. No doubt, the degree of closeness varies from unit to unit and ancil-
lary to ancillary. But in general it can be concluded that the attitude displayed by the 
public sector undertakings is relatively more positive. In addition to the government 
directive to them for the promotion of ancillaries, the public sector units have also 
not viewed the ancillaries totally as subcontractors. Barring a few companies, most of 
the units in the private sector look at ancillaries purely from an economic angle. 
For the promotion of ancillaries, the large unit should provide the necessary 
help on a continuing basis until such time that the small units are able to stand on 
their own and emerge as independent units. The more positive parent units have estab-
lished liaison calls to maintain day-to-day dialogue with ancillaries besides rendering 
reasonable technical assistance. The linkage has to be strong in the initial phase; the 
large units must try to help the small ones to procure loans from state-run institutions, 
and must also take steps to get some kind of moratorium during a period of recession. 
For example, one parent enterprise covered 50% of the value of rejected raw 
materials of its ancillary enterprises during the first month, 25% during the second, 
and from the third month onward the entrepreneur was expected to take full financial 
responsibilities for the rejections. The assistance rendered has even been extended to 
the maintenance of accounts and ledgers and the drawing up of balance sheets. 
There is a false notion among the ancillaries that their economy in production 
is essentially due to low wages. The high overheads in large enterprises arise from 
expenditures on production planning, production controls, accounting, inventory, general 
administration and a certain loss of productivity on account of a real location of workers 
to different jobs. In the ancillary units, however, the entrepreneur himself takes up 
most of the production planning, controls, and accounting, thereby reducing overheads. 
Because of the repetitive nature of the job, there would also be a saving on loss of 
productivity. Thus, there is no justification for the relatively low wage structure 
that exists in the ancillaries and that has led to the migration of workers from the 
ancillaries to the bigger units. 
At many a critical time, the small units face the problem of procuring imported 
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raw materials and also scarce local inputs. Help rendered by some parent units in assist-
ing the ancillaries to get material of quality in time to meet their orders is a welcome 
feature. However, in the long run, a cooperative venture within the ancillaries for 
material procurement appears to be the right approach. 
Most of the ancillaries could earn a profit of 15% to 25% on their capital from 
their second or third year of operation. Most of the parent units have provisions for 
renegotiating the prices on the supplies from ancillaries. For example, one large parent 
firm has a pricing committee, consisting of the project engineer (ancillary industries) 
and other senior officials, for negotiation and for establishing the rates for various 
categories of orders. The public sector units make 90% payment on delivery, whereas 
ancillaries in the private sector use bill-discounting facilities from the banks. 
The provision of common developmental and testing facilities, exhibition of new 
developments and prototype models, an organized facility to help in the procurement of 
imported materials, the institution of effective entrepreneurial and reorientation courses, 
and incentives for innovation were suggested by entrepreneurs for the promotion of the 
ancillary industries and the small-scale sector in general. In their view, a sure way 
to develop ancillary units is to give them secure orders and help them consolidate in 
manufacturing processes one by one. This would breed confidence and encourage entre-
preneurial talent. 
Eventually, the general emphasis on aid to small-scale industries should be 
switched away from giving preferences, subsidies, and special protections, to measures 
that remove the disabilities of small firms and give them a fair chance to compete. The 
national interest would be best served by the establishment of an organic link between 
the large and small firms, which could lead to the modernization and health of the small-
scale sector. 
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Table l: Programed Investment Per Mexican Employed in 728 
Exemption Applications Under ODDI~ 
Zone I I** Zone III** 
a. Programed Investment (millions of pesos) 
b. Manpower 
c. a/b 
Number of Applications 
*Figures until September 1975. 









Table 2: Industrial Production by Priorities 1970-1975. 
1970 1972 
21. 2 22.3 
1975* 











Table 3: Production of the 200 Largest Manufacturing Firms 
(percentage of the gross annual production 




Second Priority 53 .0 
Third Priority 5.8 













Table 4: Composition of the Publ1c Gross F1xed Investment (GFI) by Sectors. 
(in percentages) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976* 1977** 
Agriculture 7.2 6.0 7.7 7.6 l 0.2 14.3 15. 9 15. 5 13.3 12.5 
Fish1ng 1.4 1.4 3. l 1.5 6.7 2.7 1.2 3. l 
Mining l. 3 0.7 0.3 1.9 2.5 5.8 8.8 7.5 5.7 11.5 
Oil 2.3 6. l 6. l lo. 9 8.1 20. l 17.9 43.5 38.0 14.6 
Electricity 11.3 12.4 l 5. l 16.8 16. 0 11. 7 5. l 4.4 5.9 11.9 
..... Industry 2.5 2.8 4.2 1.7 2.2 2.6 4.2 4.9 10.8 7. l 
"' Building 13. 7 8.3 11.2 5.3 7.6 4.5 3.9 1.6 0.1 3.2 
Transport & Communicat1ons 40.2 25.3 35. 7 17.2 15.8 13. l 14.4 7.6 9.6 18.5 
Education & Health 6.2 6.4 6. l 3.9 6. l 5. l 5.5 3.6 6.7 9.2 
Other 15.2 13.0 12.3 33.3 28.4 21. l 17.5 5.4 7.9 8.4 
Public GFI: 
Total GFI 30. l 35. l 37.7 33.7 38.4 39.6 45.5 47. l 4.7 S.D. 
* INP Estimate 
**Calculated 1n November 1976 
Source: Datos INP 
Table 5: Ratio Between Gross Production Value (GPV) and Employment 





Basic Industrial Inputs 
Traditional Exports 
Nontraditional Exports 








Employment in number of people. 
Table 6: Private and State-Owned Companies According to Their Partic1pation 
in Technological Research Projects Authorized by ITINTEC in 1975. 
State Companies 
A. Cement Industry 
- Cementos Lima 
- Cementa Andina 
B. Paper Industry 
- Paramonga, TRUPAL, San Marti, Cartavio 
- Paramonga, TRUPAL, San Marti, Cartavio 
C. Other Industries 
State Sub-Total 
II Private Companies 
Private Sub-Total* 
III Total Industrial Sector 






Value of the Project 

















*Includes S/100,000 for a project at Papeles Especiales S.A., a private company. 
Source: ITINTEC, Pr1ncipal aspects of ITINTEC activities related to technology 
research and transferring technology 1971-1975, April 1976. 
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Table 7: Private and State-Owned Companies According to Their 
Participation in Technological Research Projects Authorized 
by ITINTEC in 1974. 
Date of Agreement Value of Project 
S I 000 % 
State Companies 
A. Cement Industries 




C. Other Industries 
State Sub-Total 
II Private Companies 
A. Paper Industries 
- I.P. Atlas S.A. 
8. Other Industries 
Private Sub-Total 























l 00. 0 
Source: ITINTEC, Principal aspects of ITINTEC activities related to tech-
nology research and transferring technology 1971-1975, April 1976. 
Paper Industry 
Table 8: Contribution to ITINTEC of the Most Important 
State-Owned Companies in the Industrial Sector. 
(2% of their net income) (1974)* 
s 000 
14, 865 
Cement Industry 7,633 







Total 43,251 l 00 
*The calculation only includes companies with majority state ownership: thus the 
contribution of Bayer Industrial was not included (S/5,956,000). 
Source: MIT, OSP. 
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Table 9: Paper Industry: Sources of Raw Materials for 1970. 
Raw Material 
Imported 
- bleached chemical pulp 
- unbleached chemical pulp 
- chips 
- mechanical wood pulp 
Total Imported 
National 





Source: MIT, OSP 
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% of Quantity 
8.8 





























( 1 O) 






CEPAL-NAFINSA, La politica industrial en el desarrollo econ6mico de Mexico, CEPAL/ 
MEM/71/11/Rev. 1, August 1971. 
CEPAL-NAFINSA, op. cit., p. 93. 
The basic industries were those that produced raw materials, capital goods, and 
equipment (they could receive tax exemptions for up to 10 years); the semibasic 
industries were those that produced goods that directly provided vital necessities 
of the population, tools, scientific instruments, or intermediate inputs (they 
could receive tax exemptions for up to 7 years); the secondary industries were 
defined by exclusion (and could receive tax exemptions for up to 5 years). 
Other incentives are also granted to enterprises with some capital up to 5 million 
pesos: technical assessment for the attainment of credit, preinvestment and 
feasibility studies, process and machinery selection and acquisition. 
The question is valid concerning the functioning of various instruments: fiscal 
incentives, the fiscal treatment of expenditures on R&D, etc. Regarding the con-
tribution of transnational enterprises to local technological development, see 
the section on policy instruments for the regulation of technology imports. 
In the case of the authorization for accelerated depreciation of the assets of the 
enterprise, DODI may induce speculation with the replacement of machine tools. See 
the section concerning the coefficients for the depreciation of fixed assets. 
See the Annual Report of the Bank of Mexico for 1970 and 1975 (Statistical Appendix). 
The concept of industrial production includes mining and the energy sector. For a 
discussion of the decision-making process in monetary policy in Mexico, see 
Carlos Bazdresch, La polftica monetaria mexicana, in Demograf1a y econom1a, No. 21, 
Vol. VII, 1973. 
S. Barrio, The role of banks in the commercialization of technology, STPI Team 
Report, CONICYT, June 1976. 
Charles Cooper and Phillip Maxwell, Machinery suppliers and the transfer of tech-
nology to Latin America, Sussex University, Science Policy Research Unit, 1975. 
F. Sagasti, El financiamiento industrial como instrumento de pol1tica technol6gica: 
un caso estudio peruano, El Trimestre Econ6mico, Vol. XLV, No. 178, April-June 
1978, pp. 401-441. 
See ITINTEC, Principal aspects of ITINTEC activities related to technology research 
and transferring technology 1971-1975, April 1976. 
Regulations regarding R&D expenditures are examined in Module 8. 
See La questi6n de las remesas por asistencia tecnica, in Comercio Exterior, 
Secci6n Nacional, December 1969. 
This situation could change in the near future. In the Fiscal Reform Project one 
of the principal justifications given is the necessity of countering the insuffi-
ciency of public revenue and its marked dependence on oil revenue. 
It is worth clarifying that in the jurisprudence of the Venezuelan tax system, the 
expressions "exemption" and "exoneration" are not in any way synonymous. "Exemp-
tion .... is a right, a privilege which emanates directly from the law. Exoneration 
on the other hand is no more than an occasional benefit which can be conceded or 
withheld by the National Executive in accordance with its own criteria. The con-
sequences of the difference between the two categories of exclusion from taxation 
are very important .... The beneficiary of the right to exemption can only be denied 
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this right on reasoned grounds, since the right to exemption can be the object of 
a judicial claim by he who believes he holds it .... On the other hand, he who 
aspires to exoneration has to submit himself to the discretionary will of the 
National Executive." (Junta of Appeals, Sentence No. 497, 8-6-55). 
(16) For a more detailed analysis of the impact of this and other instruments of the 
policy on engineering, see A. Nadal and M. Gonzalez Felipe, Las firmas de 













INSTITUTES AND C UNTRIES PARTICIPATING 
IN THE STPI PROJECT 
Secretaria Ejecutiva del Consejo Latinoamericano de 
Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) 
Country Coordinator: Eduardo Amadeo 
Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP) 
Country Coordinator: Fabio Erber (until September 1974) 
and Jose Tavares 
Fonda Colombiano de Investigaciones Cientificas y 
Proyectos Especiales "Francisco Jose de Caldas" 
(COLCIENCIAS) 
Country Coordinator: Fernando Chaparro 
Academy of Scientific Research and Technology 
Country Coordinator: Adel Sabet (until July 1975) and 
Ahmed Gamal Abdel Samie 
National Committee on Science and Technology 
Country Coordinator: Anil Malhotra (until June 1975) 
and S.K. Subramanian (until March 1976) 
The Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS) 
Country Coordinator: KunMo Chung 
El Colegio de Mexico 
Country Coordinator: Alejandro Nadal 
Instituto Nacional de Planificacion (INP) 
Country Coordinator: Enrique Estremadoyro (until 
February 1975) and Fernando Otero 
Technical Directors: Fernando Gonzales Vigil (until 
February 1975) and Roberto Wangeman 
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y 
Tecnologicas (CONICIT) 
Country Coordinator: Dulce de Uzcategui (until July 
1974) and Ignacio Avalos 
Faculty of Economics, University of Skopje 
Country Coordinator: Nikola Kljusev 
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Appendix 2 
SURVEY OF THE COUNTRY TEAM'S WORK 
The organization, composition, and orientation of each of the country teams 
reflected the own interests and those of the institutions that hosted them, always 
within the framework of the STPI project concerns. A brief review of the approach and 
the work of each tertm may help to place the STPI project and the comparative reports 
in perspective. To complete the survey, a description of the field coordinator's of-
fice work is given. 
ARGENTINA: The initial location for the Argentine team was the Department of Econom-
ics of the Catholic University. However, after some months, the university decided 
to withdraw its application and the country coordinator moved to the Argentine branch 
of the executive secretariat of the Latin American Social Science Council (CLACSO). The 
team was headed by Eduardo Amadeo, an economist, and two other members were appointed 
to work full time on the project. An advisory committee of several researchers and 
policymakers active in science and technology policy was formed. To carry out the re-
search, the team relied on consultants who wrote reports on specific subjects that were 
integrated into a final report. 
A significant change took place when the country coordinator was named 
president of the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Industrial (INTI), the national 
industrial technology institute, which is the largest and most important industrial re-
search organization in Argentina. Mr Amadeo never relinquished his formal role as co-
ordinator; after 6 months, he left his new post and resumed his position as country co-
ordinator. Because most of the work was well under way, his absence did not substan-
tially alter the team's pace, although the preparation of the Argentine synthesis report 
was postponed. Part of the team's work was reoriented to be most useful to the co-
ordinator in his new position. 
The Argentines focused on two branches of industry - machine tools and petro-
chemicals - but studied many broader issues. For instance, the reports include a docu-
ment on the technological content of the 3-year development plan (1974-77), a study of 
the Argentine industrial structure, a description and brief analysis of technology pol-
icy instruments in Argentina, a study of the system for regulating technology imports, 
and several short reports on international technical assistance as an instrument of tech-
nology policy. 
The structure of the Argentine scientific and technological system was studied 
in detail, as were the conditions under which it could be made more responsive to 
industry's needs. The Argentines covered the public sector, examining the possible role 
of the public sector as promoter of scientific and technological development. Detailed 
studies were carried out at two enterprises: one in charge of generating electricity 
in Buenos Aires (SEGBA) and the other in charge of generating and distributing gas for 
household and industrial consumption. Other contributions of the Argentine team were 
a study of the emergence and development of engineering and consulting firms in the 
chemical process industries, a detailed analysis of two research centres within the 
national industrial technology institute (INTI), and two short papers on capital accumu-
lation and on the crisis of capitalism. 
The Argentine team followed the methods guidelines; however, they produced a 
series of thematic reports on issues of actual and potential interest to policymakers 
in the country, coinciding with the themes selected for study in STPI. 
BRAZIL: The Brazilian team was hosted at the research group of the Financiadora de 
Estudos e Projetos (FINEP), the state agency in charge of financing studies for invest-
ment projects and also the executive arm of the national fund for scientific and tech-
nological development. The first coordinator was the director of the research group, 
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Fabio Erber. When he took a leave of absence from FINEP in September 1974, he was 
replaced by Jose Tavares, the new head of the research group. The group at FINEP had 
been carrying out research on science and technology policy for some time, and the STPI 
assignment was one of its tasks for 1973-76. Practically all of the work was done by 
members of the FINEP research group, although two or three reports were contracted to 
professionals outside FINEP. 
From the beginning, the Brazilians decided to concentrate on the role of state 
enterprises in technology policy. They chose branches of industry that were dominated 
by state enterprises (oil and petrochemicals, steel, and electricity), conducting de-
tailed interviews, analyzing existing data, and testing hypotheses systematically to 
cover issues such as the selection of equipment and processes, the purchase of 
engineering services, the performance of research and development, and the planning 
activities at these state enterprises. 
In addition to the new material generated by the Brazilian team during STPI, 
several reports based on past research carried out by FINEP were made available to the 
STPI network. These included background reports on the organization and structure of 
the Brazilian science and technology system, a study on the machine tool industry, a 
report on the demand for services of 12 research institutes, and a background report on 
industrial policies in Brazil during the last 2 decades. 
In parallel with the work for STPI, the FINEP team was also engaged in a re-
search project on the diffusion of technical innovations in three industrial branches 
{pulp and paper, cement, and textiles) and they agreed to put their results at the 
disposal of the STPI network as an additional contribution. 
The Brazilian team used the guidelines only as a general reference, given that 
most of their work went along different lines from those originally envisaged for the 
project. Nevertheless, the richness and variety of their material effectively upgraded 
the comparative reports. 
COLOMBIA: No Colombian participant was present at the initial organizing meeting, and 
the Colombian application to join the STPI network was received later and formally 
accepted at the Rio meeting of the coordinating committee. The team was hosted by the 
Colombian Council for Science and Technology, COLCIENCIAS, and was headed by a sociolog-
ist, Fernando Chaparro. In spite of joining the STPI network late, the Colombian team 
caught up with the pace of work and finished all its work by the deadline. 
COLCIENCIAS organized a special team with five members who devoted practically 
all their time to research in STPI. Several other consultants were also asked to pre-
pare reports on issues of specific interest such as selected policy instruments. For 
example, a study was commissioned on the impact of tariff mechanisms; a report was pre-
pared on the influence of price controls; and a preliminary analysis of the possible 
use of the state's purchasing power as an instrument of technology policy was also pre-
pared. The branches chosen for study were all linked to agriculture: fertilizers and 
pesticides, agricultural machinery, and food processing, taking into consideration the 
interests of Colombian policymakers as perceived by the team. In these branch studies, 
the methods guidelines were closely followed. 
Other reports prepared by the Colombian team include a study of science and 
technology planning, an analysis of implicit industrial technology policies, a conceptual 
framework for the study of consulting and engineering organizations, a series of reports 
on industrial branches based on discussions with panels of experts, a study of science 
and technology policies in the agricultural sector (to complement the analysis done for 
industry), and two essays on the process of industrialization in Colombia and its techno-
logical implications. 
Five groups of policy instruments were studied in detail, and their impact on 
each branch was examined through interviews at various enterprises. All of the findings 
were integrated into the final report of the Colombian team. 
EGYPT: Although an Egyptian representative participated in the initial deliberations 
leading to the STPI project, it was not possible to organize the team to carry out 
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research and prepare inputs for the international comparison. There were several admin-
istrative difficulties and staffing problems that prevented the organization of a work-
ing team. The host institution was the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology 
and the first coordinator was Adel Sabet, who was replaced by Gamal A. Samie in July 
1975. The Egyptian team presented papers that were personal contributions based on 
past experience rather than the result of research carried out by a team; and research 
was not begun at the academy until the second half of 1976. 
INDIA: The host organization in India was the National Committee on Science and Tech-
nology, and the first coordinator was Anil Malhotra, who was replaced in June 1975 by 
S.K. Subramanian. Mr Subramanian resigned in March 1976, and no one replaced him. No 
funds were requested to set up a country team in India, and the Indians provided back-
ground material that had already been collected as background for a new science and tech~ 
nology plan. 
Three background documents were distributed along with the final S & T plan to 
all the teams in STPI. In addition, a report on foreign collaboration, a note on 
science and technology planning in India, a survey of engineering consultancy services, 
a report on the development of the electronics industry, and two papers on small-scale 
industries and technology transfer were distributed by the Indian coordinator. No em-
pirical research was done following the methods guidelines, and the Indian contribution 
to the comparative reports reflects this. 
SOUTH KOREA: The South Korean team was one of the first to be organized and was esta-
1 i shed at the Korean Advanced Institute of Science, KAIS, as part of the activities of 
its science, technology, and society program. KunMo Chung was named country coordinator 
and the team consisted of five other members. All but one of them had other academic 
duties and could allocate only a portion of their time to STPI research. Then, Graham 
Jones was hired to advise in the preparation of the report for phase l. 
The South Korean team advanced rapidly and completed its work in time for the 
Sussex workshop, following the methods guidelines and introducing modifications only 
where necessary. Two reports were produced corresponding to the requirements for phases 
l and 2 of the project. 
The branches chosen for study were electronics, petrochemicals, and powder 
metallurgy, and a report was prepared for each one. In addition, the team prepared 
documents on engineering services and industrialization in South Korea, on the Korean 
Institute of Science and Technology, on transfer of technology in the electronics indus-
try, on the interface between the science and technology plan and the economic develop-
ment plan, and on state enterprises in technical development. 
Although most of the work was done by the team located at KAIS, consultants 
were asked to deal with specifics. The team predominantly represented engineering and 
physical sciences. but an economist who was a senior government official, helped to 
relate the results to South Korean policymakers and to balance the other team members' 
biases. 
MEXICO: The Mexican team was among the first to start working in STPI and was located 
ar-rr-colegio de Mexico, an academic and social research and graduate training organiza-
tion. Alejandro Nadal was country coordinator and there were four other members of the 
team who worked full time on STPI. The Mexican team initially followed the guidelines 
rather closely and was one of the first in suggesting modifications and changes as a 
result of contrasting concepts with preliminary research findings. In particular, the 
team found it difficult to interpret the results of interviews in enterprises using the 
schema proposed to study technological behaviour. The branches chosen for detailed 
study were capital goods. food processing, and petrochemicals. 
A background report on the structure and evolution of the Mexican scientific 
and technological system was prepared, together with a description of the industrial-
ization process and of agricultural development. Documents on particular subjects 
included a report on engineering firms, a study of the technology policy of PEMEX (the 
state oil monopoly), and progress reports dealing with hypotheses on the impact of policy 
instruments on technical behaviour at the enterprise level, a description of policy ins-
truments in Mexico, etc. 
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Most of the findings of the Mexican team were integrated into the main final 
report, part of which was delivered at the coordinating committee in New Delhi (January 
1976) and the rest at the Sussex workshop (June 1976). The work of the Mexican team 
covered practically all the research topics considered in STPI, and its contribution 
to the comparative report reflects this. The Mexican report was published in Spanish 
in 1977 and was awarded second prize in a contest for the best works in economics. 
For various reasons, the Mexican team chose to limit its direct interaction 
with policymakers and followed its own research program. Results were made available 
to policymakers in the form of draft reports, and through the participation of the coor-
dinator in one of the committees established to prepare the Mexican plan for science 
and technology. 
PERU: The Peruvian team was established within the research group of the National 
Planning Institute. A series of administrative difficulties affected the progress of 
the team, including a change of technical director, when Fernando Gonzales Vigil was 
replaced by Roberto Wangeman in February 1975. Approximately two-thirds of the research 
was completed in time for the Sussex workshop. 
From the beginning, the team decided to adopt a sectorial approach to the re-
search. Efforts were focused on the study of industrial branches connected with the 
extraction and processing of minerals and with the provision of machinery for the mining 
industry. The steel industry was also studied, with emphasis on the state enterprise 
in charge of the largest steelworks. This meant that the guidelines were used primarily 
in sectorial studies and in the analysis of policy instruments. 
Background reports on the situation of the scientific and technological system 
and on the evolution of Peruvian industry were prepared following the general framework 
put forward in the guidelines. In addition to these and the sectorial reports, the team 
prepared other documents, dealing with issues such as explicit and implicit science and 
technology policies, consulting and engineering capabilities, the possible use of state 
enterprises as instruments of technology, and the governement administrative machinery 
for science and technology policy. 
The Peruvian team was located within an official government organization, but 
its direct impact on policymaking is difficult to assess because it took the form of 
daily contact with government officials. On the basis of the sectorial reports on mining, 
a committee has been set up to review the findings of the STPI team. 
VENEZUELA: The Venezuelan team was hosted by the national council of science and tech-
nology (CONICIT) and was among the first to start working. The team was initially 
dominated by sociologists, although economists increased their participation at later 
stages. The first coordinator, Dulce de Uzcategui, was replaced by Luis Matos, who was 
soon followed by Ignacio Avalos. Three other members worked full time, and the team 
was biased toward sociology and economics. 
They progressed through two stages punctuated by a change in government. In 
the first stage, most of the background reports corresponding to phases l and 2 of the 
STPI methods were prepared, covering the science and technology, the political, the 
educational, and the economic systems. These reports were made obsolete by the change 
in government. In the second stage, the team tried to adjust to the new situation, 
repeating some of the earlier studies and continuing the research. However, the orga-
nization of a national congress on science and technology, which mobilized all the 
staff working at CONICIT, affected the team's progress. 
The branches chosen for study were capital goods, electronics, and petrochemi-
cals. In addition, reports were written on specific issues such as the governement 
organizational structure for science and technology policy, instruments for industrial 
science and technology policy, economic and financial policy instruments and their im-
pact on technology, the purchase of capital goods in two industrial branches, and the 
relations between the financial system and technology policy. The Venezuelan team 
concluded its research shortly after the Sussex workshop. 
The fact that the Venezuelan team was located in a government agency that took 
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a very active role in science and technology policy after the change in government 
created both opportunities and problems. As a result of the new tasks undertaken by 
CONICIT, the pace and continuity of the STPI work was frequently altered. On the other 
hand, there was more possibility for actively contributing to policymaking. The Vene-
zuelan contribution to the comparative reports reflects this situation. 
YUGOSLAVIA (MACEDONIA): The Macedonian team was organized at the faculty of economics 
of the University of Skopje. A senior faculty member, Nikola Kljusev, was appointed 
coordinator. The team was composed of a very large number of faculty members and re-
searchers who devoted part of their time to STPI. The tasks were subdivided and indi-
vidual reports requested from various members of the team, although at a later stage 
two team members were asked to work full time on STPI. 
The Macedonian team did not follow the guidelines, except in the preparation 
of a background report for phase 1. Individual reports were submitted on issues of 
interest to the STPI network, covering topics such as the problems of research and 
development in industrial enterprises, aspects of science and technology policy in Yu-
goslavia, the metallurgical industry in Macedonia, and the growth of engineering firms 
in Yugoslavia. 
The Macedonian team's specificity is reflected in their relatively limited 
contribution to the comparative reports. At any rate, given the high degree of partic-
ipation of professionals at all levels in policymaking in the Yugoslav self-managed 
economy, it is rather difficult to assess their contribution toward policymaking in 
conventional terms. 
THE FIELD COORDINATOR'S OFFICE: In August 1973, at the first meeting of the coordi-
nating committee, Francisco Sagasti was appointed field coordinator of the project and 
his office was established shortly thereafter and began operating in a limited way. 
Staffing was completed in April 1974 with the addition of two members. 
The field coordinator's office was independent from the teams and was not 
engaged directly in empirical research. It offered organizational and technical support 
and contracted consultants to prepare reports on topics defined by the coordinating 
committee. 
The field coordinator, first, drew up methods guidelines for phases 1 and 2 
of the project. Background reports on technology policy in China, on technological 
dependence/self-reliance, on science and technology planning, on technology policies in 
Japan, and on technology transfer were also prepared, either by staff members of the 
field coordinator's office or by consultants. The guidelines for phases 3 and 4 of the 
project were prepared jointly by the field coordinator and a consultant. The office 
also organized the Sussex workshop and drafted the comparative reports. The field coor-
dinator was also active in the board of the Peruvian Industrial Technology Institute 
(ITINTEC). 
With the exception of the teams that were engaged in science and technology 
policy research as part of the activities of their institutions (the Brazilian and 
South Korean teams, for example), the teams were dismantled after the STPI project was 
completed. The field coordinator's office was closed in December 1976, and the compara-
tive reports were prepared during 1977-1978, although some teams had not finished their 
work by April 1978. Even though most teams had concluded their STPI activities by the 
end of 1977, this does not mean that the team members left the field of S & T policy 
research and that their effort in STPI was not followed up. What was dismantled, as 
planned from the beginning, was the formal structure of the STPI project. The network 
of personal contacts remains in operation and most of the former team members are active 
in the field of science and technology policy, carrying the experience accumulated in 
STPI to their new positions. 
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Key to STPI Publications 
A GUIDE TO THE 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
(STPI) PUBLICATIONS 
A. Primary Publications 
(I) The Science and Technology Policy Instruments (STPI) Project (IDRC-050e) (out of print) 
(2) Science and Technology Policy Implementation in Less-Developed Countries: Methodological Guidelines 
for the STPI Project (IDRC--067 e) (out of print) 
(3) Science and Technology for Development Main Comparative Report of the STPI Project (IDRC-109e). 
(Also available in French (IDRC-109t) and Spanish (IDRC-109s).) 
(4) Science and Technology for Development Planning in STPI Countries (IDRC-133e) 
(5) Science and Technology for Development Technology Policy and Industrialization in the People's Republic 
of China (IDRC-I 30e) 
B. Modules 
These constitute the third part of(3) above and provide supporting material for the findings described and the 
assertions made in ( 3 ). 
(6) STPI Module I: A Review of Schools of Thought on Science, Technology, Development, and Technical 
Change (IDRC-TSI Se) 
(7) STPI Module 2: The Evolution oflndustry in STPI Countries (IDRC-TSI 9e) 
(8) STPI Module 3: The Evolution of Science and Technology in STPI Countries (IDRC- TS20e) 
(9) STPI Module 4: The Present Situation of Science and Technology in the STPI Countries (IDRC. TS22e) 
(IO) STPI Module 5: Policy Instruments to Build up an Infrastructure for the Generation ofTechnology(IDRC-
TS26e) 
(11) STPI Module 6: Policy Instruments for the Regulation of Technology Imports (IDRC-TS33e) 
(12) STPI Module 7: Policy Instruments to Define the Pattern of Demand for Technology (IDRC-TS27e) 
(13) STPI Module 8: Policy Instruments to Promote the Performance of S and T Activities in Industrial 
Enterprises (IDRC. TS28e) 
(14) STPI Module 9: Policy Instruments for the Support of Industrial Science and Technology Activities 
(IDRC-TS29e) 
(15) STPI Module I 0: Technical Changes in Industrial Branches (IDRC-TS3 I e) 
( 16) STPI Module 11: Technology Behaviour of Industrial Enterprises (IDRC-TS32e) 
( 17) STPI Module 12: Case Studies on Technical Change (IDRC-TS34e) 
C. Selections 
These are a selection of the numerous reports prepared for the STPI Project chosen as a representative sample of 
the various topics covered by the STPI Project in the course of the main research effort on policy design and 
implementation 
Science and Technology for Development A Selection of Background Papers for the Main Comparative Report 
(18) Part A: Science and Technology Policy and Development (IDRC-MR21) 
(19) Part B: Consulting and Design Engineering Capabilities in Developing Countries (IDRC-MR22) 
(20) Part C: Technology Transfer in Developing Countries (IDRC-MR23) 
(21) Part D: State Enterprises and Technological Development (IDRC-MR24) 
D. Background Papers 
(22) El INTI y el Desarrollo Tecnologico en la Industria Argentina (In press) 
(23) El Sector Maquinas Herramientas en la Argentina (In press) 
(24) Los lnstrumentos de Politica Cientifica y Tecnologica en Argentina (In press) 
(25) The Brazilian Machine-Tool Industry: Patterns of Technological Transfer and the Role of the Government 
(In press) 
(26) Roi de las Bancos en la Comercializacion de Tecnologia (In press) 
(27) Comportamiento Tecnologico de las Empresas Mixtas en la Industria Petroquimica (In press) 
(28) Interrelacion Entre la Variable Tecnologica y las Variables Horizontales: Comercio Exterior, Financia-
miento e Inversion (In press) 
(29) A Planned Approach for the Growth of the Electronics Industry - A Case Study for India (In press) 
E. Country Reports 
(30) Instruments of Science and Technology Policy in Mexico (In press) 
(31) Technology and Industrial Development in Korea (In press) 
(32) Los Instrumentos de Politica Cientifica y Tecnologica en el Peru: Sintesis Final (In press) 
(33) STPI Country Report for Colombia (In press) 

